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This thesis examines the Karabagh conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia and 
its implications on the Caucasus regional security in general and Turkey’s role in 
particular.  It investigates the causes of the conflict from a theoretical, historical and 
practical view and evaluates the role of the various international actors in the conflict. 
This thesis also traces the role of oil and oil politics in resolving the conflict and 
contrarily examines how the conflict affects the development of the oil in the Caucasus 
region. This study concludes that the Karabagh conflict and the ensuing events eroded the 
Turkish role in the Caucasus and created a situation prone to instability and renewed 
violence. This study provides specific recommendations for Turkish foreign policy 
makers to enhance the stability in the region without sacrificing Turkish interests. 
Recommendations include increased relations and engagement with Iran and Russia and 
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The Karabagh conflict appeared in the media in the early 1990s, but it was 
eclipsed by the unexpected events leading to the collapse of the Soviet Union. The 
conflict also did not receive enough attention because the international community was 
embroiled in the catastrophic events in another artificial constellation, the former 
Yugoslavia. However, despite the attention the Karabagh conflict deserved, it had 
important effects on the collapse of the Soviet Empire, on the policies of the regional 
powers, and on the region’s stability.   
The Karabagh conflict was the last link in the events between Armenians and 
Azeris initiated with the Tsarist Russian conquest of the region. A variety of reasons 
caused the conflict, but manipulation, foreign meddling, and ensuing extremism further 
exacerbated the conflict.  
Since the first armed conflict in 1905, Azeris and Armenians started to clash with 
each other wherever and whenever an opportunity arose, especially when the central 
authority that contained the hostilities weakened. Such an opportunity was Gorbachev’s 
Glasnost (openness) campaigns, which afforded the radicals the necessary opportunity to 
mobilize respective ethnic communities in the “hostile mirror image” of each other. As 
soon as the Soviet Union collapsed, an undeclared war erupted over the control of an 
enclave belonging to Azerbaijan but populated mainly by ethnic Armenians. The struggle 
between these two newly independent states, Azerbaijan and Armenia, ended with the 
ultimate humiliation and defeat of the more populous and seemingly stronger state, 
Azerbaijan.  The cease-fire concluded in 1994 confirmed the Armenian victory over 
Azerbaijan, resulting in one million Azeri refugees and 20 percent of the Azeri territory 
occupied by ethnic Armenian forces. Parties to the conflict are still negotiating under the 
aegis of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), although a 
solution seems elusive. 
Armenia enjoys good relations with three of the four important powers relevant to 
the conflict, Russia, Iran and the United States, and it has the support of its well-
organized Diaspora communities in important Western countries. Through this influence, 
 xiv 
Armenia managed to defeat its adversary and to capture Azerbaijani territory without 
being labeled the aggressor. Armenia also avoided any sanctions that would normally be 
imposed on aggressors.  
Azerbaijan, on the other hand, found little support from the International 
community except its ethnic cousin, Turkey. Azerbaijan is currently trying to use its oil 
reserves to compensate for its deficiency in friends.  Yet, oil in the region complicates the 
situation. Given the high stakes in oil, the regional states pursue their interests more 
aggressively, anticipating a share of the prospective oil wealth. As nations fiercely 
compete over the routes for the oil pipelines that are needed to transfer the oil from the 
land-locked Caspian basin, the region’s stability is in peril. Paradoxically, the success of 
the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline depends heavily on stability. The strategic considerations of an 
oil- rich Azerbaijan, namely, using the oil money to build up its military to regain its lost 
territories, and the probable Armenian reaction to this military buildup seriously imperil 
the security and stability in the South Caucasus.  
The Karabagh War and the ensuing policies of the relevant players in the conflict 
influenced the regional security. Turkish policies in the conflict also eroded Turkish 
credibility in the region. The Turkish leadership realized that their ability to form policies 
independent of other regional powers was not plausible in light of its limited resources 
and capabilities. As a result, assessing its capabilities realistically, Turkey moderated its 
formerly ambitious rhetoric and policies in the region. 




 The Karabagh Conflict was the first and the longest armed ethnic clash to arise 
during the collapse of the Soviet Union. It raised great concerns about the resurgence of 
ethno-nationalism and interethnic violence, which had previously been somewhat 
contained and suppressed under the cloak of communism. The ensuing conflict resulted 
in a war between the Republic of Azerbaijan, Armenia and the self-declared Nagorno 
Karabagh Republic over the control of the Nagorno Karabagh Autonomous Region.1 
This area had been the source of conflict between Armenians and Azerbaijanis for almost 
a century. Although that region was within Azerbaijan, Armenians constituted a majority 
in the area.  
The recent conflict can be regarded as the last of the events between the 
Armenians and Azerbaijanis, which was initiated with Russia’s conquest of the Caucasus. 
After the Russian conquest, inter-ethnic violence, forced expulsions and widespread 
atrocities had ravaged Karabagh and the Caucasus in general. Clearly, Soviet rule brought 
several decades of peace and security to the area. However, the resurgence of the 
Karabagh conflict again, despite the communist indoctrination and state repression for 
decades, showed that ethnic sentiments and extremism were resistant to any ideology or 
time.  
   The conflict constituted the first stress test for the Turkish bid to gain a 
dominant role in the region.  With the Soviet Union’s collapse, Turkey faced some 
challenges and saw an opportunity to increase its influence in Central Asia and the 
Caucasus region.  The Cold War was over and Turkey’s aid to contain the Soviet Union 
was no longer needed. Turkey’s diminished strategic importance in the eyes of its Cold 
War allies partly motivated it to increase relations with other Turkic states, for Turkey 
                                                 
1 Although the Republic of Armenia refused that it was a party to the war, its role in the conflict is well 
documented by’s Helsinki Human Rights Watch publication: “Azerbaijan: Seven Years of Conflict in 
Nagorno-Karabagh” pp 67-73. It says, “ As a matter of law, Armenian troop involvement in Azerbaijan 
makes Armenia a party to the conflict and makes the war an international armed conflict, as between the 
government of Armenia and Azerbaijan.” Charter of Paris for a New Europe in 1990 also confirms that 
Armenia is involved as it says, “ Armenia violates the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan by sending armed 
forces into Karabagh. Such use of forces is illegal unless authorized by U.N Security Council” Cornell, 
Svante, “Undeclared War: The Nagorno-Karabagh Conflict Reconsidered” in The Journal of South Asian 
and Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. XX, No. 4, summer 1997.  
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shared ethnic and cultural ties with five of the newly independent former Soviet States. 
As a result of this perceived affinity, Turkey tried to gain a more dominant role in the 
region. Other than Turkey’s decreased strategic importance in the Western camp, various 
factors increased Turkish interest in its newly found cousins. The resurgence of Turkish 
nationalism, which had developed as a reaction to the separatist Kurdish Terrorism in 
Southeastern Turkey since the late 1980s, was one of these factors. Turkey’s isolation 
and perceived harassments at the hands of its former European allies regarding its human 
rights record was another factor. Its sense of exclusion from the rest of the Muslim world 
was also among the concerns. As a result, Turkey sought to increase relations with these 
culturally and ethnically similar states to overcome its isolation and sense of insecurity.  
Great expectations were articulated by some prominent political figures, foreseeing a 
loose constellation of friendly states, a “Turkish world,” extending from the Adriatic to 
the Great Wall of China. Hopes that the 21st century would be a Turkish century were 
also prevalent.   
After the Soviet Union collapsed, Turkey elicited Western and U.S support to 
promote its model of development to these Turkic states of Central Asia and the 
Caucasus. Containing the Iranian influence was one of the West’s motives behind this 
support.  The Islamic version of development promoted by Iran was not favored by the 
United States or other Western states. However, the breakout of the Karabagh conflict put 
Turkey in a precarious position. Turkey did not want to sacrifice its relations with 
Armenia in light of strong Pro-Armenian public opinion in Western countries, which had 
supported the Turkish model. Nevertheless, Turkey also risked losing its prestige and 
dreams of an undeclared leadership in the Turkic world if it failed to help its ethnic kin in 
Azerbaijan.  Public opinion in Turkey also concerned the Turkish government of the 
time.  Public outrage was swelling, as the news of massacres in Karabagh and refugee 
flows began to fill the television screens.  Opposition parties were pressuring the Turkish 
government to side openly with Azerbaijan or even to intervene on its behalf. After an 
initial hesitation, Turkey started supporting Azerbaijan, although refraining from a solid 
commitment. The Turkish government support was mostly limited to political and 
diplomatic issues.  
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 Another concern was the return of Russian influence in its former colonies. As 
Turkey was trying to fill the vacuum supposedly left by Russia after the Soviet collapse, 
the Russian Federation was reorienting its foreign policy to regain influence in the old 
Soviet territory, or  “ Near Abroad.” As the conflict escalated, its course and outcome 
changed the region’s security and political environment largely, leading to a constellation 
of powers on old ethnic and religious lines. Armenia, for example, concluded a security 
agreement with Russia, its traditional protector. Contrarily, Azerbaijan was leaning 
toward Turkey with which it was in conformity over the Karabagh issue. Due to the hard 
lines formed on old ethnic and cultural affinities, any confrontation ran the risk of 
spinning out of control, with the danger of involving a nuclear Russia and a NATO-
member Turkey. 
Turkey’s ongoing struggle to gain influence in the region was even more 
complicated since the Caucasus region, especially Azerbaijan, was estimated to contain 
large deposits of oil and gas reserves. An agreement was signed between the Azerbaijan 
government and foreign oil companies to develop three Azeri oil fields in 1994. Since the 
region was land- locked, pipeline routes to transfer the future oil to world markets gained 
importance. These pipeline routes became fiercely competitive due to the potential 
advantages for each host country. Currently, Turkey seems to have the upper hand but the 
proposed Turkish Baku-Ceyhan pipeline route passes very closely to the Karabagh 
frontline, with its security implications. Despite the cease-fire concluded in 1994 between 
the belligerents, skirmishes on the borderline flare up occasionally, with the danger of an 
all-out confrontation. As a result, analyzing the nature and the future implications of this 
conflict to better evaluate the probable effects on the regional and global stability is 
essential.  The main arguments and issues addressed in this thesis are 
· With the collapse of the Soviet Union, old ethnic and religious bonds gained 
importance. A new constellation of states, which was reminiscent of the pre-WWI period, 
emerged. Turkey found itself in an evolving balance-of-power situation with Azerbaijan 
against Russia and Armenia, with Iran favoring Russia. In this new constellation, nuclear 
Russia and NATO-member Turkey faced each other, with security implications for the 
regional and global stability. 
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· The Karabagh Conflict and the resulting events coincided with the increased 
Russian interest in the region, and the conflict created a convenient hot spot that would 
guarantee Russian participation. This conflict also enabled Russia to return to Turkey’s 
borders as a result of its alignment with Armenians. In light of the Russian bases on the 
Turkish border, Turkey’s security concerns about Russia remained the same or even 
worsened after the Cold War.  
· To Turkey’s dismay, the Armenian attitude toward Turkey hardened the 
fanatic groups increased their affect in Armenia, culminating with the forced resignation 
of the relatively moderate Armenian President Levon Ter Petrossian. Turkey’s handling 
of the crises alienated Armenia and led to today’s hostile relations in which hardliner 
nationalists assumed control of the Armenian administration. This change in 
administration resulted in anti-Turkish agitation and propaganda in the U.S and in 
Western Europe. It also caused irredentist Armenian territorial claims on Turkey, thus 
increasing the likelihood of prolonged strained relations. In short, Turkey could not 
achieve its initial objective of reconciling past resentments and benefiting from the 
possible trade with Armenia.  
· Lacking the necessary means or the will to back up its rhetoric, Turkey lost its 
credibility. The hopes for an active Turkish role of leadership with other Turkic states 
shattered and shifted into a more realistic form. 
· The Karabagh Conflict could destabilize the region and affect the safe 
exploitation of the region’s hydrocarbon reserves. The conflict became more complicated 
when the regional powers sought to benefit from this exploitation. 
The second chapter explains the roots of the conflict by focusing on conflict 
theories. The third chapter traces the historical background of the conflict, focusing on 
the interactions of the belligerents in the region before and after the Soviet period. This 
entails a period from the escalation of the conflict until the 1994 cease-fire and the 
mediation process conducted under the OSCE aegis. The fourth chapter deals primarily 
with Armenia’s policies and relations with other important regional powers. The fifth 
chapter reviews the same issues regarding Azerbaijan. The sixth chapter exclusively 
examines the Caspian oil and the Baku-Ceyhan Pipeline project and related issues. The 
probable effects on the resolution of the Karabagh conflict and on regional stability are 
5 
also discussed. In Chapter VIII, the effects of the conflict on Turkey’s role in the region 
are reviewed in the light of all those issues addressed in previous chapters. Finally, an 
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II. THEORY AND THE ROOTS OF THE CONFLICT 
Commonly, ancient hatreds are believed to be the main cause of the Karabagh 
conflict. Supposedly, after decades of simmering, these hatreds surfaced as soon as the 
power, the Soviet Union, that had suppressed it disappeared.  This chapter contends that a 
complex web of reasons, not only the ancient hatreds, caused the problems between 
Azerbaijan and Armenia. As mentioned before, the seeds of the conflict were sown in the 
beginning of the 19th century when Russia entered the region.   
As the nation-state concept emerged in the 18th century, ethnic conflicts and 
ethnicity in general gained importance in international relations. As three European 
empires collapsed at the end of the First World War, after the de-colonization process in 
the 1960s, and following the demise of the Soviet Union, ethnic conflicts accelerated and 
new nations emerged. In this process, international conflicts, while retaining their 
significance, were coupled with interstate conflicts. In interstate conflicts, different 
groups, defined in terms of ethnic, religious, or linguistic identities, mobilized and 
clashed for autonomy within or for secession from sovereign states.   
Despite the long history of ethnic conflict, few theories on these conflicts are 
agreed upon.  Existing theories attempt to explicate the roots and causes of ethnic 
conflicts. Another goal of these theories is to create models to provide the negotiators 
with guidelines in their efforts to bring about a sustainable solution to ethnic problems. 
This chapter focuses on conflict theories that deal with the roots and causes of the ethnic 
conflicts.  
To start, we should first define the terms “ethnic groups” and “ethnic conflict.” As 
Rothchild and Lake explains, there are three different approaches to the study of 
ethnicity. Let us examine each in turn: 
The Primordialist Approach: This approach takes ethnicity as a fixed 
characteristic of individuals and communities. This characteristic could be rooted in 
inherited bio logical traits or centuries of past practice that are now beyond the ability of 
the individuals or groups to change.2 According to this view, the mere existence of a 
                                                 
2 Lake, David A. and Rothchild, Donald,  “Spreading Fear: The Genesis of Transnational Ethnic 
Conflict” in The International Spread of Ethnic Conflict: Fear, Diffusion, and Escalation, Princeton 
University Press, 1998, p. 5 
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different ethnicity is sufficient for an ethnic tension. Any other explanation is not 
necessary in the presence of ethnicity, as ethnicity, in itself, is significant.  
The Instrumentalist Approach: This is Rothchild and Lake’s second approach to 
ethnicity. This approach considers ethnicity as a tool used and manipulated by the elites 
to obtain material and political benefits. In this approach, ethnicity does not have an 
independent standing outside the political process in which the elites try to manipulate 
the masses.  
The Constructivist Approach: This is the third approach Rothchild and Lake put 
forth regarding the ethnicity. This approach maintains that ethnicity in itself is a social 
phenomenon rather than an individual or group attribute as supported by the 
“primordialists.”3 Ethnicity is, accordingly, constructed from dense webs of social 
interaction.  
Charles Tilly, on the other hand, classifies the theories of ethnicity into three 
different groups. Combining the primordialist and instrumentalist approaches, he defines 
an ethnic group as a set of people who publicly claim a common origin that distinguishes 
them from other members of the same population. Accordingly, ethnic groups organize 
where and when members of at least two well-connected communities, defined by 
claimed origin and kinship, begin competing for the same social benefits.4 Tilly’s first 
groups of theories on ethnicity, “theories of cultural construction,” define the process in 
which people create imagined communities.  Ethnicity is created with a combination of 
arbitrariness and ensuing myths. “Structural theories,” Tilly’s second group, identify the 
circumstances in which potential ethnic groups become energetic political actors. These 
groups first specify how political and economic changes affect the interests and 
organization of people who share identity and social characteristics. This is similar to the 
instrumentalist approach of Lake and Rothchild. Tilly’s third group of theories on 
ethnicity is the “social-psychological theories,” which is defined as follows:  
Social-psychological theories . . . stress the homologies between ethnicity 
and other markers of difference, emphasize the undesirable features of we-
                                                 
3 Lake, David A. and Rothchild, Donald,  “Spreading Fear: The Genesis of Transnational Ethnic 
Conflict” in The International Spread of Ethnic Conflict: Fear, Diffusion, and Escalation, Princeton 
University Press, 1998, p. 6 
4 Tilly, Charles,  “Ethnic Conflict in the Soviet Union,” Theory and Society, Vol. 20, No. 5, October 
1991, p. 574 
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they distinctions, and ground such differences in various defenses of the 
self.5 
 
As to the definition of “a conflict,” Donald Horowitz defines it as a struggle in 
which the aim is to gain objectives and simultaneously to neutralize, injure, or eliminate 
rivals.6 We can classify conflicts into three groups.   
International Conflicts: These conflicts involve sovereign states as the main 
actors. If the actions of two sovereign states are crucial for the continuation of the 
conflict, then that conflict has an international character.7  
Conflicts Involving a Struggle for Governmental Power: These conflicts are the 
second classification and contrary to “international conflicts” do not entail a territorial 
demand on the part of the challengers to the state. The main aim is to gain control of the 
state structure and territory as a whole, not only a certain part of it.  
The State-Formation Conflicts: This third kind of conflicts concern a state and a 
geographically concentrated minority, sometimes with the interference of another 
sovereign state. This third group includes the “ethno-political” conflict, which we will 
focus on in this chapter.  
Conflicts in general can have ideological, religious, economic, territorial, ethnic, 
communal, national and other such characteristics. In most cases, conflicts comprise 
more than one of these characteristics with varying proportions. Likewise, while an 
ethnic conflict has an ethnic confrontation at its core, it can further be complicated by 
religion, economy, language, ideology, and likewise. As a result, we will use the term, 
“ethno-political conflict,” instead of “ethnic conflict” from now on. An ethno-political 
conflict is 
A political, social, or military confrontation in which the parties identify 
themselves and each other in terms of nationality, religion, race, culture, 
language, or by a combination of some or all of these criteria.8 
 
Ethnicity, by itself, is not a cause of a violent ethno-political conflict. A potential 
                                                 
5 Ibid, p. 572 
6 Horowitz, Donald, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, University of California Press, p. 95 
7 Cornell, Svante E.  “Conflict Theory and the Nagorno Karabagh Conflict: Guidelines for a Political 
Solution?” Triton Publishers, Stockholm Sweden, printed in Turkey, 1997 
8 Ibid, p. 17 
10 
of an ethno-political conflict appears when ethnicity is politicized and as a result, ethnic 
groups mobilize. The reasons for ethnic mobilization, in which ethnic groups assume the 
goal of neutralizing or eliminating their  rivals, will now be discussed extensively in this 
chapter. We will mainly focus on the theories put forth by Donald Horowitz, Michael 
Brown and Svante Cornell to explain the reasons of ethnic mobilization and the ensuing 
ethno-political conflict. However, to complement these two scholars, we will also refer to 
Charles Tilly, Eric Malender and Stuart Kaufman.  
Donald Horowitz, our first scholar, explains ethnic mobilization in terms of the 
clash between modernity and traditionalism. In his opinion, there are three different 
approaches to modernity and its relation with traditionalism in explaining the causes of 
ethnic mobilization and ensuing ethno-political conflict. These approaches are the 
“absolute levels of modernization,” the “absolute rates of modernization” and “group 
disparities.” 
Absolute Levels of Modernization: This approach focuses on the overall effects of 
modernization on the entire population.  Exposure to the mass media, changes in literacy 
patterns, urbanization, shifts from agriculture to industry and involvement in mass 
politics can breakdown the commitment to the traditions. This process of modernization 
makes the members of the society, their goals and needs more alike.  Similarities in 
demand and the insufficiency of the resources, in turn, create a competition among the 
members of the society, as similar demands inevitably lead to a clash. 9 Elites seek safety 
from this competition by mobilizing their distinctive ethnic groups. This mobilization is 
intended to alleviate the uncertain cond itions of the raging competition for the resources. 
Mobilization and the subsequent conflict become even more acute if the assimilation rate 
of the mobilized group is not very high in the host society.10 The greater the gap between 
the rates of social mobilization and the assimilation becomes, the more probable the 
ethnic conflict becomes.  
Absolute Rates of Modernization: In this approach, Horowitz questions the 
credibility of the “absolute levels” approach. He contends that empirical studies show 
                                                 
9 Horowitz, Donald L.  Ethnic Groups in Conflict, University of California Press, 2000, p. 99 
10 For a comprehensive study of the nationalities in the Soviet Union and their assimilation patterns, 
see David D. Laitin, Identity in Formation: The Russian Speaking Populations in the Near Abroad , Cornell 
University Press, 1998, pp. 36-82 
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most ethnic conflicts erupt in less developed parts of the world. This is in direct 
contradiction to the previous “absolute levels of modernization” approach, which relates 
the conflict to the overall modernization of the society. He explains this paradox with the  
“advantage of backwardness” concept in economy, namely the rates of change are higher 
when the starting levels are lower. Accordingly, rates of modernization and the resulting 
ethnic mobilization may be higher in less modernized places. He also argues that the 
elites in less modernized places are disproportionately important. Their ambitions ignite 
the ethnic conflicts. To ensure the following of the masses, they may transfer the mass 
antagonism onto other ethnic groups by exploiting mass sentiments, apprehensions, and 
aspirations. 
Group Disparities: This is Horowitz’s third approach regarding ethnic 
mobilization. According to this approach, ethnic mobilization and conflict may result 
from a modernization gap between ethnic groups or a function of the rate at which such a 
gap is growing.11 Uneven distribution of economic and educational opportunities is an 
important factor for group tensions: 
Resulting social classes tend to overlap and reinforce ethnic group 
boundaries, making the confrontation intense. As a result, ethnic groups 
that are wealthier, better educated, and more urbanized tend to be envied, 
resented, and sometimes feared by others in a new system of 
stratification.12 
 
Horowitz’s third approach can be applied to the Karabagh conflict in which a 
poorly disguised economic gap was the starting point for the hostilities. Although 
Azerbaijan was producing almost half of the world’s oil production in the Tsarist Russia 
in the late 19th century, this production brought little benefit to the Azeri population. 
They were generally rural and poor, while their Armenian neighbors were making 
fortunes from developing Azeri oil fields.13 Largely due to the Russian favoritism over 
the local Muslims, the Armenians were occupying high and effective posts, were living in 
                                                 
11 Horowitz, Donald L. Ethnic Groups in Conflict, University of California Press, 2000, p. 103 
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urban areas, and prospering from the Azeri oil, according to the Azerbaijanis. All these 
factors, together with the perceived Armenian arrogance toward Muslims caused 
resentments among the Azerbaijanis against the Armenians. 
Charles Tilly explains the reasons of ethnic mobilization in terms of 
discrimination and group identity. He contends that entire ethnic groups almost never 
mobilize or act collectively. These groups instead serve as bases for mobilization and 
collective action when the actions of the outsiders either threaten to exclude ethnic 
groups from shared and collectively controlled opportunities or open up new stakes to 
collective competition.14 Ethnic “entrepreneurs” (who are often professional brokers, 
such as intellectuals and politicians) play exceptional parts in such situations.  
Eric Malender, on the other hand, looks into the reasons for ethnic mobilization in 
terms of “willingness” and “opportunity.”15 Deep cultural differences in language and 
religion, a history of intense conflict with accompanying myths, and an exclusive ethnic 
conception of the nation combine to give rise to a strong “willingness.”  As a result, 
parties to the conflict mobilize and, if not checked, resort to violence.  Factors enhancing 
the “opportunity” in our case could include mountainous terrain suitable for guerilla 
warfare, access to arms, and the presence of ethnic kin in a neighboring state, the 
autonomy and autonomous institutions to develop necessary group cohesion, external 
support and radical leadership.   
Another scholar who supports the willingness-opportunity approach, Stuart 
Kaufman, contends that ethnic prejudices and fears among the masses give rise to a 
“willingness” to provide for their own security by violent means. Relaxing the state 
repression affords the minority the “opportunity” to mobilize and to take military action 
eventually.16 Ethnic mobilization results in a security dilemma in which each side tries to 
enhance its own security by threatening the others. Brown argues that changing military 
and demographic balances after the collapse of a state structure create acute uncertainty 
                                                 
14 Tilly, Charles,  “Ethnic Conflict in Soviet Union,” Theory and Society, Vol. 20, No. 5, October 
1991, p. 574 
15 Malender, Eric, “The Nagorno Karabagh Conflict Revisited: Was the War Inevitable?” Journal of 
Cold War Studies, Vol. 3, No. 2, 2001, p. 52  
16 Kaufman, Stuart J. “Ethnic Fears and Ethnic War in Karabagh,” paper presented at the Annual 
Meeting of the International Studies Association, Minneapolis, MN, March 1998 
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and fear for physical safety.17 In light of these military and demographic imbalances, the 
desire to survive and a general fear of what the future might bring eventually creates this 
security dilemma.18  The probable outcome of such a dilemma is a preemptive ethnic 
warfare  
Seeking to explain the reasons for ethnic mobilization, Michael E. Brown makes a 
distinction between “underlying factors” (background or permissive factors) and 
“catalyzing (triggering) factors” in bringing about a mobilization. According to him, a 
factor that is necessary for the ethno-political conflict may not be sufficient to trigger it. 
The presence of underlying factors makes some places and some situations more prone to 
violence than others and conflicts seldom erupt without their existence.19 These factors 
are time-resistant and necessary for the conflict to occur. Nevertheless, they do not 
explain why conflicts erupt at a specific point in time and they do not trigger these 
conflicts by themselves.20 Brown foresees four groups of underlying factors for the 
ethnic mobilization and ensuing ethno-political conflict.21   
Structural Factors: This is Brown’s first group of underlying factors for ethnic 
mobilization. This group of factors comprises “weak state structures, intra-state security 
concerns, and “ethnic geography.” “Weak state structures,” which lack political 
legitimacy and politically sensible borders and political institutions to control the territory 
they supervise, are starting points for ethnic unrest. Absence of strong state institutions 
creates “security concerns” for individual groups. As a result, these groups seek to 
provide their own safety by forming defensive institutions. This, in turn, might be 
perceived as a threat to the security of other groups. Each side seeks to increase its 
capabilities while undermining the others.’ A vicious cycle, a security dilemma can be 
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Press, 2000 
20 Cornell, Svante “Authonomy In the South Caucasus: A Catalyst of Conflict?” prepared for the ASN 
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the result of such a race. The third factor of structural factors, “ethnic geography,” 
foresees that states with ethnic minorities are more prone to conflict. The risk further 
increases when the minorities are not intermingled with the main population and are 
concentrated in a separate geography. 
Political Factors: This is the second group of underlying factors, according to 
Brown. This group comprises “discriminatory political institutions, exclusionary national 
ideologies, inter-group politics, and elite politics.” The first one, “discriminatory political 
institutions,” involves ethnic resentments that may appear when ethnic groups are 
inadequately represented in government, the courts, the military, the police, the political 
parties, and other state or political institutions. Secondly, the national ideology that links 
citizenship to ethnic, or racial criteria, may create ethnic tensions within the country. The 
third element of political factors, “inter-group politics,” states that prospects for violence 
are greater if groups, whether political, ideological, religious, or ethnic ones, have 
ambitious objectives, strong senses of identity, and confrontational strategies. The fourth 
element, “elite politics,” involves elites who often provoke ethnic conflicts in times of 
political or economic turmoil to contain their domestic challengers. One example is 
Yugoslav leader Slobodan Milosevic’s ascent to power, his policies to retain it, and the 
resulting genocidal civil war that ensued.  
Economic and the Social Factors:  This is Brown’s third group of underlying 
factors and it includes “economic problems, discriminatory economic systems, and the 
effects of rapid or unbalanced economic development and modernization.”22 “Economic 
problems” that entail unemployment, inflation, and competition for resources create 
social frustrations that could lead to social unrest. “Economic systems that discriminate” 
based on ethnicity and clan can multiply resentments and social unrest. These policies 
may include unequal economic opportunities, unequal distribution of resources or sharp 
differences in the standards of living. These policies are among the reasons articulated by 
Karabagh Armenians as among their major grievances against Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan 
allegedly tried to make them remain backward by not allocating necessary resources in 
the region. Although the per capita income of the Karabagh Armenians was higher than 
                                                 




that of the rest of the Azerbaijan, it was lower than the per capita income of their ethnic 
brethren in Armenian SSR.  Thirdly, “rapid or unbalanced economic development,” 
industrialization, new technologies, and modernization might create ethnic tensions. 
These kinds of developments generally cause migration and urbanization, which disrupt 
traditional family and social structures. They also raise economic and political 
expectations and lead to frustration when these expectations are not met. In the absence 
of traditional social institutions, these resentments and frustration may explode in the 
form of social unrest. Donald Horowitz, as explained previously, also adopted this 
approach by identifying the dichotomy between traditionalism and modernism as the 
source of ethnic conflict. 
Cultural and Perceptional Factors: This is Brown’s last group of underlying 
factors for the ethnic mobilization and eventual ethnic conflict. These factors include the 
patterns of “cultural discrimination and the problematic group histories.” “Cultural 
discrimination” may include unequal educational opportunities, legal and political 
constraints on the use or teaching of native languages, constraints on religious freedoms, 
or forceful assimilation attempts. In our case, Karabagh Armenians also claimed that 
Azerbaijan was applying discriminatory educational policies. Azerbaijan was allegedly 
preventing the Armenian language television broadcasts and trying to settle ethnic Azeris. 
Group histories and group perceptions with accompanying myths form another element 
of cultural/perceptional underlying factors. Accordingly, ethnic groups manipulate the 
events of the past to glorify their own histories while demonizing their neighbors and 
adversaries. These “created” ethnic mythologies become distorted and exaggerated with 
each passing generation. These myths become even more complicated if rival ethnicities 
have mirror images of each other. Some scholars argued that this is one of the factors that 
caused the Karabagh conflict. Armenian and Azeri nationalism developed out of hostility 
for one another, out of self-glorification and the demonization of the other.    
Nationalist revolutionary feelings began to develop in the region in the 1870s. In 
the late 19th century, Russian meddled in the Ottoman Empire and, as a consequence, the 
Ottoman Armenian rebellions increased. As the Ottomans suppressed these Armenian 
rebellions, the Armenian nationalist sentiments and revolutionary movements 
proliferated. These movements aimed to cleanse all Turks and Muslims (including the 
16 
Azeris) from the so-called historic Armenia. However, the Turks and Azeris formed the 
majority in the areas the Armenian revolutionaries claimed. The existence of the Turks 
and the Azeris in those areas claimed by the Armenian revolutionaries were an obstacle 
to creating a “Great Armenia.” Such ethnic hostilities are still very intense on the 
Armenian side, as Iskhanian argues:  
[To] curse at Muslims and especially at Turks, to talk much about the 
Armenian Genocide, and to remind others constantly of the brutality of the 
Turks are all regarded as expressions of patriotism. Among the leaders of 
the past, we consider those who curse Turks and killed Turks to be the 
most patriotic. Our most recent heroes are those who assassinated Turkish 
diplomats in European cities . . . [this] is the dominant mentality.23 
 
Armenian desires to form an ethnically homogenous state would inevitably come 
at the expense of the Azeris living in the same geography. Azeris, in return, were 
developing their own ideologies. Like their Crimean Tatar brethren, Azeri intellectuals 
were holding on to Pan-Turkish ideals with the intensification of the Russification 
campaigns.24 As pro-Turkish sentiments developed among the Azeri intellectuals, they 
unavoidably came into conflict with strong Anti-Turkish sentiments of Revolutionary 
Armenians. Armenians increasingly equated the Azeris with the so-called anti-Armenian 
Ottoman Turks. As one scholar put it: 
Much of Armenian identity is wrapped up in what they said to have 
suffered at the hands of the Turks, and since the Azerbaijanis are Turks, 
(Azeri is a Turkic language); hostility felt towards one people is 
transferred to another.25 
 
As Brown elaborated, underlying factors are necessary but not enough to start an 
ethnic conflict. We will call the factors that actually trigger the conflict as proximate or 
triggering factors. These factors are grouped as follows: 
                                                 
23 Iskhanian Rafael “ The Law of Excluding the Third Force,” received from Kaufman, Stuat J. 
“Ethnic Fears and Ethnic War in Karabagh,” PONARS Working Paper No. 8, p. 16 
24 For detailed account of Russification campaigns, review  “Azerbaijan’s First and Second Republics: 
The Problem of National Consciousness” Audrey L. Altsadt, University of Massachussets, through internet 
http://ourworld.compuserve.com/ homepages/usazerb/345.htm 
25 Laitin, David D. and Suny, Robert Grigor, “Armenia and Azerbaijan: Thinking a Way out of 
Karabakh” www.mepc.org/journal/9910_laitinsuny.html 
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Internal Elite-Level Triggering Factors: These are related to bad leaders and bad 
governance.26 These factors may include power struggles involving civilian or military 
leaders; ideological contests over a country’s political, economic, social, or religious 
affairs; or criminal assaults on the state.27  
Internal Mass-Level Triggering Factors: These factors are related to bad domestic 
problems, which can be caused by rapid economic development and modernization or by 
the patterns of political and economic problems. Brown contends that internal mass- level 
factors triggered the Nagorno Karabagh Conflict as the Soviet Union dissolved 
highlighted problematic ethnic geography and patterns of discrimination.  
External Elite-Level Triggering Factors: These factors comprise the deliberate 
decisions of governments to trigger conflict in neighboring states for various purposes of 
their own. Russian meddling in Georgia and Azerbaijan or the Armenian intervention in 
the Karabagh conflict falls into this category.  
External Mass-Level Triggering Factors: A typical cause of these factors is 
refugee flows that bring turmoil, violence and instability into host countries. We can also 
call it the “spillover effect.” Palestinian refugee flows in Jordan and the ensuing “Black 
September” incidents in which Jordanians had to crush a Palestinian uprising is an 
example of the spillover effect. Another example is the Lebanese civil war. Nearly one 
million Azeri refugees after the war may also be a destabilizing factor and enormously 
strain the Azerbaijani economy.   
Stephen Van Evera sums up the triggering factors of an ethno-political conflict in 
four hypotheses. He contends that the risk of war is greater: 
· When the proportion of stateless nationalities is also great  
· When the nationalities pursue the recovery of national diasporas intensively, and 
when these nationalities pursue annexationist strategies of recovery  
· When the goals that nationalities pursue toward one another are hegemonistic;  
                                                 
26 For a detailed study of the role of the domestic elites in the eruption of ethnic conflicts, see Jack 
Snyder, “From Voting to Violence: Democratization and Nationalist Conflict,” W W Norton Press, 2000, 
pp. 45-88 
27 Brown, Michael E. “The Causes of Internal Conflict” in Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict, The MIT 
Press, 2000, p. 16 
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· Moreover, when nationalities severely oppress minorities living in their states.28 
Cornell encompasses most of the above-mentioned ideas and provides an 
inclusive account of reasons for ethnic mobilization by using the willingness-opportunity 
approach. In his opinion, four main factors help bring about an ethnic mobilization and an 
ethno-political conflict.  
Group Cohesion and Willingness: Cornell includes in this group “cultural 
differences, political discrimination, national conception, past conflict and the perception 
of the other.” A conflict does not qualify as an ethno-political character if it does not 
emanate from cultural differences. The risk of the conflict increases with the intensity and 
the depth of the cultural differences. Cultural differences may include differences in 
language, religion, physical appearance, customs, traditions, etc. Brown discussed aspects 
of the political discrimination previously. Cornell further adds that discrimination is 
largely a matter of perception. He contends that it is not actually important if such 
discrimination did indeed happen, but merely if a group imagined they are being 
discriminated against. Different interpretations or implementation of nationalism (such as 
civic, genealogic, ethnic, etc.) may also cause ethno-political conflicts. A conception of 
nation based on civic nationalism tends to be more peaceful. Conversely, a state’s official 
nationalism dominated by an ethnic conception of the nation tends to be 
counterproductive and prone to ethnic conflict. Cornell’s account of past conflict and 
perception of the other parallels Brown’s Cultural-Perceptional factors. 
Capacity for Action: This is Cornell’s label for the second group of factors for 
ethnic mobilization and ethno-political conflict.  These factors include “settlement 
patterns, rough terrain, demography, ethnic kin, economic factors, and the availability of 
arms.” The possibility of a secessionist movement becomes higher if an ethnic group is 
concentrated in a certain geography. For example, Cornel claims that “rough terrain,” 
especially the mountains or heavy forests increase the risk of conflict. According to 
studies concluded after the collapse of the Soviet Union, mountain groups were six times 
more likely to experience large-scale fighting with the state.29 In terms of 
                                                 
28 Stephen Van Evera, “Hypotheses on Nationalism and War,” International Security , Vol. 18, No. 4, 
Spring 1994, p. 8 
29 Cornell, Svante “Autonomy in the South Caucasus: A Catalyst of Conflict?” prepared for the ASN 
Fifth Annual World Convention (2000), New York, 14 April 2000, Harrimann Institute, Columbia 
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“demography,” an ethnic group’s numerical strength compared to its state’s population 
and its ethnic composition in the region it inhabits determine the risk for an ethno-
political conflict. “The existence of an ethnic kin” in a neighboring state (especially if it 
is the majority in that state) also increases the risk of an ethnic conflict. Cyprus and 
Karabagh constitute good examples, in which the existence of ethnic kin in neighboring 
states bolstered the respective minorities in their quest for security or secession. Iran’s 
policies over Azerbaijan create a contradiction in which Iran inhabits a considerable 
Azeri population but nevertheless supports the Armenian side. Cornell’s economic 
factors are in parallel with Horowitz and Brown as previously discussed. The 
“availability of arms” is more or less related to other factors such as geography and 
external support. Arms invariably increase the possibility of a conflict, as was the case in 
the Caucasus, which abounded in the Soviet arsenal.   
Political Opportunity: This is the third group of factors that Cornell says can 
cause ethno-political conflicts. Actually, Cornell considers the “political opportunity” as 
the catalyzing factor.  This group includes “political transition and a weakening of state 
structures, radical leadership and external support.” Conflict is more likely to emerge in 
times of “political transition,” which decreases state repression. As state structures 
weaken, the opportunity for political action increases. In Karabagh, the conflict erupted 
with Gorbachev’s Perestroika process and the consequent Soviet collapse.  The political 
leaders’ ambitions to stay in power or to gain economic benefits also play a part in the 
eruption of ethno-political conflicts. “Radical leadership” also largely affects the course 
of events and the risk of conflict. Radical leadership was one of the main reasons in the 
Karabakh conflict, too. The radical Karabagh Committee on the Armenian side and the 
resulting Azerbaijan Popular Front on the Azeri side hijacked the situation in Karabagh 
and made a peaceful solution almost impossible. Cornell also included “external support” 
as another factor that falls under the heading of “political opportunity.” The Republic of 
Armenia, Russia, and the Armenian Diaspora abroad supported the Karabagh Armenians 
militarily while Azerbaijan resorted to hiring mercenaries from Slavic CIS states and 
Afghanistan.30   
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Autonomy: This is last factor Cornell mentions as a reason for ethnic 
mobilization. Cornell contends that the existence of territorial autonomy and the 
economical viability it entails significantly increase the risk of a conflict. Autonomy 
promotes and institutionalizes the separate identity of the autonomous ethnicity. It 
provides clearly defined borders, ethno-territorial administrative units, separate systems 
of native language education, mass media opportunities to influence the population, an 
institutionalized decision-making capacity and a succession mechanism. Autonomy also 
provides crucial tools for political entrepreneurs to achieve a leading political position 
and legitimacy. All these increase group cohesion and a willingness to act and also enable 
the group to act through these state- like political institutions.31 
In light of all these theoretical explanations and the events that occurred in the 
Karabagh conflict, we can finally assume that Karabagh Armenians had a strong 
willingness to act because of deep cultural differences and their remembrance of past 
conflicts with all the accompanying myths. The autonomous status of their region 
afforded them the necessary tools to create group cohesion. External support, as a 
catalyzing factor, was available through Armenia and Russia, as will be elaborated in the 
second chapter. Such a support neutralized the demographic disadvantage and economic 
dependency of Karabagh on Azerbaijan. Finally, another catalyzing factor, radical 
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III. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE KARABAGH 
CONFLICT 
The Caucasus region was the scene of military conquests and migrating peoples 
for centuries as its changed ownership from Greeks, Persians, Arabs, Mongols, Turks, 
and Russians. After several wars with the Ottoman Empire and Persia, the Russian 
Empire consolidated its conquest of the Caucasus by 1829. Until then, the region was 
governed by semi- independent khanates as vassals to the Persian Empire.  These 
khanates were legally part of Persia but actually independent in their affairs. No 
incidence of violence was recorded among the ethnically and religiously diverse peoples 
of the region during the different phases of the Ottoman and the Persian rule. After the 
consolidation of the Russian hegemony, Russians introduced population exchanges to 
retain control of the region. Accordingly, they began to replace the Muslim majority on 
the borderlands with the culturally and religiously more compatible Armenian 
population. Regarding this population as more reliable, Russians encouraged the 
Armenians to emigrate from Persia and the Ottoman Empire.32   Population exchanges, as 
intended, succeeded in changing the demographics of the region. Predominantly Azeri-
populated areas were systematically cleansed and re-populated by Christians, including 
newly arriving emigrants from the Persian and Ottoman lands. Even today’s modern day 
Armenia and Nagorno Karabagh is mostly the product of this policy. According to Justin 
McCarthy: 
An Armenian majority came to pass in what today is the Republic of 
Armenia, a majority created by the Russians. Erivan, approximately the 
area of the present Armenian Republic, was until 1827, an Iranian 
province with a Muslim (primarily Turkish) majority.33 
  
Muslims became a minority within five years, by 1832. The situation is almost the 
same in Karabagh. According to Svante Cornell, Russian census reports showed the 
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percentage of Armenians compared to the Muslim majority as only nine percent in 1823, 
compared to a 53 percent Armenian majority in 1880.34  Forced displacements of this 
kind would inevitably generate mistrust. In addition to population exchanges, Armenians 
also attempted to buy out the Azeris from their lands. The fact that Armenians 
accumulated their wealth from Azeri oil further contributed to Azeri resentments. Within 
a few decades, the Tsarist and the subsequent Soviet nationality policies exacerbated the 
already tense relations. These policies centered on the need to create hot spots between 
ethnicities and to ensure a Russian role in future conflicts.  Playing one ethnicity off 
another, together with contested and ambiguous borders, would fuel the resurgence of 
ethnic nationalism and extremism.  
A.       THE EARLY PERIOD IN AZERBAIJANI-ARMENIAN RELATIONS 
(1905-1987) 
The ongoing tensions mentioned above turned violent in 1905 after an ethnic 
Armenian policeman killed an Azerbaijani in Baku. The violence spilled over to 
Nakhcivan shortly afterwards. Clashes between the Armenians and Azeris continued until 
order could be restored in 1907.35 This began the violent relations of these two 
ethnicities. With the start of World War I, Armenians in Russian Armenia and Eastern 
Turkey sided with the Tsarist Russia against the Ottoman Turkey. The Caucasus as well 
as Eastern Anatolia became the theater of struggle between the Ottomans and the 
Russians, involving regular and irregular Armenian forces on the Russian side.  
Russia created a special role for the Armenians on the Caucasus front. 
Unlike the Georgians, who served in regular units, and the Azerbaijanis, 
who were excluded from service because they were Muslim and therefore 
regarded as unreliable, the Armenians were encouraged to form their own 
battalions. The Armenian volunteer battalions were in action until 1916. 
The authorities also subsidized independent Armenian military activity by 
channeling 200,000 rubles to the Dashnaks for use in mounting operations 
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and uprisings in Turkish Armenia.36 
  
Shortly after the war started, Armenians in Eastern Turkey rebelled against their 
government. The Ottoman Turkish government of the time deported the country’s 
Armenian population from Eastern Anatolia in due course. This in turn caused the 
Armenian nationalist sentiment s to further radicalize. The course of events was to change 
dramatically with the October Revolution in Russia in 1917. Consequently, Russians 
withdrew from the war after the Brest-Litovsk treaty. This generated unexpected results 
in the Caucasus region and the inhabiting peoples.  With the Russians gone from the 
Caucasus, two rivaling governments existed in Azerbaijan. Nationalists under the 
Musavat Party formed a government in the city of Gence, while the Bolsheviks, headed 
by an Armenian commissar, Stephan Shaumian, formed their own government in Baku. 
In March of 1918, a civil war erupted between the Bolsheviks and the Musavat Party 
supporters in Baku:  
Armenian forces allied with the Bolsheviks to crush a Musavat bid to gain 
control of the city. Equating the Musavats with the Turks, the Armenians 
set out to take revenge for the persecution and the “so-called” genocide 
suffered at the hands of the Ottomans.37 
 
 Events known as the “March Days” turned into a massacre of the Muslim 
population of the city under the cloak of ideological conflict.38 With the Russians gone 
as the imperial power from the region, a South Caucasian Republic was declared, 
consisting of the Azeri Musavat Party, the Armenian Dashnaks, and the Georgian 
Mensheviks on April 22, 1918. It was an odd constellation since each side seemed to 
pursue different goals. Each ethnicity had differing plans for the future. Armenians were 
leaning to the allied powers of Britain, France or at worst Russia. Georgians, on the other 
hand, were opting for a German alliance, while the Azeris preferred the Turks. As a 
result, reconciling the existence of a single state proved impossible as each side had 
differing agendas. Azerbaijan and Georgia declared their independence on May 27, 1919, 
only to be followed by Armenia two days later. For a brief period (between September 
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and November of 1918), Turkish forces captured Baku and the Caucasus. The Azeris 
then set out to take their revenge for the March Days.39  
British forces replaced the Turks soon after the war and the Ottomans were suing 
for peace. Due to their contribution to the allied war effort during World War I, 
Armenians expected the British to support their claims on the Karabagh.  Despite the 
Armenian expectations, the British supported the Azeri authority over the Nagorno-
Karabagh by appointing an Azeri Governor-General. Protesting the Azeri authority, 
Karabagh Armenians revolted in August 1919. Azerbaijani forces suppressed the revolt 
in Karabagh and after the capitulation of the rebels, the situation relaxed for a short time. 
The Governor-General appointed an Armenian as his assistant. The Azerbaijan 
government also formed a council to administer the region and included several 
Armenians in it. The region was given autonomy shortly afterwards. After the British 
withdrew from the area, another armed Armenian uprising began in Karabagh in March 
1920. While Azerbaijan shifted its forces to suppress the rebellion, the Bolsheviks 
captured Baku unopposed on April 27, 1920.  Azerbaijan then became a Soviet Republic. 
The Bolsheviks asked the Armenian forces to leave the Karabagh and occupied the 
region in May 1920.  
Meanwhile, Turkey was fighting for its survival against the invading Greek 
Armies in the Western Anatolia. Instead of trying to consolidate its position against an 
imminent Bolshevik threat on its border, the Armenian Dashnak government tried to 
capitalize on Turkey’s predicament. The Armenian Army attacked Turkey’s eastern 
provinces to compensate for its current losses in Karabagh. The Armenian attack aimed 
to take the area, which the victorious allies had promised them during the war in return 
for their rebellion against the Ottomans. Turkey’s Eastern Army defeated the Armenians 
and pushed them back. The Armenians were suing for peace shortly after their defeat. An 
agreement was accorded on November 18,1920, ending the hostilities. Two weeks later, 
the Bolsheviks occupied Armenia on December 1st. As a result, violence in the region 
stopped for the next six decades until the late 1980s.  
                                                 




Shortly after Armenia was incorporated into the Soviet Union forcibly, the 
revolutionary committee of Azerbaijan issued a statement on December 2nd, seemingly 
as a gesture, but in reality under Soviet pressure, saying that the Karabagh, Zangezur, and 
Nakhcivan regions of Azerbaijan were transferred to the Armenian Republic, as 
“boundaries had no meaning among the family of Soviet peoples.40” However, the 
Bolshevik leader of Azerbaijan, Nariman Narimanov, refused this transfer with the 
support of Stalin, who was the Soviet commissar for nationalities at the time.  On July 4, 
1921, the Caucasian Bureau of the Soviet Communist Party transferred Karabagh to 
Armenian SSR. Azerbaijan’s forced declaration on December 2nd was the basis of the 
bureau’s decision. However, Stalin allegedly influenced the bureau members and 
reversed that decision the next day. The declared reasons were the need to maintain peace 
between the Armenians and the Muslims, and the economic tie between Karabagh and 
Azerbaijan. In reality, the soviet ploy was similar to the Tsarist plot, namely to create and 
to maintain trouble spots between client ethnicities.41 Some writers argue that the main 
motivation was a desire to show a sign of “good will” to Republican Turkey and to 
recruit it to the Bolshevik Revolution.42  
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enclave within Azerbaijan could serve as a potential pro-Soviet fifth column in the event of disloyalty by 
the Azerbaijanis.”  
  
42 Tchlingirian, Hratch “ Nagorno Karabagh: Transition and the Elite” Central Asian Survey, Vol. 18, 
No. 4 Dec. 1999 p. 441. As quoted in Cornell’s “The Nagorno Karabagh Conflict,” p.10, Richard 
Hovanissian contends that” Soviet Russia, on the international front, sacrificed the Armenian Question to 
cement the Turkish Alliance. ” Allegedly, Turkey’ concluded agreements with the Bolsheviks at the 
expense of Armenia. Turkey’s motive was to keep Armenia weak, to guarantee new Turkish Republic’s 
territorial integrity. Turkey’s motive coincided with Stalin’s desire to divide the South Caucasian Nations 
to avoid a unified resistance.  Cornell contends on the same page that “This (Soviet decision) is in a sense 
surprising, given that the Armenians had historically been far more benevolently disposed towards- as well 
as favored by- Russian rulers than the Azeris. In retrospect, this decision may have been to Azerbaijan’s 
immediate favor, but in the end the Armenians’ feeling of frustration with the loss of western Armenia 
(writer implies the Eastern Turkey, which was promised to Armenians during the First World War in return 
for their collaboration against the Ottoman Turks. Armenians constituted a minority despite their claims of 
the region as being the Western Armenia) despite western promises and the loss of Nagorno Karabagh and 
Nakhcivan, despite Soviet promises, proved to be a catalyzer of conflict.” 
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After this decision to retain Karabagh within the Azerbaijan SSR, the status of 
Karabagh had to be negotiated. Karabagh was given the rank of an autonomous Oblast 
(region), as Stalin officially formed Nagorno-Karabagh Autonomous Oblast on July 7, 
1923. While drawing the borders of the Oblast, Stalin made sure that it was separated 
from Armenia physically by a strip of land, known as the Lachin Corridor. Armenians 
attempted to gain the support of the communist authorities to transfer Karabagh to 
Armenian SSR since 1930s, but Soviet Authorities did not take these attempts seriously.  
Despite several violent events in 1963 and 1968 resulting in casualties, relative calm 
ensued until the infamous Glastnost era. 
B.        RESURGENCE IN THE KARABAGH CONFLICT (1987-1991) 
 
The Karabagh conflict had a turning point with the rise of Mikhail Gorbachev to 
power as General Secretary of the Communist Party in 1985. Gorbachev’s ascent to 
power initiated drastic changes and tendencies in the Soviet Union that would have a 
crucial effect on the conflict. Desiring to stimulate a lagging economy, he set out 
economic restructuring and an accompanying liberalization program known as Glastnost 
(openness). This program of openness intended to mobilize popular support for the 
economic reforms and to force the heavy-handed Party officials into action by exposing 
them in this relative freedom of speech.  However, as the Soviet regime gained and 
retained its legitimacy through repression, creating the environment of relaxed state 
control would open up the Pandora’s box of resentments with consequences devastating 
for the integrity of the Soviet Union and the stability in the Caucasus.    
With the loosening of the Soviet grip, tensions that could be contained previously 
started to surface again after a long period of suppression. In August of 1987, the 
Armenian Academy of Sciences sent a petition to Gorbachev signed by 75,000 Karabagh 
Armenians demanding the inclusion of Karabagh to Armenia. Armenian Scholars in that 
petition claimed tha t,  
Azerbaijan was implementing a “Turkish Pan-Islamist” plan to take back 
land captured from Turkey by Catherine the Great. “They are not only 
kicking out Armenian and Russian inhabitants from Nakhcivan and 
Karabagh, but also, by realizing the plans of NATO member Turkey, they 
have created a string of Muslim villages which consider themselves 
Turkish along the Soviet frontier.43 
                                                 
43 Kaufman, Stuart J. “Ethnic Fears and Ethnic War in Karabagh,” PONAR Working Paper No. 8, p. 
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The removal of Heydar Aliyev, a former KGB general of Azeri ethnic origin who 
is currently the President of Azerbaijan, from the Soviet Politburo in October 1987 
caused unrest in Azerbaijan. Armenians, at the same time, were allegedly receiving 
encouraging signals from the high- level Soviet officials regarding Armenian demands 
over Karabagh.44 The first conflict between the Azeris and Armenians emerged in 
October of 1987 when the Armenians opposed the nomination of an ethnic Azeri as a 
Kolkhoz (collective farm) director in a predominantly Armenian village outside 
Karabagh. Some local Azeris assaulted opposing Armenian villagers.45 Upon the spread 
of the news, mass demonstrations in Yerevan and Karabagh for supposedly 
environmental reasons took a political form asking for the transfer of Nagorno Karabagh 
from Azerbaijan to Armenian SSR. Anti–Azeri demonstrations led to the forced evictions 
of Azeris from Armenia. In late January 1988, the first group of refugees started to flow 
from Armenia and most of them were settled in Sumgait, an industrial suburb of Baku, 
which would be the scene of further violence.  
On February 20, 1988, the Karabagh Parliament (Regional Soviet of the Nagorno 
Karabagh Autonomous Oblast) accepted a resolution (with 110 to 17 margin, 13 
abstained) requesting the transfer of Karabagh to Armenia. The Central Committee of the 
Soviet Communist Party unequivocally rejected this request on February 23, 1988. This 
in turn made the demonstrations in Armenia and Karabagh an everyday event, ultimately 
leading to further harassments and the eviction of Azerbaijanis from Karabagh and 
Armenia. With waves of displaced Azerbaijanis arriving, together with the ongoing 
Armenian demonstrations, counter demonstrations were held in Azerbaijan. These 
demonstrations took a violent character after the reports that two Azerbaijanis were killed 
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44Cornell, in his  “ Small Nations and Great Powers: A Study of Ethno-political Conflict in the 
Caucasus, Curzon Press, 2001” p. 79 states that Abel Agenbeyan, an ethnic Armenian and advisor to 
Gorbachev, told a French Newspaper in November 1987 that Karabagh would soon be transferred to 
Armenian SSR. Stuart Kaufman also argued that throughout the fall of 1987, some prominent Armenians, 
such as scholar Sergei Mikoyan; Advisor to Gorbachev, Abel Aganbeygan; writer Zori Balayan had 
publicly speculated that the Karabagh issue would be resolved soon, thus raising expectations among the 
Armenians. (Kaufman, Stuart J. “Ethnic Fears and Ethnic War in Karabagh,” PONAR Working Paper No. 
8, p. 25)      
45 It is hard to determine what really happened as some sources use rather vague language in 
describing the events, such as “crack down,” and  “beating,” etc… without concrete description of the 
treatment Armenians received, but there were no casualties reported. 
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on February 27, 1988, in a city within the Karabagh.46 Race riots flared up in Sumgait, 
on the 28th and 29th of February against the Armenians, thus accelerating the exodus of 
peoples toward their home countries on both sides.47 After the Sumgait riots, around 
160,000 Azeris and 40,000 Armenians left for Azerbaijan and Armenia respectively.48   
Meanwhile, Armenian activists had formed a “Karabagh Committee” to pursue 
the goal of unifying Karabagh with Armenia, and its two representatives met with 
Gorbachev demanding unification with Armenia. Gorbachev answered through a decision 
by the presidium of the Supreme Soviet, the highest institution of the Union, on March 
23, 1988 rejecting such a transfer without a chance of repeal, because it violated the 
Soviet constitution to change territory without the consent of the republics in question. 
This decision further accelerated the eviction of Azeris from Armenia and some parts of 
Karabagh.49 On June 13, 1988, Supreme Soviet of Azerbaijan declared that the 
Karabagh Soviet’s vote in February for unification with Armenia was unacceptable as it 
was a violation of the Soviet constitution and Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity. On June 
15th, the Supreme Soviet of Armenia passed a resolution calling for the USSR Supreme 
                                                 
46 Cornell contends in “ The Nagorno Karabagh Conflict,” p. 16 that other than the news of murdered 
Azeris, there were rumors saying that Armenians had declared victory in Yerevan after meeting with 
Gorbachev. These rumors further inflamed the Azeris and led to anti-Armenian pogroms. In these events, 
Azeri thugs killed 26 Armenians while Armenians killed 6 Azeris. 
47 Igor Nolyain has a different version of events in Sumgait in “Moscow’s Initiation of the Azeri-
Armenian Conflict,” Central Asian Survey, Vol. 13, No. 4, 1994 
48 Haxton, Michael and Mincheva, Lyobov “ Armenians in Azerbaijan” via 
www.bsos.umd.edu/cidcm/mar/ azearmen.htm 
49 Nature of the ethnic cleansing perpetrated on both sides differs from each other in character. 
Azerbaijanis expulsed their Armenian neighbors as a reaction to the frustration against Armenian 
irredentism. Azeri violence against Armenians was spontaneous rather than planned.  Armenians, however, 
took a more systematic approach in their ethnic cleansing campaign. Prof. Robert Grigor Suny from the 
University of Chicago and David Laitin fro m the Stanford University contend that, “ As horrific as the 
killings in Azerbaijan were, it should be noted that the initial tragic events were affairs of a few days rather 
that a methodical, prolonged genocide of local Armenians. There was no overall Azerbaijani plan to rid 
Azerbaijan of Armenians, certainly not to murder them systematically. Even today, some Armenians 
manage to live in Baku without overt threats or ethnic slurs. It is clear that the key actors in the pogroms 
were Azerbaijani refugees forced out of Armenia . . . In extensive interviews carried out with Azerbaijani 
refugees and IDPs, a very clear story emerged. Armenian militias along with civilian compatriots 
systematically cleansed the corridor separating Armenia from Karabagh in a cold-blooded campaign. 
Armed bands relied on local Armenians to identify Azerbaijani villages and homes and then recruited these 
people to burn down the homes of their neighbors . . . From 1988 to 1993, an estimated 20,000 Azeris were 
killed, all but a few hundred in the fighting. 233, 700 refugees were created along with 551,000 IDPs. The 
bulk of the refugees and the IDPs were from Azerbaijani territory outside the formal territory of Karabagh 
itself.”  Suny, Robert Grigor and Laitin, David D. “ Armenia and Azerbaijan: Thinking a Way Out of 
Karabagh,” Journal of Middle East Policy, Vol. VII, No. 1, October 1999.  
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Soviet to accept Karabagh’s request to incorporate into Armenia and voted unanimously 
for unification with Karabagh.  The Azerbaijani Supreme Soviet protested and rejected 
that decision on June 17th, to be followed by the presidium of the Soviet Supreme of the 
Soviet Union on June 28th. On July 12th, the Karabagh Parliament voted in favor of 
unilateral secession from Azerbaijan, to be rejected by the Azerbaijan Supreme Soviet 
and the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet on July 18th. Demonstrations and violence 
increased on both sides, organized by the Karabagh Committee and Armenian 
Nationalistic Movement (ANM) on the Armenian side and the Azerbaijan Popular Front 
(APF) on the Azeri side. Anticipating further unrest, Moscow declared a state of 
emergency in Karabagh in September 1988.  
A devastating earthquake struck Armenia on December 7, 1988. Soviets used the 
earthquake as a pretext to arrests the leaders of the Karabagh Committee on charges of 
creating public disorder and that that they were preventing the distribution of the aid in 
the earthquake zone.50 On January 12, 1989, Karabagh was put under direct control of 
the USSR Supreme Soviet. On August 16th, Karabagh Armenians held unauthorized 
elections and formed a national council of 78 members to replace the council set up to 
administer the region under Moscow’s direct rule. In September, Armenian Supreme 
Soviet passed a resolution recognizing the National Council as the only legitimate body 
to represent the people of the Nagorno Karabagh. National Council increased its efforts to 
create armed units with support from Armenia and Armenian factions in the Middle East, 
which would prove invaluable against the unprepared Azerbaijanis in the future. 
Armenian moves in turn led to a series of Azeri strikes and a railroad blockade against 
Karabagh. Azerbaijan Popular Front (APF) was staging mass demonstrations against 
Azerbaijan’s communist leaders, accusing them of indifference to legitimate Azeri rights 
to Karabagh.  
In the region, Soviet troops failed to suppress the paramilitary groups and instead 
served more as a source of weapons for these groups. Unable to restore order in the 
region, the USSR Supreme Soviet transferred Karabagh back to the Azerbaijan Supreme 
                                                 
50 Karabagh Committee members allegedly refused the aid coming from Azerbaijan. Committee 
members were arrested under the pretext that they were hindering the distribution of the earthquake relief. 
They would be released though by Soviet authorities on 31 May 1989 after mass demonstrations and 
protests by Armenians.  
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Soviet on November 28, 1989. As soon as Moscow’s rule was abolished and the region 
was transferred back to the Azeri administration, Armenia took an unprecedented move. 
Trying to capitalize on the perception that the Soviets tacitly conceded defeat, Armenia 
declared the unification of Karabagh with Armenia under a unified Armenian Republic 
on December 1, 1989. The Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet 
Union declared this move unconstitutional a month later.  Mass demonstrations were held 
in Baku from November 17th against the decisions of the Karabagh and the Armenian 
Supreme Soviet. The apathy of the Soviet and the Azerbaijan Communist Authorities to 
Azeri demands and reports that an Armenian attacked two Azerbaijanis in Baku started 
violent reprisals. In the ensuing events, a large proportion of Armenians living in Baku 
was expelled from the city from January 13 to January 14, 1990, followed by an 
Armenian response of deporting the remaining Azeris from Armenia.51 Skirmishes in the 
region between paramilitary groups increased dramatically following the mutual 
deportations. Meanwhile, demonstrations in Baku soon took an anti-Soviet and pro-
independence character, which eventually led to the bloody suppression by Soviet troops 
dispatched by Gorbachev on January 19, 1990. Events known as the “Black January” left 
130 Azeri dead.52  
After the bloody crackdown on Azeri nationalists, a loyal Communist, Ayaz 
Muttalibov, replaced the first secretary of Azerbaijan Communist Party.  Muttalibov 
chose to cooperate with the Soviet central government and reasserted the authority of the 
Communist Party in Baku, despite the public outrage over the Soviet raid and the 
subsequent blood bath. Ongoing clashes between the paramilitary groups increased in 
frequency on the borders of Karabagh as displaced persons from both sides filled the 
ranks of the irregular units. This led to a sudden escalation of the conflict. To end the 
                                                 
51 The number of casualties is disputed by different sources. Human Rights Watch book, Azerbaijan: 
Seven Years of Conflict in Nagorno Karabagh, p. 2; Croissant, The Armenia-Azerbaijan Conflict, p. 37; 
Cornell, “The Nagorno Karabagh conflict,” p. 23. An estimated 180,000 Armenians and 160,000 Azeris 
had left their homes for their native countries according to Cornell, The Nagorno Karabagh Conflict , p. 19 
52 During Baku riots, Soviet Interior Ministry Troops, already present in Baku, did not intervene in the 
events as Azeri mobs took on local Armenian civilians. Cornell contends that, Azerbaijan Popular Front, 
the main nationalist group behind the demonstrations, condemned the riots and denounced Moscow for not 
intervening and argued that Soviets did so to justify an invasion of Baku, as it was afraid of the APF 
coming to power in Azerbaijan. This was to be proven correct after a week when Soviets rolled into Baku. 
Cornell, Svante “Undeclared War: The Nagorno Karabagh Conflict Reconsidered,” Journal of South Asian 
and Middle Eastern Studies Vol. XX, No. IV, summer 1997.   
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clashes, which were already taking a relatively higher toll in civil and military losses, the 
Popular Fronts of Baltic States arranged a meeting on February 3, 1990 between the 
Azerbaijan Popular Front and the Armenian National Movement. That attempt ended in 
failure as each side countered each other with concepts of self-determination and 
territorial integrity. In May, Azerbaijan announced that 1989 census figures were 
inaccurate and did not reflect the true composition of Karabagh. In the same month, 22 
Armenian militants were killed while trying to seize weapons and ammunition from a 
Soviet depot in Yerevan. This unpleasant experience on the part of Armenians did not 
stop them from participating in raids on Soviet military convoys, arsenal depots, and 
checkpoints to seize weapons and ammunition.  
With the tensions escalating, unofficial militia forces proliferated on both sides. 
The Armenians were more successful in mobilizing for an imminent war, while the 
Azeris were appealing to the Soviet central government to resolve the conflict on their 
behalf.  Weapons sent by radical Armenians from Armenia and Beirut allegedly 
supported armed groups among the Karabagh Armenians. Modern weapons acquired in 
the Middle East market were allegedly transferred to Karabagh in planeloads.53 In 
August of 1990, Armenian militants attacked eight Azeri villages in the Kazan district of 
Karabagh. Soviet troops supported the Azeri units as the Azeri Internal Ministry troops 
countered Armenian attacks in the Khanlar district. Eventually the clash was subdued.  
The organizations of independent militias in Karabagh and Armenia supported the 
efforts to secede from the Soviet Union altogether. Initially, the Supreme Soviet of 
Armenia elected Levon Ter Petrossian, one of the leaders of the Karabagh Committee 
and the Armenian National Movement, as the President of Armenia on August 5, 1990. 
On August 23rd, new leadership in Armenia declared its sovereignty with the intention to 
secede from the Soviet Union after a referendum. It also renamed the Armenian SSR as 
the Armenian Republic and called for the establishment of independent military forces. 
To achieve that goal, Petrossian disbanded the paramilitary groups that were becoming 
uncontrollable and tried to incorporate them into the Armenian armed forces, which he 
succeeded in doing after several minor clashes between the government troops and the 
unwilling militias.   
                                                 
53 Cornell, Svante, Small Nations and Great Powers, p. 90 
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As opposed to their Armenian neighbors, Azeris were lagging behind in military 
preparations in anticipation of Soviet help.54  To the disappointment of the Azeris, the 
future of the Soviet Union was far from secure. Trying to deal with the troubles 
unleashed by his Perestroika and Glastnost, Gorbachev was struggling to keep the Soviet 
Union united. To restrain the separatist movements in the Soviet periphery, he drafted a 
new “Union treaty,” giving more freedoms and autonomy to the republics after a 
referendum on March 17, 1991. While the Azerbaijan Supreme Soviet voted to 
participate in the referendum on March 7, the Armenian Supreme Soviet refused to take 
part on January 31, 1991. Armenia further declared on March 1st that the referendum’s 
results would not have legal force in its territory, which was also supposed to include 
Karabagh as had been declared on December 1, 1989. During these events, fighting broke 
out on the northern border of Karabagh between ever increasing Armenian militias, 
which were getting better-organized and equipped, and the Azerbaijani units supported 
by Soviet troops. 
According to Azerbaijani interior ministry sources, there had been a 
notable increase of illegal Armenian migration to the region in order to 
artificially alter the composition of the local population and participate in 
the armed insurrection in the Northern part of Karabagh including the 
Shaumian region of Azerbaijan.55 
   
The Azerbaijan government and Soviet troops started conducting joint operations 
in April of 1991 to disarm and dispel Armenian paramilitaries and illegal armed 
formations, which were already actively engaging the Azeri troops and civilians in 
Karabagh. Known as the “ Operation Ring,” this joint Azeri-Soviet operation aimed to 
screen the region to clear armed militants by establishing checkpoints, carrying out 
identification or document checks, and searching the villages for weapons and 
militants.56The Armenian government interpreted as a Soviet attempt to coerce the 
                                                 
54 The communist authorities in Azerbaijan neglected the formation of Azeri armed forces either 
inadvertently or deliberately, which is hard to prove. The Azerbaijan Popular Front (APF) would eventually 
accuse the communist leadership of Azerbaijan of treason, as a numerically weak enemy, namely the 
Armenians, routed Azeris decisively in the battlefield. Moreover, the Azerbaijan Army’s level of weakness 
in equipment, training, logistics organization was exposed. Many conspiracy theories flourished at the time 
to explain the reasons for Azeri catastrophe.  
55Helsinki Human Rights Watch, Azerbaijan: Seven Years of Conflict in Nagorno Karabagh, p.4 
56 Armenian civilians allegedly received bad treatment during these searches and some villages were 
emptied of their inhabitants. By the end of April 1991, 24 Armenian villages (consisting of 10,000 people, 
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Armenian Republic into cooperating with itself.57 The operations, however, did not 
mitigate the conflict, as the Armenian militants resisted strongly. As a result, casualty 
figures rose to 816 by June of 1991.  
C.        ESCALATION AND WAR (1991-1994) 
Events were in flux in the Soviet Union.  Azerbaijan watched anxiously as its 
main support base was in turmoil. In August 1991, conservative and reactionary elements 
in the Soviet Communist Party and the KGB attempted a coup against Gorbachev. The 
attempt eventually failed, but it further accelerated the doom of the Union and ended the 
joint Soviet-Azeri military operations in Karabagh.58 Armenians welcomed the failure of 
the coup, despite their aversion to Gorbachev while the Azeri leader Ayaz Muttalibov 
allegedly expressed his satisfaction with the coup, as he perceived that Gorbachev was 
dissolving his main power base, namely the Soviet Union.  As the failure of the coup 
became evident, Muttalibov suppressed the APF to prevent a takeover, and had himself 
chosen as the president of Azerbaijan. He further distanced himself from the coup attempt 
by a declaration condemning the attempt and denying his support for the coup. Shortly 
afterward, Azerbaijan declared its independence on August 30, 1991. Soviet troops were 
still present in the Karabagh region during this time. Despite their confusion about the 
course of events and  their future, the Soviet troops still minimally restrained the clashes 
between the armed groups.  
Following Azerbaijan’s independence, the Karabagh Soviet (Karabagh National 
Council) declared their Oblast an independent Soviet Republic, consisting of the former 
Nagorno Karabagh Autonomous Oblast territory and the Geranboy-Shaumian district of 
Azerbaijan outside the Karabagh on September 2,1991. The Karabagh Armenians further 
declared that they would secede altogether from the Soviet Union if necessary, to coerce 
support for their declaration. Following the declaration of the Karabagh Armenians, the 
Azerbaijani forces moved to reverse this separatist move by force, which led to fighting 
between the Azerbaijani and the Armenian paramilitaries. As would be evidenced by the 
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57 Levon Ter-Petrossian later termed the Soviet military’s actions supporting Azeri troops in disarming 
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58 Baev, Pavel “ Russia’s Policies in the Caucasus” The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1997 
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pace of events in the future, the time had passed for the Azerbaijan military to assert 
control, owing to their inferior level of preparations. Consequently, the Armenian forces 
halted the Azeri move and managed to establish strongholds in key villages. The 
mediation efforts of Russian President Boris Yeltsin and Kazakhstan President Nursultan 
Nazarbayev to broker a cease-fire on September 20 to 23 failed. After a short break 
following the mediation efforts, the Karabagh Armenian forces attacked Azeri villages, 
evicting their inhabitants from their homes while the Azeris tried to counter with missile 
attacks on Armenian villages. Among the clashes, Armenia declared its independence on 
September 23 following a referendum two days earlier.  
From the level of equipment and the number of warriors in the hands of the 
Karabagh Armenian forces, the Azeri Government rightfully suspected the involvement 
of regular Armenian Republic troops. Seeing the poor performance of its troops, the 
Azerbaijan government nationalized all military hardware within the borders of 
Azerbaijan and in October 1991 recalled the ethnic Azeris serving in the Soviet Army. 59 
However, this move would not benefit Azerbaijan to a considerable extent, as, unlike the 
Armenians, there was a shortage of experienced Azeri officers and conscripts in the 
Soviet Army. Azeri nationals, just as all other conscripts from Muslim Soviet Republics 
in the Red Army, tended to serve in construction battalions rather than combat units. 
Azerbaijan cut off a pipeline to Armenia because of its role in the escalating the 
conflict in Karabagh on November 4.  An Azeri helicopter-carrying Deputy Prime 
Minister and Interior Minister of Azerbaijan as well as Russian and Kazakh observers to 
the ongoing peace talks60was downed by Armenians over the Karabagh on November 
20, 1991, killing twenty people. As a response to the helicopter attack and the Armenian 
blockade of Nakhcivan, a province of Azerbaijan cut off geographically from the 
mainland by Armenian territory, Azerbaijan imposed a railroad blockade to Armenia 
starting on November 25. On November 26, 1991, Azerbaijan Parliament abolished the 
autonomous status of the Karabagh, although it had only symbolic significance as Azeris 
had already started to lose control of the region regardless of its status.  
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On December 8, 1991, a referendum held in Karabagh confirmed the secession 
from the Soviet Union, while ethnic Azeris were boycotting the referendum. The Soviet 
Union practically seized to exist the same day, on December 8, as the leaders of three 
Slavic Soviet Republics declared the dissolution of the USSR and the formation of the 
Commonwealth of Independent States, open to voluntary participation of all former 
Soviet Republics. As a result, Soviet troops withdrew from the region in December, 
leaving the parties to the conflict in direct confrontation. Azerbaijan President Muttalibov 
issued a Presidential decree the same day on December 8, for a mobilization calling for 
people above 18 years of age to military service.  The dissolution of the Soviet Union and 
the ensuing withdrawal of Soviet troops proved to be a catastrophe for the Azeris as they 
had heavily relied on Soviet authority to resolve the conflict while their Armenian 
neighbors were preparing for a final solution by force.  
Now that there was no central authority restraining the conflicting sides, clashes 
increased rapidly. On December 21,1991, Armenia decided to join the Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS), which Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine had established two weeks 
after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Azerbaijan followed Armenia and joined in the 
CIS. On January 6, 1992, Nagorno Karabagh declared its independence as the Republic 
of Nagorno Karabagh. Simultaneously, Armenians started attacking Azeri positions to 
clear their newly declared republic of its Azeri population. On February 11, Armenian 
forces attacked and captured three Azeri villages, killing at least 100 civilians. After the 
capture of their initial targets, Armenians, on February 25, channeled their offensives on 
Khocali, a strategically located Azeri town. They pushed back Azeri forces and killed 
fleeing Azeri civilians61 with the alleged help of the 366th Russian (former Soviet) 
Motorized Rifle Regiment.62   
                                                 
61 Death toll in Khojali differs depending on the sources. Helsinki Watch says, “ There are no exact 
figures for the Azeri civilians killed because Karabagh Armenian forces gained control of the area after the 
massacre. While it is widely accepted that 200 Azeris were murdered, as many as 500 to 1,000 may have 
died,” p. 5, Cornell estimates the number at around 600, while Thomas Goltz, a Western journalist who 
witnessed the events and personally saw the casualties, report that there were 477 registered in the day he 
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Goltz, Thomas, Azerbaijan Diary: A Rouge Reporter’s Adventures in an Oil-Rich, War-Torn, Post-Soviet 
Republic, p. 123      
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The fall of Khojali and the ensuing Armenian massacre led to protests and 
demonstrations in Baku, where large crowds besieged the Azerbaijani Parliament 
demanding the resignation of President Ayaz Muttalibov. The Azerbaijan Popular Front 
demanded Muttalibov’s resignation for his government’s ineptitude to defend Azeri 
civilians from massacres and failing to form a national army. Ensuing demonstrations led 
to the forced resignation of Muttalibov on March 5, 1992 after interior ministry troops 
disobeyed his orders to disperse the crowd. A transitional government was formed with 
the participation of APF and elections were scheduled for June 5.  On May 5, Azerbaijan 
refused to sign the Tashkent Treaty for the collective security and suspended its 
participation in the CIS.63 In a striking coincidence, Armenians launched an offensive on 
May 8 and after two days captured Susha. The city was a strategically located Azeri 
stronghold with a predominantly Azeri population and the traditional capital of Karabagh.  
Fall of Susha was an emotional shock for Azeris, as the place was regarded as the center 
of Azeri culture and identity. It was the cradle of poets and composers and more 
importantly, it was the last Azeri stronghold left in Karabagh.  
Political turmoil after the fall of Susha in Azerbaijan resulted in a political power 
struggle between the APF and Muttalibov supporters. The government changed hands 
two times between May 14 and 15 in which the APF prevailed eventually. Using the 
political turmoil in Azerbaijan, Armenians diverted their attacks toward the Lachin 
Corridor, a strip of land separating Karabagh from Armenia. They captured it on May 18, 
1992, creating a land corridor between Karabagh and Armenia. By the end of May, 
Armenians had routed the Azeris, captured all of Karabagh, and cleared the region of its 
Azeri population in a dazzling success. Simultaneous Armenian attacks on Nakhcivan, a 
small Azeri province on the Turkish border, created serious concerns in Turkey and Iran. 
Turkey made known its discontent and did not rule out an armed intervention if 
Armenians tried to invade Nakhcivan on which Turkey claimed to have a guarantor 
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status.  Russia was recovering from its early non-interventionist attitude toward the 
Caucasus in the meantime and was adopting a more active position on the conflict.  
Ebulfez Elchibey, a pro-Turkish politician and the leader of the Azerbaijan 
Popular Front, was elected the President of Azerbaijan on June 5, 1992. After the 
elections, Azeris launched an attack to liberate the lands lost to Armenians on June 12th. 
Large-scale Azeri offensives concentrated on the Geranboy-shaumian region of 
Azerbaijan and the Agdere-mardakert province in Nagorno Karabagh. Azeri forces were 
using their newly acquired military equipment received after the division of the Soviet 
military arsenal under the treaty of Tashkent in May 1992. They gained initial success as 
they recaptured almost 80 percent of the Agdere province.  Another Azeri offensive 
brought them within 10 km of Stepanakert, the Karabagh Armenian Capital. While 
Azeris aimed to recapture Susha and the Lachin Corridor in September, they were 
eventually repelled in October and the Karabagh Armenian position stabilized. On 
September 19, 1992, Armenia and Azerbaijan agreed on a cease-fire with the 
participation of Pavel Grachev, the Russian Defense Minister.  In October 1992, the 
Azerbaijan Parliament voted in favor of leaving the CIS as President Elchibey reoriented 
Azerbaijan away from Russia and toward Turkey in an effort to reverse the policies of his 
rival, Muttalibov.   
On February 5, 1993, the Armenians launched an attack to regain the territories 
lost to Azerbaijan after Azerbaijan’s June 1992 offensive, and they literally routed the 
Azerbaijanis. After their successes in recapturing Agdere-mardakert, Armenians turned to 
the west on April 3 and occupied Kelbajar, an Azeri city outside the Karabagh. Thus they 
managed to open another corridor linking Karabagh with Armenia other than the Lachin 
corridor. The fall of Kelbajar created a big refugee problem as the Azeri civilians were 
trapped between the advancing Armenian forces. As Azerbaijan lacked enough air 
transportation, efforts to evacuate all of the 62,000 people in the region failed. Despite 
President Elchibey’s requests, Turkey refused to send in its helicopters, probably for fear 
of alarming its Western Allies or of over committing. Fearful of an end similar to that in 
Khocali, the Azeri inhabitants tried to flee using the snow-covered mountain passes 
around the city. Meanwhile, the Armenian forces continued their offensive by attacking 
Fizuli, another big Azeri city outside the Karabagh on April 4. 
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 The Armenian attacks against the Azeri populated areas outside the Karabagh 
turned the Turkish public opinion sharply against Armenia. Public outrage created by the  
predicament of the Azeri civilians forced the Turkish Government to act. Although 
reluctant, the Turkish government tried to exonerate itself against the increasing criticism 
of all of the nation’s opposing political parties.  As a first step to this end, on April 3, 
1993, Turkey closed its border to Armenia and participated in an embargo which was 
previously initiated by Azerbaijan.  In conjunction with the embargo and in an attempt to 
intimidate the Armenians into stopping their offensive outside the Karabagh, Turkey 
massed troops on the Armenian border and the risk for an expanding conflict increased. 
Turkish President, Turgut Ozal, following a solidarity tour of Turkic countries of the 
former Soviet Union, declared in Baku on April 14, 1993, three days before his death 
that: 
In Armenia, some circles wish to test the patience of the Turkic Peoples. 
They are making a terrible mistake.64 
 
Ozal also said that Russian transport planes increased their flights to Yerevan 
substantially before and after the Armenian aggression on Kelbajar, and that he doubted 
that they were carrying just humanitarian aid.65 Russia made it known that a possible 
Turkish intervention would trigger a World War and there were nuclear threats against 
Turkey.  The U.N Security Council passed a resolution (# 822) on April 30, condemning 
the violence and calling for a cease-fire without naming any aggressors. In the same 
resolution, the U.N designated the CSCE as the primary forum to seek an agreement on 
the conflict.  In the same month, the parties to the war adopted a Turkish-US and Russian 
sponsored peace plan.  
Shortly after the peace plan, political instability ensued in Baku. A local 
commander, Suret Huseinov, who the APF government dismissed, refused to leave his 
post and instead started a standoff with the government from his power base in Ganja. He 
was accused of pulling his troops out of the front in the face of the Armenian attacks on 
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Agdere-mardakert in February 1993. He had declined to return to the front despite several 
requests.  Huseinov reportedly had close contacts with the Russian troop, 104th Airborne 
Russian Regiment, deployed in Ganja and appropriated a considerable amount of the 
regiment’s weaponry when it withdrew on May 28, 1993. On June 4th, a clash occurred 
between Huseinov supporters and the government troops over the possession of weapons 
left by the withdrawing Russian unit, which left ten people dead. Husseinov prevailed 
and started a march on the capital, Baku, demanding the resignation of the government.  
Allegedly, Russia supported Husseinov to topple the pro-Turkish Elchibey government. 
The timing of the coup reinforces this perception as it coincided with an oil agreement to 
be signed by western oil companies and the Azerbaijan government in June 1993. The 
agreement would include the development of three Azeri oil fields in the Caspian Sea bed 
and a pipeline to carry the oil to the Turkish Mediterranean port of Ceyhan. Russia was 
being excluded in both projects.    
On June 11, The Azerbaijan Parliament offered amnesty to the rebels in return for 
ending their march on the capital, which Huseyinov refused. On his way to Baku, 
Huseinov fired Popular Front members from government posts and replaced them with 
former communists in towns and cities he stopped by. In an effort to placate the 
Huseinov, Heydar Aliyev, a former KGB general and Politburo member, was brought in 
from his native Nakhcivan province and chosen as the speaker of the Azerbaijan 
Parliament. Aliyev had refused to accept the post of Prime Minister in an attempt to make 
way for his own presidency after the shaky Elchibey.  Huseinov continued his march 
unopposed. Elchibey left his post in Baku on June 17 and left for his hometown in 
Nakhcivan.  
The new speaker of the Azerbaijan Parliament, Heydar Aliyev, took over the 
functions of the President and assigned the rebel leader Huseinov as the prime 
minister.66 Aliyev distanced himself from the policies of the Elchibey government as he 
dismissed Turkish military advisors, postponed the signing of the oil deal in June, and 
announced his intention to bring Azerbaijan back to CIS in September. In the meantime, 
with the Political disorder in Baku, Armenians attempted to capitalize on the situation by 
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scraping the tripartite peace plan of Russia, Turkey and the US.  Seeing a golden 
opportunity in this political turmoil in Azerbaijan, they attacked Agdam, another Azeri 
city outside the Karabagh, on July 12 and captured it on 23 July. On the same day, 
Armenians attacked the Azeri cities of Jebrail and Fuzuli on the Iranian border and to the 
south of Agdam. The U.N Security council adopted another resolution (#853) 
condemning the violence but not its perpetrators on July 29, 1993. Armenian forces 
captured the besieged cities of Jebrail and Fizuli in August (20 and 24), while driving 
local Azeri population, amounting to a quarter million, from their homes.  Wedged by 
closing Armenian troops with the exception of a narrow escape route to Eastern 
Azerbaijan in Goradiz, a considerable amount of Azeri refugees crossed the Aras River 
into Iran to escape from their bleak prospects. This refugee flow caused serious concerns 
in Iran, which set up refugee camps to accommodate the flood of refugees on August 
27th.  
When the Armenian forces turned their assaults on Goradiz and Kubatli, the last 
passage for the refugees out of the Armenian circle into Azerbaijan, Iran dispatched 
troops on September 2 into Azerbaijan, securing a buffer zone for the refugees. In 
anticipation of additional refugees amounting to hundreds of thousands, Iran prevented 
the refugees from crossing into Northern Iran, which was populated by an ethnic Azeri 
majority. The Iranian incursion into Azerbaijan drew criticism from Russia. Another U.N 
Security Council resolution (#874), on October 14, 1993, cautioned all-regional states 
from interference or intervention, which would spread the violence in the region. 
Armenians captured Goradiz on October 25. They attacked and captured Zangilan, the 
last remaining Azeri town south of Agdam to the Iranian border, thus driving 60,000 
more civilians into Iran on October 28.  
As an evaluation of its performance by the end of 1993, the Azerbaijan Army was 
badly routed, had to leave its civilian population at the mercy of Armenian forces and on 
most occasions had outright escaped the front.  Aliyev tried to bring some order into the 
Army by taking steps to prevent or at least decrease desertion from the ranks. Desertion 
was a serious problem in the Azerbaijan Army. The desertion rates decreased with an 
initial pardon allowing them to return to their units and then by draconian measures to 
deter it. According to some claims, Aliyev further reaped the benefits of distancing 
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Azerbaijan from the Pro-Turkish Elchibey policies by bringing Azerbaijan back to the 
CIS and improving relations with Russia. Azerbaijan allegedly acquired Russian 
weaponry although the credibility of the claims is unknown. Aliyev also reportedly 
regulated the subordination issue in the Azeri Army, as the previous Azeri operations had 
suffered from a lack of coordination between the different units.   He also brought back 
the Turkish military advisors, whom he had fired, and acquired additional ones from 
Russia, together with mercenaries from Afghanistan and the CIS states.  
As a result, Azeris initiated a counter attack to regain their lost territories on 
December 10, 1993 with initial successes. Azeri forces recaptured Goradiz and 
surrounding villages on January 12, 1994. The Azeri attacks halted in February 1994 with 
the worsening winter conditions and the intervention of the regular Armenian Republic 
troops that were dispatched to aid the Karabagh Armenian forces. On February 18, 1994, 
Russian Defense Minister Grachev presented a plan for a cease-fire, disengagement and 
withdrawal, including a leading Russian military role. In this proposal, a summit of 
Russian, Armenian, and Azeri Presidents would decide the Karabakh’s status, with 
Karabakh participating. However, the Azeri parliament initially rejected a revised version 
of this plan. 
   After some more minor clashes, belligerent parties agreed on a cease-fire in 
Bishkek on May 12, 1994 under the supervision of Russia. Today, skirmishes still flare 
up in border areas between Azeri and Armenian troops with a possibility of full- fledged 
hostilities resuming.67 In summary, the Armenians managed to capture Karabagh and a 
buffer zone surrounding it which make up 20 percent of Azeri territory, displaced the 
Azeri population from Karabagh and other occupied territories of Azerbaijan and 
managed to change the internationally recognized borders of a state in their favor without 
a tangible retribution other than Azerbaijan and Turkey’s embargo.  
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D.        MEDIATION PROCESS IN THE CONFLICT (1994-) 
 The main international organization resolving the Karabagh conflict is the 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). OSCE’s role in Karabagh 
started after the former Soviet republics entered the organization in January 1992 and the 
Minsk Group was created in March 1992. The Minsk Group includes Belarus, France, 
Finland, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Russia, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, and the United 
States.68 The U.N Security Council also designated the OSCE (then CSCE) as the 
primary forum to seek an agreement on the conflict on April 30, 1993. As a result, the 
organization became the primary mediator between the conflicting sides.  
Despite the best of intentions, the OSCE initially lacked the means and the 
expertise to end the conflict. At the same time, Russia tried imposing its will in areas that 
it claimed were its sphere of influence. As a result, despite its initial willingness to 
cooperate with the OSCE in the South Caucasus, Russia chose to act independently. 
Organizing its own meetings with the parties to the conflict, Russia proposed its own 
cease-fires and acted independently of the OSCE efforts. Russian Defense Minister Pavel 
Grachev, for example, presented a plan in May 1994, consisting of a cease-fire, 
disengagement, and a CIS separation force. This force would consist of 1,800 troops, 
primarily Russians, under the command of the Russian First Deputy Defense Minister.  
The plan was designed to exclude the OSCE, as there was no representative from the 
organization. 
Although agreeing to a cease-fire to take effect on May 12, Azerbaijan refused to 
allow the CIS (Russian) troops on its territory, because the Azeris believed that Russia 
was becoming increasingly Pro-Armenian. Russia tried to bully Azerbaijan into yielding 
to its demands to station troops in the Azeri territory. The Azeri leadership rebuffed the 
proposition while improving relations with Turkey and trying to mobilize the 
International Community for an International Peacekeeping force to replace the Russian 
offer.  
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In June of 1994, the Minsk Group Chairman suggested a unified OSCE-Russian 
approach instead of unilateral attempts. This approach would prevent the parties from 
trying to play one side against another. Azerbaijan insisted that no country should provide 
more than 30 percent of the peacekeepers. Armenia, on the other hand, was adamant that 
there should be no Turkish contingents. The United States also entered the process to 
ensure an international force instead of a predominantly Russian one. The unilateralist 
Russian approach frustrated the U.S ambassador to the CSCE. He said:  
Their bad faith became increasingly obvious … It was clear that it was 
their deliberate intention not to cooperate, thus to ensure that their own 
proposal would be understood by the parties to be the only game in town, 
and ultimately to supplant the International negotiation process.69 
  
The Minsk Group meeting in Vienna criticized the Russian efforts as unilateral 
and as excluding the OSCE, which led the Russians to boycott the remainder of the 
meeting. The OSCE participating states categorically rejected another Russian proposal 
to have the OSCE grant a mandate and to pay for the Russian/CIS peacekeeping 
operation in Karabagh.70 An impasse appeared in the peace-making process, as each side 
tried to capitalize on it.  As compromise in December 1994, Russia was named co chair 
of the Minsk Group at the Budapest Summit, with France and the United States.  
Despite this newly formed understanding between the OSCE and Russia, little 
tangible progress was achieved. The two opposing states had widely different 
irreconcilable objectives. Both sides were also reluctant to compromise due to domestic 
opposition at home. Each side believed that time was on its side. The main obstacles to a 
solution were the status and security of Nagorno-Karabagh; the status of Susha and 
Lachin; and the return of the refugees. The Karabagh Armenian leadership was especially 
intransient on these issues, sometimes to the extent of directly contradicting Armenia 
itself. Throughout 1995, Armenia insisted on a phased approach to the problem, although 
the Karabagh Armenians refused such an approach. The Karabagh leadership favored a 
package deal to decide on the crucial questions. Karabagh’s status, refugees, and the 
status of Lachin and Susha were to be agreed upon before the occupied territories were 
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returned to Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan, instead, preferred a phased solution, which would 
ensure the return of refugees to their homes before the negotiations for Karabagh’s final 
status started.  
Talks about the final status of Nagorno-Karabagh, held in Stokholm, ended in 
failure in June 1996.  A new series of talks were held in Finland with another eventual 
failure. The aim of the talks was to reach an agreement or a common understanding 
before the Lisbon Summit of the OSCE. The Lisbon Summit, held in December 1994, 
was a success for Azeri diplomacy. The Karabagh conflict took the center stage during 
the Summit in Lisbon. The Lisbon Summit Declaration contained a paragraph supporting 
the Azerbaijani position on the issue. Due to the Armenian protests, the paragraph did not 
form a part of the final, binding document. It was, although, included as Annex 1 of the 
declaration of the OSCE Chairman in Office, Swiss Foreign Minister, Flavio Cotti.  The 
statement of the OSCE Chairman in Office was a very strong endorsement of 
Azerbaijan's position.71 The Armenian delegation protested the statement, and contended 
that it was predetermining the outcome of the negotiations to be held between the 
Armenians and the Azeris.72 
The nine member states of the Minsk Group (Germany, France, Turkey, the U.S, 
Russia, Belarus, Finland, Sweden and Italy) supported the three principles advocated in 
the paragraph. These principles were the territorial integrity of the republics of Armenia 
and Azerbaijan; The legal status of Nagorno-Karabagh with the highest degree of self-
rule within Azerbaijan; guaranteed security for Nagorno-Karabagh and its whole 
population, including the mutual obligations to ensure compliance by all parties with the 
provisions of the settlement. Armenians, however, claimed that insistence on Nagorno-
Karabagh staying within Azerbaijan was contrary to the spirit and aims of the Minsk 
Process. The status of Karabagh had to be negotiated and decided at the Minsk 
Conference, not before it.  In the Armenian view, such demands also precluded the 
"guaranteed security" for the population of Karabagh. 
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After the Summit, Armenia appeared isolated and uncompromising before the 
International Community.  In May 1997, the Minsk Group issued a new set of proposals 
offering new terms. These terms included a return of territories outside the Karabagh, 
together with Susha within Karabagh, back to Azerbaijan. Refugees would return to their 
homes. In return, Azerbaijan would accept a Karabagh constitution, a temporary defense 
force under the supervision of the OSCE, a humanitarian corridor connecting Karabagh 
to Armenia, special tariff and trade treatments. The final status of Karabagh would be 
negotiated afterward. The Karabagh leadership dismissed the plan as being unrealistic.73 
While Azerbaijan preferred more cooperation with the West, Armenia chose to increase 
its relations with Russia. Armenia concluded a military agreement with Russia, granting 
Russian military bases in its territory. 
Meanwhile, the Azeri government concluded oil agreements with western oil 
companies to develop and to transport oil. Fearing a change in the current balance 
favoring Armenia, Armenia’s relatively moderate President, Levon Ter-Petrossian, 
declared in October 1997 that any future struggle for an independent Karabagh would be 
impossible. He admitted that the conflict needed to be settled according to the plan 
proposed by the OSCE Minsk Group.  As a result, Ter-Petrossian agreed to a two-stage 
OSCE plan on Karabagh. Accordingly, the Karabagh Armenian forces would withdraw 
from the occupied territories surrounding the Karabagh. These areas would be 
demilitarized and the refugees would return to their homes under the monitoring of a 
2,000 strong UN force. Karabagh would continue to exist in its current form. Karabagh’s 
future status and security, and the status of Lachin and Susha would be dealt with in the 
second stage. The Azeri refugees would not return to these two places until their status 
could be agreed upon. The final status of Karabagh would not be implemented until each 
side agreed and Karabagh would have a veto power on any status agreement. The Azeri 
Blockade and the Turkish embargo against Armenia and Karabagh would end. 
Normalization of relations in the region would ensue.   
Azerbaijan welcomed the decision. Nevertheless, the plan could not be 
implemented. The Karabagh Armenians categorically refused the plan and the plan itself 
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created a backlash among hardliners in Armenia. In September 1997, the Armenian 
President addressed his nation in a press conference, reiterating his opinion on the 
Karabagh issue.  He declared that Azerbaijan had agreed to the draft plan foreseen by 
OSCE and that Armenia would respond likewise. His statement caused an outrage in 
Karabagh and among Armenia’s hardliners.  President Ter-Petrossian was accused of 
selling out Karabagh Armenians. He lost support of the so-called power ministries in the 
government. After a standoff with the opposition, Petrossain was forced to resign in 
February 1998.  Karabagh separatist leader, Robert Kocharian, who was also the current 
prime minister of Armenia, took over. The Kocharian government announced the refusal 
of the Minsk Group’s phased plan, and instead proposed a package plan to resolve all the 
issues beforehand. He also ruled out any agreement that would subordinate Karabagh to 
Azerbaijan. The OSCE found itself in a dilemma, as Michael Och remarks:  
The refusal by Armenia and Nagorno-Karabagh to consider the earlier 
plan has brought about wholesale changes in the OSCE’s mediation, 
leading to the conclusion that stubbornness yields dividends. If Baku 
draws this inference and sticks to its position, the Minsk Group will either 
have to devise a new compromise plan somewhere between the two 
already proffered or face growing irrelevance. All the contenders in 
Azerbaijan’s October 11 presidential elections, except for Heydar Aliyev, 
voiced doubts about OSCE’s ability to resolve the conflict, with some 
calling for UN Security Council involvement (given UN Security Council 
record in conflict resolution, writer contends that this pleas for its 
involvement may be caused by desperation rather than reasoning).74 
 
            Seeing the intransigence of the new Armenian leadership, the Minsk Group 
offered another plan in which Karabagh and Azerbaijan would form a common state. 
Two self-governing entities of seven million Azerbaijan and 150,000 Karabagh would 
coexist under a symbolic structure. The common state between Serbia and Montenegro 
under the name of Yugoslavia was the example. Azerbaijan feared that such a 
compromise would lead to the same kind of demands by its Lezgin and Talish minorities. 
This would turn Azerbaijan into a lose federation, prone to foreign manipulation in 
Azerbaijani internal affairs.75  Azerbaijan declared the plan a non-starter in November 
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1998 and consequently the Minsk Group abandoned it. The Kocharian government 
declared three principles upon which they would not compromise. These were 
· No subordination of Karabagh to Azerbaijan; 
· A Self-declared Karabagh Republic should not exist as an enclave within 
Azerbaijan; 
· Karabagh should determine its own degree of safety and guarantees. 
Karabagh Armenians insisted on the retaining armed forces, finance and state 
structure independent from Azerbaijan, and having Armenia as a guarantor state in case 
of a political agreement. Kocharian declared in April 1998 that Azerbaijan had to accept 
beforehand that Karabagh could not possibly return to Azerbaijan rule. In June 1998, 
Armenian foreign minister Vartan Oskanian stated that Armenia might take unilateral 
action and annex Karabagh to break the Azeri intransigence,76but backed down 
following a harsh reaction from the U.S State Department and the Minsk Group.77 
Oskanyan also stated that Armenia would never accept Lisbon Summit princ iples.78  On 
the other side, Azeri President Aliyev reiterated that Azerbaijan would never give 
Karabagh independence, but it was ready to afford any degree of self-government, except 
an army and external political bodies.  
Despite the deadlock, the Presidents of the respective countries, President Aliyev 
and Kocharian have met occasionally to discuss the Karabagh issue under the supervision 
of the Minsk Group co-chairs since April 28, 1998.79 The two Presidents met four times 
in 1999.  While there were rumors of improvement in the relations, gunmen raided the 
Armenian Parliament in September, killed the Armenian Prime minister, the speaker of 
the parliament, and six other government officials. On November 5, the Armenian 
Foreign Minister Oskanian noted that the assassinations had produced a “slowdown in the 
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resolution of the conflict.”80 As a result, meetings were suspended only to resume in 
January 2000.81 The two presidents met again in Key West, Florida in April of 2001 in a 
five-day conference where it was rumored that they were close to an agreement.82  
However, talks ended without a result as the two Presidents were reluctant to compromise 
on certain issues. They were probably wary of the political implications of a compromise 
in domestic politics. 83  The Armenian President must have been especially wary of 
Armenian hardliners who had toppled his predecessor for his conciliatory attitude 
towards the conflict.84 The outcome of these talks will determine the future of the 
conflict and the region with implications about the viability of the OSCE in resolving 
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IV. ARMENIA 
Armenia is a small country, covering an area of 29,800 square km, with a 
population of approximately 3.6 million people. It borders Azerbaijan on the east, 
Georgia on the north, Iran on the south, the Nakhcivan province of Azerbaijan on the 
southwest, and Turkey on the west. Armenia announced its independence on September 
21, 1991 and engaged in an armed conflict with neighboring Azerbaijan, capturing 
Karabagh and the surrounding Azerbaijani territories. The war resulted in a ceasefire, 
which is still in effect despite occasional skirmishes that claim almost four hundred dead 
annually.85 Armenia is seemingly content with the status quo. It achieved more than it 
had anticipated by occupying 20 percent of Azerbaijani territory outside the Karabagh, 
including the strategic Lachin corridor. This area was populated by Azeris and Kurds and 
separated Karabagh from Armenia. Armenians ethnically cleansed the Karabagh and the 
adjoining territories. They evicted almost one million Azeri refugees to secure an Azeri 
province populated by roughly one hundred and fifty thousand Armenians. Armenia itself 
is an ethnically homogenous count ry, owing to efforts of Armenian revolutionaries since 
the beginning of the century, and its population shares a strong ethnic cohesion. The 
possibility of domestic turmoil is much lower compared to Azerbaijan, although 
assassinations of important political figures have been widespread in Armenia. 
The Armenian attitude to Azerbaijan and to resolving the Karabagh conflict will 
determine the relations and the stability in the region. Although Armenians occupied 
Azerbaijani territory and evicted Azeri refugees, they managed to portray themselves as 
victims in the conflict, owing to the fact that Armenia enjoys broad sympathy abroad. As 
Svante Cornell puts it:  
Nevertheless the Armenians managed to de facto alter internationally 
recognized borders by force, without even receiving a direct condemnation 
by any major power or organization except Turkey and to a lesser extent 
Iran. Neither was any international sanctions even discussed. In this sense, 
The Armenian campaign was a clear-cut success.86 
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Armenia was not even explicitly mentioned as the aggressor in U.N resolutions, 
which condemned the violence, virtually, out of custom.  Armenia’s success mostly lies 
in the capable hands of the Armenian Diaspora, which excelled in effective lobbying and 
promoting the Armenian cause. An estimated 60 percent of the total eight million 
Armenians worldwide live outside the country, with one million each in the U.S. and 
Russia. The Armenian communities in the United States are especially well-organized 
and funded lobbies, ranking among the most influential ethnic lobbies on Capitol Hill. In 
addition, significant Armenian communities live in Georgia, France, Iran, Lebanon, 
Syria, Argentina, and Canada. As a result, Armenians enjoy rather favorable relations 
with a couple of influential states, compared to its adversary, Azerbaijan. 
 






A.        ARMENIAN- RUSSIAN RELATIONS 
Armenian-Russian relations have traditionally been and still are very cordial. For 
at least two centuries, Russians assumed the role of the protector of the Armenians. This 
self-appointed role afforded the Russian empire with the pretexts it needed to carve up 
the territory of the Ottoman Empire during its waning years. This close cooperation 
between the Russia and the Armenians was evidenced by a common hostility against the 
Ottoman Turks since the 18th century. Armenia signed a friendship, cooperation, and 
mutual assistance agreement with Russia on August 29, 1997 against any third party 
aggression. Both sides characterized this agreement as a strategic partnership and 
Armenian President Ter Petrossian said that it provided “elements of an alliance.” In 
addition, Russians have military bases in Armenia and they control Armenian-Turkish 
and Armenian-Iranian borders.  
Russia allegedly supplied Armenia with a billion dollars worth of military 
equipment including 84 T-72 tanks, 32 Scud-B missiles with 8 launchers, 1,000 hand-
fired anti–aircraft missiles free of charge 87 between 1994-96.88 This transfer was in 
violation of the CFE treaty. 89 Shortly after Armenia participated in a CIS air defense 
system on April 15, 1999,90 Russia declared its intention to deploy S-300 anti aircraft 
missiles in Armenia 91 and installed them in September of 2001.92 Deployment of theses 
missiles in Cyprus had caused serious problems between Southern Cyprus and Turkey in 
the past, and Turkey had threatened to destroy these missiles if the Cypriots deployed 
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them. The Commander- in-Chief of the Russian Air Force said that the S-300s were 
needed to protect Armenia and the CIS from Turkey and NATO. Later, the Russian 
Defense Minister reiterated that Russian-Armenian military cooperation is not directed 
against a third party. 93 Armenian and Russian militaries also conduct joint training 
exercises.94 
 Armenian-Russian relations were not very close until 1992. The Armenian 
defiance of Soviet authorities on the status of Nagorno Karabagh during the dissolution 
of the Soviet Union irritated the relations. As a challenge to Gorbachev’s efforts to keep 
the Soviets together, Armenia had declared its firm intent to seek independence from the 
Union. Unlike Azerbaijan, Armenia had also refused to participate in the “all-Union” 
referendum in March of 1991. Armenia’s main motive was the fear that the new Union 
Treaty to be adopted after the referendum would confirm the sovereignty rights of 
Azerbaijan over Karabagh. Armenian opposition to the Soviet Union’s continuation led 
the Soviets to side with Azerbaijan until the Union dissolved. This Soviet-Azeri 
cooperation was evident in “ Operation Ring,” conducted jointly by Soviet and Azeri 
troops against Armenian militants in Karabagh.  
However, this strained relations between the Russians and the Armenians changed 
shortly after the dissolution.  As Azerbaijan took a more independent approach and 
started to lean to Turkey, Armenia’s reluctant nemesis, in orientation, Armenia chose a 
closer relationship with its traditional ally, Russia. As it began to appear clearly that 
Turkey would side with the Azeris in the conflict and that a possible rapprochement was 
unlikely, Armenians aligned themselves with Russia and adopted a very pro-Russian 
foreign policy.  
The Russian alliance brought invaluable benefits to Armenia, apart from the flow 
of weapons. During the intensity of Armenian attacks on Azeri cities, Armenians avoided 
an international U.N embargo thanks to the Russian membership in the Security 
Council.95   Russia is Armenia’s biggest trading partner despite the fact that these two 
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states do not share a common border. Armenia alleviates the effect of the Aze ri-Turkish 
embargo through supplies of agricultural goods, raw materials and energy brought in 
from Russia and Iran. One indirect benefit for Armenians of the Russian close 
cooperation was the destabilizing role Russia played in Azerbaijan’s internal affairs. The 
Suret Huseyinov coup, as explained in detail in the third chapter, was considered a 
Russian-engineered or at least a Russian-encouraged move intended to topple the 
Elchibey government, which Russians perceived to be working against their interests. 
Armenia used the political instability and disorder engendered by this coup attempt and 
consolidated its gains by capturing additional Azeri territories. The most significant of all 
the benefits was the tangible Russian security guarantees against Armenia’s neighbors. 
Apart from the Russian military bases and air defense systems, security guarantees make 
an intervention against Armenia highly unlikely.  The Treaty on Collective Security 
signed between Kazakhstan, Russia, Kyrgizystan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Armenia in 
Tashkent on May 15, 1992, forms the basis of the security guarantee to Armenia. It states 
that: 
If one of the participating states is subjected to aggression by any state or 
group of states, this will be received as an aggression against all 
participating states to the treaty. In the event of an act of aggression being 
committed against any of the participating states, all the other participating 
states will give it the necessary assistance, including military assistance, 
and also will give support with the means at their disposal by way of 
exercising the right to collective defense in accordance with Article 51 of 
the UN charter.96 
 
 This commitment was tested when in April of 1993, after Armenian forces 
captured Kelbajar outside the Karabagh and attacked the Fizuli, another large Azeri city. 
Turkey massed troops on the Armenian border and some prominent political figures, 
including the late President Turgut Ozal, articulated the possibility of Turkey’s 
intervention in the conflict to stop Armenian aggression:  
To prevent any potential Turkish opportunism, Marshal Shaposhnikov, 
then Commander- in-Chief of the Joint Armed Forces of the CIS, warned 
of a “ Third World War” if Turkey were to interfere militarily in the 
Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict. In March 1993, General Grachev, Russia’s 
Defense Minister, made Russia’s own military co-operation with Turkey 
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conditional on Ankara’s discontinuing its military assistance to Baku.97  
 
On the other hand, Jonathan Aves contends that a direct Russian threat to 
intervene on behalf of Armenia kept Azerbaijan from directly attacking Armenia (other 
than a few minor incidents on the border),98 which clearly reveals the value of the 
Russian alliance for Armenia.  
B.        ARMENIAN-IRANIAN RELATIONS 
Armenia’s relations with Iran are also close actually, similar to that of Russia’s. 
Initially, however, Iranian-Armenian relations fluctuated during the conflict. Iran 
assumed a mediator role in the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, when, on 
March 15, 1992, it brokered a cease-fire, which both sides eventually failed to observe. 
Iran had several goals by assuming this self-appointed mediator role. One of its aims was 
to restrict an increased Russian and Turkish role in the region as the conflict protracted. 
Iran also wanted to forestall a serious refugee problem and balance the powers of 
Armenia and Azerbaijan so as not to create a cycle of irredentism and a security threat to 
Iran.99  The Armenians especially welcomed Iran’s mediator role as the leader of the 
Karabagh Armenians stated:  
All these territories where once a part of Persia, and only later were joined 
to Russia. Iran has significantly more moral, political, historical, and 
geographic rights for participation in the resolution of the conflict, than 
Turkey. Yet the negotiations are held within the framework of OSCE, and 
Iran is not a member. This, along with a range of other reasons, keeps 
Teheran on a distance from participating in the peace process. In general 
we believe that Iran has a right to apply for the mediator’s role.100 
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On May 10th, Iranian President personally met with the presidents of the 
respective countries and brokered another cease-fire. At the time, this cease-fire was 
promoted as a victory of Iranian diplomacy. Whereas, with the declaration of the cease-
fire, Armenians attacked and captured Susha and Lachin, expelling the Azeri inhabitants. 
Armenian attacks in the face of Iran-brokered cease-fire embarrassed Iran. Its neutral 
stance tilted toward Azerbaijanis as fellow Shia Muslims and former Persian subjects. 
The fact that the Armenian attack occurred simultaneously with the cease-fire agreement 
was severely criticized in Iran according to Abdollah Ramezanzadeh. 101  The Iranian 
Daily Salam wrote, “The Armenians have proved that they do not keep any promises and 
that they took advantage of the opportunities (prepared for them by our diplomacy) for 
rearmament.” The paper also sharply criticized the Iranian foreign ministry for 
considering that rapprochement with Armenian and international bodies was more 
important then the massacres of the Azerbaijan’s Shiite population. 102   
However, this pro-Azeri sentiment would change with the advent of the APF 
government’s accession to power in Baku. This new government adopted a strong pro-
Turkish and pro-Western policy and flirted with NATO and the United States. The 
Azerbaijan government awkwardly rejected the role of Iran as a mediator and exclusively 
favored Turkey and the West. As a result, the Armenian-Iranian relations improved after 
this dramatic change in Baku’s policies. The Azeri clampdown on Iranian religious 
establishments in Azerbaijan was another irritant in their relations. Increasing fear of 
aggressive Azerbaijani nationalism also concerned Iran. Ethnic Azeris predominantly 
populated Northern Iran, which bordered Azerbaijan. Some Azeri officials in the new 
Elchibey government articulated their desires to unite Northern and Southern Azerbaijan 
(Southern Azerbaijan being Northern Iran). This was a direct challenge to Iran’s 
territorial integrity. Naturally, this aggressive rhetoric improved the Armenian-Iranian 
relations. According to Cornell, Azerbaijan’s President Elchibey himself, being pro-
Turkish, secularly oriented and pan-Azeri, was vehemently anti-Iranian. He allegedly 
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labeled Iran as a doomed state and predicted that within five years Azerbaijan would be 
united, thus showing his lack of diplomatic experience and tact.103 
 Iran’s deteriorating relations with Azerbaijan improved its relations with 
Armenia. Currently Iran is Armenia’s second largest trading partner, following Russia.104 
The border between these countries has been open throughout the conflict despite several 
incidents. Their relations temporarily severed when Iran sent in troops inside the Azeri 
territory on September 2,1993 to create a buffer zone and stem a refugee flow escaping 
from the invading Armenian forces. Relations were also tense when Armenian forces 
downed an Iranian airliner over Karabagh in March of 1994.105 Despite these initial 
difficulties between the two states, however, bilateral relations between Iran and Armenia 
have been very good so far. About 200,000 Armenians live in Iran and some hold official 
positions. The two nations have an economic cooperation agreement and a friendship 
pact dating back to 1992. Iran is in a trilateral economic agreement with Armenia and 
Greece, uneasy neighbors of Turkey, since 1997.106  
One of the most significant Armenian gains from improved relationship with Iran 
was the agreement concluded in May 1995, shortly after Iran was excluded from the oil 
deal signed between the Azeri Government and Western oil companies. According to this 
agreement, Iran would supply Armenia with natural gas and electricity for 20 years.107  
These two countries now plan to build a gas pipeline from Iran to Armenia in 2001,108 
which is financed by a consortium consisting of Russian, French and Greek 
companies.109 Through Iran and to some extent through Georgia, Armenia has resolved 
some transport problems caused by the Azeri and Turkish embargoes. The electricity and 
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gas supplies from Iran would especially do much to break the Azeri and Turkish 
embargoes on Armenia.  
C.        ARMENIAN-TURKISH RELATIONS 
Relations with Turkey are a bit complicated for Armenians. Turkish-Armenian 
relations date back to the 11th century when Seljuk Turks started to conquer the Caucasus 
and the Anatolia by pushing back the Byzantine Greeks westward. A good proportion of 
Armenians lived under different forms of Turkish rule until the early 20th century. Since 
the early 18th century, as the structure of the Ottoman Empire started to crumble, member 
states began to gain their independence from the empire with covert or overt foreign 
intervention. As influential powers, especially Russia, sought to dismember the Turkish 
Empire, the harmony that dominated the Turkish-Armenian relations began to give way 
to open hostility. Numerous wars, fought between the Russians and the Ottomans from 
the late 17th century to the WW I, became a proving ground for conflicting loyalties. 
Armenians generally sided with the invading Russian Armies against the Ottoman 
governments and rebelled several times within the borders of Turkey. 110 WW I was the 
last in a chain of wars between the Russian Empire since the early 17th century. During 
WW I, Armenians cooperated with the invading Russian Armies against the Turkish 
government. As a result, the Ottoman government deported the Armenians from Anatolia 
altogether.111 Armenians, thus, developed a long- lasting distrust for Turkey for what they 
call a genocide committed against rebelling Armenians during World War I. Paul Henze 
summarizes the nature of the events: 
In every Russo-Turkish war in the19th century and in World War I, Russia 
tried to use the Armenians of Anatolia as a fifth column. Ottoman 
Armenians suffered grievously as a consequence, and so did Kurds and the 
Turks in the region.112 
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Again, after Russia withdrew from the war, the Armenian attempt to occupy the 
Turkish towns of Kars and Ardahan led to a Turkish-Armenian War in September of 
1920. The war ended with the victory of the seemingly exhausted Turkish Army. 113 With 
the Treaty of Gumru/Alexandropol between Turkey and the Dashnak-governed Armenia 
on November 18, 1920, Armenians agreed to withdraw their claims on the territories they 
attempted to invade. The Treaty of Kars in March 1921 and the Treaty of Moscow in 
October 1921 between the Bolsheviks and the Republican Turkey further confirmed the 
current border between Turkey and Armenia. That humiliating Armenian defeat further 
aggravated their hard feelings and resentment toward Turkey. Especially the Diaspora 
Armenians, who were the descendants of those evicted from Turkey in 1915, began a 
campaign in the 1970s, which continues to the present. They pressed for the recognition 
of Ottoman deportations as “ genocide” in Western capitals, the latest example of which 
is the resolution adopted by the French Parliament.114   
Although scholars still seriously debate what actually happened during the World 
War I, Armenians and their sympathizers believe that deportation was a deliberate 
attempt of the Ottoman government to exterminate the country’s Armenian population. 
They put the number of Armenian casualties at 1.5 million. The Turkish government and 
scholars, on the other hand, claim that this number is grossly exaggerated, that both 
parties suffered from the inter-ethnic strife initiated by Armenians and as a result, more 
Turks were killed in the region than Armenians.115 The Genocide claim is a continuing 
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irritant in the relations. The current hardliner government in Yerevan, unlike the previous 
Ter Petrossian government, recognized the claimed genocide as an Armenian foreign 
policy goal. This  further exacerbated the relationship.  
Another obstacle in Turkish-Armenian relations is the irredentist Armenian 
claims on the Turkish territory. In January of 1991, the Armenian Parliament declared 
that Armenia no longer recognized the existing borders established by the treaty of Kars 
in 1921 between the Bolsheviks and the Turkish Republic. Following this declaration of 
the Armenian parliament, Turkey declared that it would not open diplomatic relations 
with Armenian unless Yerevan respected the existing borders and renounced its claims to 
Turkish territory. 116  
Despite a seemingly doomed start, Turkey tried to salvage the relations and to 
reconcile the old grievances by trying to engage Armenia into improving relations. For 
instance, Turkey was among the first countries to recognize Armenia on December 16, 
1991.  In April 1991, the Turkish ambassador in Moscow visited Armenia. Drafts of a 
treaty of friendship were prepared, together with an agreement to initiate direct cross-
border trade and the opening of a highway between the two countries.117 Turkey also 
tried to adopt a neutral stance in the Karabagh conflict in its early years and further 
offered grain and electricity for humanitarian purposes.  Turkey also let Armenian 
Diaspora in the U.S and in France use Turkish air space for humanitarian aids, many of 
which ended up being used on the front against the Azeris.118  
After the Khojali massacre on February 25, 1992, where Armenian forces killed 
up to a thousand unarmed Azeri civilians, public opinion turned strongly against 
Armenia. Public demonstrations in Turkey gathered hundreds of thousands in the streets 
protesting Armenian atrocities and the Turkish government’s inactivity. The Government 
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was forced to change its policy in the face of strong criticism from opposition parties. 
President Turgut Ozal made a statement that Turkey should “show its teeth”119 and that 
the Armenians needed to be frightened a bit to stop their offensive against Azeri 
civilians.120 Diaspora Armenians used Ozal’s statement widely to demonstrate Turkey’s 
intentions for another “ genocide” to exterminate the Armenians. Important Turkish 
political figures argued for a more assertive policy against the Armenians on Azerbaijan’s 
behalf.121 The leader of the Nationalist Action Party, for example, demanded an 
intervention to stop Armenian attacks and criticized the government for allowing an 
Armenian genocide of the Azeris.122   
Even under severe pressure, the Turkish government tried to maintain a moderate 
level of relations not to totally alienate the Armenians. In November 1992, Turkey signed 
an agreement with Armenia to supply the latter with electricity and allowed a 
considerable amount of food to pass through Turkish territory. 123 Ter Petrossian’s 
government, in return, sent warm signals following these Turkish moves. He was 
reportedly preparing to rule out the genocide claims and to accept the existing borders. 
To the consternation of the Turkish public, Suleyman Demirel’s government further 
declared that Turkey would send fuel and food to Armenia. Nevertheless, after continuing 
Armenian attacks and the occupation of Kelbajar, a large Azeri city outside of Karabagh, 
Turkey announced in March that it would inspect airplanes going to Armenia through 
Turkish aerospace. Turkey eventually closed its border to Armenia on April 3,1993 
(ostensibly due to Armenia’s noncompliance with Security Council Resolution #822).  
Despite the closure of the border with Armenia, Turkey tried to maintain some 
semblance of relations with Armenia. In April 1995, the Turkish Prime minister, Mesut 
Yilmaz, announced the reopening of an air corridor to Armenia.  Following the Armenian 
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offer to exclude genocide stance from the bilateral agenda if Turkey would exclude 
Karabagh, flights resumed in October.124 In March of 1996, Prime Minister Yilmaz 
declared that borders with Armenia could be opened before a formal accord if Armenia 
and Azerbaijan simply agreed on principles.  Allegedly, after pressure from Azerbaijan 
and its connections within the Turkish Parliament, he later added that Armenia must first 
recognize Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity. 125  
Relations seem to be getting worse after the forced resignation of moderate Ter 
Petrossian and the takeover of the hardliners in Armenia. Consequent Armenian President 
Kocharian was the former President of the self-declared Karabagh Republic. He could 
practically be regarded an Azerbaijan citizen. In May of 1998, Kocharian re- legalized the 
extremist Dashnak Party, which has a strong backing among the Diaspora Armenians. 
This party was in charge during the Armenia-Turkish war in 1920 and it has long been a 
strong supporter of genocide claims against Turkey. Its members also openly articulated 
territorial demands on the Turkish territory. Dashnaks, being the main supporters of the 
current Kocharian government, have demanded the recognition of the claimed Armenian 
genocide by the international community and Turkey. They also have demanded the 
return of large territories (articulated as six vilayets [cities] including Kars, Ardahan, 
Erzurum, Van, Trabzon, and Bitlis) in Eastern Turkey and the return of the entire 
Nakhcivan to Armenia. They sought the annexation of Nagorno Karabagh and 
compensations from Turkey for the 1915 events.126  Ter Petrossian had banned the 
Dashnak Party on charges of terrorism after a series of political assassinations in 1994.127 
Petrossian had formally accused the Dashnaks by a decree he himself read on Armenian 
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television. He had accused Dashnaks of running a secret armed organization called 
Dro;128 involvement in drug smuggling; and collecting intelligence on the Armenian 
Army and carrying out political assassinations.129 Turkey had welcomed this ban as a 
sign of good will considering the strong anti-Turkish rhetoric and the policies of the 
banned party.  
Kocharian also backed off from the proposed peace deal with Azerbaijan, which 
Petrossian had supported.  He adopted an uncompromising stance over the status of 
Karabagh and related issues. Kocharian further distanced Armenia from the policies of 
the Petrossian government by focusing on the “ genocide” campaign against Turkey in 
Western capitals.130 His government declared that it would openly pursue the “Armenian 
Cause,” or “Hai Dat” in Armenian, making reconciliation almost impossible.   
Considering Kocharian’s stance, an improvement in relations is seemingly 
impossible as the so-called Armenian cause includes demands unacceptable to Turkey. 
As these demands include the secession of a certain part of Turkey to Armenia, it is 
highly doubtful that any Turkish government would consider a rapprochement in the 
shadow of such demands.   
In addition to these irredentist claims, Armenia’s alignment with states, known to 
be unfriendly to Turkey, causes serious concern in Turkey and it further complicates the 
already tense relations. Armenia already has a defense agreement with Russia, which 
concerns Turkey. After a meeting between the Armenian Prime Minister and the Greek 
Chief of National Defense in July 1997, Armenia and Greece stated that they were to 
begin exchanging military intelligence and increasing joint training programs. In 
September of 1999, foreign ministers of Armenia, Greece, and Iran signed a 
memorandum that pledged to strengthen the original 1997 agreement on trilateral 
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cooperation on trade, communications, energy, and technology. 131 While all three denied 
that the agreement was directed at any other country, the actual extent of discussions on 
future defensive commitments are unknown. A tripartite defensive pact with anti-Turkish 
overtones is open to speculation. 132 Greek and Armenian Chief of Staffs further met in 
Yerevan, reportedly discussing joint training and defense industry initiatives in August 
2000.133  An Armenian delegation headed by the Armenian Defense Minister also met 
Syrian Defense Ministers, reportedly reviewing military cooperation and discussing ways 
to expand such ties.134 Following this meeting, Armenia and Syria signed a defense 
cooperation accord, details of which were not disclosed.135  Armenia’s close cooperation 
with Iran, Russia, Greece and Syria should naturally concern Turkish policy makers 
because such a cooperation creates a geographical encirclement that could assume an 
anti-Turkish character in the future.  
Although Turkey maintains that it aims to normalize relations with Armenia only 
when the Armenians make peace with their past, leave the judgment of the history to 
historians, drop their claims on the Turkish territory, and take concrete steps toward 
resolving their conflict with Azerbaijan, there are still some modest steps toward a 
dialogue in the relations.  A group of Turkish and Armenian former diplomats, 
academicians and intellectuals met in Geneva on July 9, 2001, following two previous 
meetings in Vienna. They finally decided to establish a "Turkish-Armenian 
Reconciliation Commission" to start a dialogue between the two sides at an informal 
level.  This commission would act as an informal bridge in the absence of a dialogue 
between Ankara and Yerevan. 136 A majority of groups in the Armenian Parliament, the 
Dashnaks and some other radical Diaspora groups opposed this initiative on the grounds 
that it would compromise the Armenian cause by trying to divide the Armenian public 
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opinion in its approach to the “genocide” issue.137 A reconciliation seems elusive in the 
short term between Armenia and Turkey, but the future of the relations is yet to be seen. 
D.        ARMENIAN-U.S RELATIONS 
Ironically, despite its close relations with Russia and Iran, Armenia also enjoys 
good relations with the United States.  Owing to its effective ethnic lobby in the US, 
Armenia is the largest per capita recipient of U.S aid among the former Soviet states138 
and the second largest in the world after Israel. 139 The Armenian lobby succeeded in 
depriving Azerbaijan of U.S foreign aids by influencing the U.S Congress to pass the 
Freedom Support Act Section 907 in 1992. The Armenian lobby also managed to provide 
U.S foreign aid for Karabagh by circumventing Baku. Remarks from a U.S Department 
of State Dispatch explains the situation well:  
Unfortunately, however, our ability to promote Azerbaijan’s democratic 
and economic reforms has been sharply limited since 1992 by section 907 
of the Freedom Support Act. This legislation also has restricted our ability 
to address urgent humanitarian needs. Aid to Azerbaijan since 
independence has been $80 million (thanks to a partial loosening of the act 
by the Clinton Administration) in a country where 780, 000 people are 
refugees or internally displaced. In contrast, we have provided $612 
million to Armenia, and $420 million to Georgia.140 
 
E.            CONCLUSION 
 
    Armenia seems to have the upper hand in relations with the Azerbaijan. 
However, the situation does not seem promising for Armenia, either. Its economy is in 
ruins. It lacks natural resources and is dependent on foreign energy. It sustains itself 
through foreign aid, mainly from the U.S and Russia and donations from Diaspora 
Armenians. Azerbaijani blockade and Turkish embargo seriously crippled its economy 
and strained its already low welfare. As an Armenian scholar put it: 
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Armenia has been an independent state for long [sic: for a long time] now, 
but people here joke that the country is not only independent of Russia, it 
is also independent of gas, light, warm water, and heat. Romantic dreams 
of a strong, democratic country and the victory of historical justice in 
Nagorno-Karabagh have faded into an endless war, economic paralysis, 
and a transportation and energy blockade.141  
 
Corruption is rampant in the government and the military. Allegations of abuses 
and corruption in conscription agencies are legion, creating an atmosphere of suspicion 
and fear. Many draft-age Armenians have left the country as a result.142  Several military 
officials were sentenced to terms of imprisonment in 1998 for soliciting bribes to gain 
exemption from service for favored people.143 War and the ensuing blockades caused a 
sharp deterioration in industrial production and increased overall poverty. There has been 
little foreign investment in the country due to the war and ensuing instability. Most 
importantly, between 700,000 to a million people, mostly those who are young and 
skilled, have left Armenia since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Some Western 
observers even say it is closer to 1.5 million, almost half of Armenia's population. 144 
Officially, 30% of the economically active population (18% in total), namely those who 
were to become the core of the middle class, left the country. 145 Some observers suggest 
that the same number of people might leave the country for Europe, the CIS countries and 
the U.S over the next five to ten years, if the situation plaguing the Armenia 
persists.146Even in Nazi Germany, which lost a war on two fronts from 1939 to 1945 
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World War II, the total loss of its population amounted to about 12% compared to 18% in 
Armenia.147  
The main causes of such emigration are the uncertain security conditions, a 
depressed economy, and the resulting socio-economic situation. These in turn were 
caused by the prolonged conflict with Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh, the ensuing 
transport blockade, the energy crisis, and the ensuing dramatic drop in living standards. 
This high emigration rate of skilled personnel has led to a severe "brain drain," which has 
had an adverse effect on the Armenian economy. Mass emigration also negatively 
affected the demographic structure of Armenia’s population. It contributed, together with 
the worsening of living conditions, to the postponement of marriages, the fall in fertility 
rates, the reduction of family size and the overall decrease in population growth. 148 Due 
to the migration of the economically active population, the percentage of children, 
unemployed and elderly people, refugees and other vulnerable groups rose. Therefore, 
the burden of the state, which is obliged to care for the vulnerable, increased, 
creating additional obstacles for the already fragile economy.   
While anticipating a democratic western orientation, Armenia chose to align itself 
with Russia and Iran. Armenia further consolidated this orientation with the forced 
resignation of moderate Levon Ter Petrossian and the takeover of hardliners since 1998. 
The impact of radical Dashnaks increased with the number of assassinations of important 
political figures some of whom were known for their reconciliatory attitudes toward the 
Karabagh issue and relations with Turkey. In light of these developments, Armenia seems 
to be consuming its own future prospects as a sovereign, prosperous, and democratic 
republic. It is, instead, consolidating its current situation as a democratically deprived 
country, which is at an undeclared war with its neighbors. Its gloomy democratic 
tradition is also coupled by an economic failure that causes its population to abandon the 
ship before it sank further into the depth. 
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V.         AZERBAIJAN 
Azerbaijan, like Armenia, is a small country, covering an area of 88,800 square 
km, with a population of approximately 7.3 million people. It borders the Caspian Sea on 
the west, the Russian Federation on the north, Georgia on the Northeast, Armenia on the 
east, and Iran on the south. Its southwestern part, Nakhcivan, is separated from the main 
body of the country by Armenia. In contrast to Armenia, Azerbaijan does not have an 
ethnically homogenous and ideologically united people. It witnessed political instability 
and upheavals together with military defeats after its independence. As mentioned 
previously, together with Karabagh, 20 percent of Azerbaijan’s territory is under 
occupation by neighboring Armenia and breakaway Karabakh Armenians. Around one 
million of its citizens had to flee their homes. These refugees are currently living in 
makeshift camps under squalid conditions and creating economic hardships and political 
unrest within the country. There is a budding separatist movement in Northern 
Azerbaijan among Lezgin minority, who demand unification with Daghestani Lezgins 
across the Russian border. There is also a considerable Talish minority in Southern 
Azerbaijan, which could be manipulated to exert further pressure on Azerbaijan. 
Azerbaijan does not have a strong foreign supporter or a Diaspora to promote its 
concerns.  As a result, despite minimal rhetorical support, most international actors have 
disregarded its claims on territorial integrity. In fact, during the Karabagh Conflict, 
Azerbaijan found all regional and global powers, which were related to the conflict, with 
the exception of Turkey, hostile to Azerbaijan or at least sympathetic to the Armenian 
side. The Azerbaijanis perceived that Russia and the United States had united, despite 
their historical and still ongoing rivalry, for a modern-day crusade against Azerbaijan. 
Supposedly, Russia was supplying the Armenians with weaponry while Americans were 
financing the Armenian war effort by extending it one of the highest per capita financial 
aid programs among all recipients of U.S aid.  Azerbaijan was subject to a U.S ban on 
foreign aid, due to its blockade of Armenia and Karabagh. Owing to the influential 
Armenian lobby in the U.S, the U.S was denying humanitarian aid to Azerbaijan, in 
which every eighth inhabitant was a war refugee or a displaced person. 149 Strangely 
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enough, this block was to be joined by Azerbaijan’s other powerful neighbor, the Islamic 
Republic of Iran, a fellow Shia Muslim country with which Azerbaijan had enjoyed 
common historical and religious bonds in the past.  
 
Figure 3.   Republic of Azerbaijan 
 
Azerbaijan contains rich mineral deposits and intends to use its oil wealth to buy 
friends and to exert pressure on Armenia. It intends to ensure its territorial integrity by 
encouraging the western oil companies to invest in the region and thus to use their 
relations with the western governments as leverage against Armenia. Azerbaijan also 
intends to develop close ties with NATO to further enhance its security. In February of 
1990, for instance, Azerbaijan asked for the deployment of U.S or NATO troops on its 
soil.150 An influential Azeri official (Vafa Guluzade, foreign policy advisor to Azerbaijan 
President) stated that the Incirlik air force base in Turkey could be re-stationed on the 
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Absheron Peninsula in Azerbaijan. This utterance caused a lightning- like response from 
Moscow, Yerevan, and Tehran. 151   
A.        AZERBAIJANI-RUSSIAN RELATIONS 
Azeri relations with Russia are not cordial, considering the bloody crackdown in 
Baku in 1988, the pro-Armenian Russian foreign policy and alleged involvement during 
the Karabagh War, the Armenian-Russian Friendship and Cooperation Agreement of 
August 1997, and lastly the massive Russian arms shipments to Armenia between 1994-
1996. Azerbaijan has refused to let Russia deploy troops and establish military bases 
within Azerbaijan’s borders, and as a result it was subject to Russian pressure and 
bullying. Russia considers the region in its own sphere of influence. This belief is 
expressed by many Russian politicians and evidenced by Russian meddling in numerous 
coup attempts and separatist movements in the region. 152 To keep the region in its own 
orbit, Russia intends to: 
· Reintegrate Caucasian and Russian security within the institutional context of 
the CIS.153 
· Form bilateral security arrangements with individual states in the South 
Caucasus and deploy Russian border troops to guard the external frontiers of the three 
South Caucasian States. Russian border guards are currently patrolling Turkish-Georgian 
and Turkish-Armenian borders.154 
· Re-establish permanent Russian military bases in South Caucasus, which it 
managed to achieve in Armenia and Georgia but failed in Azerbaijan. Russia has tried to 
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intimidate Azerbaijan into accepting Russian bases on a few occasions and allegedly 
plotted coups to topple defiant leaders.155 
· Press for an exclusive CIS (namely Russian) peacekeeping presence in the 
region. Russian attempts to dominate the Karabagh peacekeeping process was resisted by 
Azerbaijan, Turkey and the OSCE Minsk Group. Turkey refused a solely CIS military 
peacekeeping presence in the region and especially in the Karabagh conflict, in case an 
agreement had been reached between the sides.156 
· Station more Russian troops and weaponry than foreseen by the CFE treaty. 
· Restrict the role of the outsiders by promoting pipelines through Russian 
territory and dispute the legality of agreements concluded between the foreign oil 
companies. Russia also challenged Azerbaijan by disputing the legal status of Caspian 
Sea.157 Russian policy on this specific issue comes close to that of Iran’s, as will be 
explained below.  
 Remarks of the former US ambassador to OSCE and US special negotiator for 
the Karabagh, John Maresca, summarized the Russian intentions: 
Russia wished to reestablish its dominance in the region and to exclude 
outsiders, namely the US and Turkey. Russia wants to dominate Armenia 
and Azerbaijan for a number of reasons. Most obviously, Moscow would 
like to reestablish control of the former soviet frontier with Turkey and 
Iran and to share in Azerbaijan’s oil riches. To accomplish these aims, 
Russia has been pressuring Azerbaijan to accept the reentry of Russian 
troops as a separation force and as border guards, as to give Russia a share 
of the oil concessions being developed by Western Countries. For leverage 
the Russians have used an implicit but dramatic threat. If Azerbaijan does 
not comply, Russia will step up its backing for Armenia, with disastrous 
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military results for the Azeris.158 
 
Russian-Azeri Relations are in evolution as can be traced from the changing 
nature of the Russian support for Azerbaijan. During the Elchibey government between 
June 1992 and June 1993, relations with Russia lost their primary status compared to 
their cordial level during the of pro-communist Ayaz Muttalibov’s presidency years. 
Russian-Azerbaijani relations cooled down mostly with the anti-colonial struggle of 
Azerbaijani nationalists against Russia and the latter’s bloody crackdown on the 
Azerbaijani Popular Front in January 1992. Russia’s pro-Armenian standing and alleged 
Russian troop involvement, together with material and equipment support, in the 
Karabagh war exacerbated the relations.  
In October 1992, the Azerbaijani National Assembly voted unanimously against 
Azerbaijan’s membership in the CIS. Elchibey regarded the creation of the CIS as an 
attempt to restore the Soviet Union, and he insisted on bilateral relations with Russia. 
Elchibey and the succeeding Aliyev governments successfully resisted the Russian 
pressure for military bases on the territory of Azerbaijan; joint protection of Azerbaijan’s 
external borders; joint exploitation of Caspian oil and gas resources; unilateral Russian 
participation in the Karabagh peacekeeping operations and Russian leadership in the 
mediation process. Russia responded by forming a military alliance with Armenia; 
increasing its involvement in the conflict on the Armenian side; and creating political 
domestic instability within Azerbaijan. A warlord, Suret Huseinov, who was notorious 
for close contacts with Moscow, for example, toppled Elchibey. Heydar Aliyev, who 
assumed power after the Moscow-engineered coup in June 1993, used a more balanced 
and realistic approach toward Russia. He made several concessions in an attempt to 
placate Russian dissatisfaction and thus to elicit Russian support for Azerbaijan’s 
struggle against Armenia. In September 1993, Azerbaijan returned to the CIS.  
On the other hand, being aware of dominant Western interests, namely the 
economic benefits, Aliyev signed an $8 billion oil contract with a consortium of Western 
oil companies in September of 1994. Thus, as an act of pragmatism, he tied the economic 
interests of the U.S and the Western countries to the region. Signing of the oil agreement 
in September 1994, which also involved Russia’s Lukoil oil company, was regarded 
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negatively in Russia. The Foreign ministry declared Russia’s opposition to the deal   on 
the grounds that the legal status of the Caspian Sea and the ownership of the oil fields to 
be developed were disputed. Lukoil’s participation caused a conflict between the Russian 
Ministry of Energy, which sided with Lukoil, and the Russian Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs. Azerbaijan responded to the Russian dissatisfaction by giving Lukoil a larger 
share (32.5 %) in the development of another new oil field (which was named after 
Karabagh) and a ten percent share in the Shah Deniz oil field.  Lukoil remains the only 
foreign company to participate in all the contracts signed.  
There are, however, modest Russian steps to improve its relations with 
Azerbaijan. In April 1996, Russia agreed to extradite an Azeri national, Rahim Gaziyev, 
who was residing in Moscow after an alleged coup attempt against Azerbaijan President 
Aliyev. Moscow, on the other hand, turned down another Azeri request for the extradition 
of Ayaz Muttalibov, former President of Azerbaijan who was also living in Moscow. 159  
In August of 1996, President Aliyev and Russian Prime Minister Chernomyrdin signed a 
preliminary agreement on the lifting of a Russian blockade on Azerbaijan’s northern 
border. The blockade had allegedly intended to stop the Azeris from helping the Chechen 
rebels during the first Chechen war.   
Relations were strained again on October 1996, when Aman Tuleyev, the Russian 
minister for the CIS affairs, revealed that since 1994 Russia had supplied Armenia with a 
billion dollars worth of military equipment, including modern tanks and air defense 
weapons, free of charge. Azerbaijan protested the transfer as a violation of the CFE treaty 
and the CIS collective security agreement. However, Azeri demands to remove the 
weapons from Armenia were not heeded. Chairman of the Duma Defense Committee, 
General Rev Rochlin, protested the transfers and called for improved relations with 
Azerbaijan.    
In November of 1996, Chernomyrdin made serious concessions about the issue of 
the status of the Caspian Sea. He stated that Russia was willing to recognize the 
jurisdiction of the littoral states for a distance of 45 miles from the shore, compared to a 
previous offer of 20 miles. He also offered to extend this jurisdiction to other areas where 
oil extraction had begun or was about to start. The previous Russian position was that 
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there had to be a joint ownership and development of the Caspian Sea oil by all five 
littoral states. According to the Azerbaijan’s point of view, the Russian offer was not 
good enough because the Azerbaijan’s main oil fields were beyond the proposed 45-mile 
limit.  Nevertheless, the Russian offer was a good signal of their willingness to improve 
relations by abandoning their previously uncompromising attitude. At the Lisbon 
Summit, in December of 1996, Russia backed the Azerbaijan’s position regarding the 
Karabagh issue for the first time. At the summit, the principle of the territorial integrity 
took precedence over the right of self-determination.  
In March of 1997, Russia agreed to extradite Suret Huseinov, who was the former 
Azeri Prime minister and the warlord who had engineered the coup to topple the Elchibey 
government. Huseinov had to flee to Russia after his second coup attempt against Aliyev 
failed.  On July 4, 1997, Azerbaijan and Russia signed a Treaty of Friendship and 
Cooperation, which condemned “separatism” and promoted conflict settlements 
according to the principle of territorial integrity. Despite this mostly symbolical 
agreement, the Azeri-Russian agreement differed significantly from the one concluded 
between Russia and Armenia in that the former lacked tangible security provisions. 
Russia responded to Azeri concerns over Russia’s role as an impartial mediator, 
considering its security agreement with Armenia, by announcing that the treaty between 
Russia and Armenia “is not directed against Azerbaijan” and “will never be invoked to 
the advantage of those opposed to Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity.”160 On January 10, 
2001, Russian President Vladimir Putin made an official visit to Azerbaijan in an effort to 
improve the political, economic, and security relations. Russia seemed to modify its 
initial stance of unconditionally supporting Armenia against an Azerbaijan it had chosen 
to bully in the past in an effort to get Azerbaijan to return to the Russian orbit. However, 
considering the Russian tradition of volatility in its support of conflicting sides in the face 
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B.        AZERBAIJANI-IRANIAN RELATIONS 
Apart from Russia, Azerbaijan also has problems with Iran, another Armenian 
ally. Unlike Turkey, Iran did not recognize the independence of Azerbaijan until the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union. Iran’s reasons to pursue a seemingly anti-Azeri foreign 
policy can be interpreted as follows: 
· Baku’s pro-Western attitude, its close relations with Turkey, its flirting with 
NATO, the United States, Israel and the other Western states and its eagerness to lure 
foreign oil companies in the region;  
· Iran’s exclusion from the Caspian oil projects by Azerbaijan International 
Operating Company [AIOC] under the U.S pressure;  
· Azerbaijan’s refusal to yield to Iran’s claims about the status of the Caspian, 
thus facilitating foreign involvement and causing Iran to lose potential revenue; 
· The Azeri clampdown on Iranian religious establishment in Azerbaijan;  
· Iran’s increasing fear of a future dismemberment due to aggressive 
Azerbaijani nationalism that could lay claims on Northern Iran, which was populated 
mainly by ethnic Azeris;  
As explained in Chapter III, relations with Iran deteriorated during the APF 
government in Azerbaijan. Aliyev, however, chose to distance Azerbaijan from the 
earlier policies of Elchibey. During his presidency, relations improved to some extent.  
When Azerbaijan concluded an oil agreement in September of 1994 with foreign oil 
companies, Aliyev gave Iran a five percent share of the deal. This move was intended to 
improve relations with Iran and to elicit its support to increase the effects of the Azeri-
Turkish embargo on Armenia.  
However, the United States forced Azerbaijan to exclude Iran from the oil 
agreement in April of 1995. This naturally angered the Iranians and exacerbated the 
relations between the Azerbaijan and Iran. Since that time, Iran adopted a non-
conciliatory attitude toward Azerbaijan in almost every issue including the legal status of 
the Caspian Sea and property rights for exploiting the oil in the disputed areas. This 
hostility was evidenced recently when Iranian ships and aircrafts chased off Azeri ships 
from an area claimed by both states on July 23, 2001.161  
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Shortly after its exclusion from the agreement, Iran curtailed the electrical energy 
to Nakhcivan and drew itself closer to Armenia by concluding a couple of agreements on 
the energy issue. These agreements decreased the efficiency of the Azerbaijani embargo 
on Armenia. In June 1995, Iran concluded agreements with Russia to coordinate their 
policies in the Caspian. This coordination placed unified pressure on Azerbaijan 
regarding the legal status of the Caspian Sea. In June 1999, the Azeri National Security 
Ministry accused Iran of spying for Armenia and of training Islamist fighters to 
undermine the Azeri government. Iran currently harbors the leader of a 1995 troop 
rebellion in Azerbaijan, Mahir Jevadov, and refuses to extradite him.162  
Although Aliyev later offered a ten percent share to Iran for developing the Shah 
Deniz oil field, which Iran eventually accepted in May 1996, this offer did not appease 
Iran enough to elicit a decent level of cooperation.  Iran continues to exhibit a hostile 
attitude toward Baku. Currently Iran and Azerbaijan have differing views on Russia’s 
role in their region, on Azerbaijan’s relations with the United States, on NATO, on 
Turkey, on the division of the Caspian Sea, and on the proposed route of oil pipelines.163  
Interestingly enough, Azerbaijan’s close relationship with Israel causes another 
difficulty with Iran. Israel is currently forging ties with Azerbaijan and seeking ways to 
cooperate in the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline project.164  Allegedly, under the administration of 
the Ehud Barak, the Israelis established intelligence links with Azerbaijan, which shares a 
border with Iran. 165 Iran’s then foreign minister, Ali Akbar Velayeti, and his Azeri 
counterpart at the time, Hasan Hasanov, had sharp exchanges over the friendly relations 
of Iran with Armenia and of Azerbaijan with Israel during Velayeti’s visit to Baku in 
March of 1996.166    
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C.        AZERBAIJANI-TURKISH RELATIONS 
Relations with Turkey are good but far from being satisfactory for Azerbaijan. 
Turkey has historic, linguistic, and cultural ties to Azerbaijan, and Turkey was the first 
state to recognize Azerbaijan on November 9, 1991, before the formal dissolution of the 
Soviet Union on December 8th. Diplomatic relations between the two countries was 
established on January 14,1992. Recognition resulted as much from Turkey’s domestic 
politics, where Turkic pride was ascendant, as from foreign policy considerations, as well 
as economic, commercial, and cultural ties.167 Azerbaijan’s first post-communist leader, 
Ebulfaz Elchibey, focused on Turkey as the major conductor of the Western model in the 
region. He also established a priority of improving relations with Turkey as Azerbaijan’s 
foreign policy  
A coup in 1993 created a change of leadership in Azerbaijan. This coup was 
regarded in Turkey as a Russian-sponsored attempt to replace the pro-Turkish Abulfez 
Elchibey with Heydar Aliyev. Most people in Turkey considered Aliyev a Russian tool, 
considering his past in the Soviet Union as a Politburo member and a devoted 
communist. For some months after Aliyev took power, a certain cooling in Azerbaijani-
Turkish relations occured. Heydar Aliyev initially tilted heavily toward Moscow, joining 
the CIS in September 1993 with the hope of swaying Russia to the Azeri side in the 
Karabagh issue. He cancelled the international oil deal signed by Elchibey, reducing 
Turkey’s shares while increasing those of Russia and allotting some to Iran. 168 However, 
Aliyev realized the intransigence of the regional powers in the conflict regarding 
Azerbaijan. He also failed to elicit either Russian or Iranian support in his struggle to 
isolate Armenia and to force it to a solution without compromising Azerbaijan’s 
independence and territorial integrity.  
The continuation of the conflict benefited both Russia and Iran for several 
reasons. For Russia, the conflict was forming a convenient hotspot for Russian 
involvement in the region. It was ensuring a Russian presence, as Armenia was willing to 
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accommodate Russian troops as long as these troops ensured security for Armenia. In an 
environment in which its service was no longer needed, Russia would face the risk of 
losing its only willing foothold in the region against perceived Turkish infiltration. For 
Iran, a weak and divided Azerbaijan under the poised risk of continuing warfare and 
ensuing difficulties would ensure Iran’s territorial integrity. This would discourage its 
sizable ethnic Azeri population from seeking to unite with Azerbaijan. 
 As a result, geopolitical and basic security considerations brought Azerbaijan and 
Turkey back together. Azerbaijan realized that Turkey was the only country from which 
Azerbaijan could possibly gain support in the conflict against Armenia. However, 
Turkish support was not enough for Azerbaijan, considering the active Russian support 
for the Armenians during the conflict. Turkey’s efforts to adopt an impartial stance in the 
Karabagh issue until 1993 especially frustrated the Azeris. Turkey’s permitting the 
humanitarian aids to pass to Armenia through Turkish airspace was especially 
disappointing for the Azeris. According to Le Pauw:  
Azeri disappointment was highly acute when, in the summer of 1993, the 
Armenians launched highly successful attacks against their positions in 
Southern Azerbaijan. Throughout the winter, Turkey had opened its 
borders to humanitarian aid, which provided Armenia with energy 
supplies-part of which seemed to have been used for military purposes. In 
the eyes of many Azerbaijanis, this dealt a strong blow to Turkish 
credibility and prestige.169 
 
Another Azeri disappointment came when Armenian forces captured Kelbajar in 
April of 1993. Unable to evacuate the Azeri civilians from the area, Azerbaijan President 
Elchibey asked for Turkish helicopters. Turkish Prime Minister Demirel outright refused 
the request for fear that it could draw Ankara into the conflict and into confrontation with 
Russia.170 However, Ankara did suspend relief flights to Yerevan by closing its airspace 
to such flights.171  In 1993, the Turkish media reported that some retired Turkish military 
officers were training the Azeri army and that Turkey had extended a $30 million credit 
to Azerbaijan. However, these steps fell short of Azerbaijan’s expectations. There were 
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several reasons for Turkey’s reluctance to commit itself wholly to a conflict that could  
lead to unknown outcomes. The primary reasons were as follows:   
Turkey’s Reluctance to Antagonize Russia: This played an important role in the 
Turkish restraint. Turkey has traditionally perceived Russia as an expansionist state. 
Russia had relentlessly pursued a policy of expelling the Ottoman Turks from Crimea, the 
Balkans, the Circassian coast (today’s Abkhazia), and other parts of the Caucasus 
(including Batum, Akhiska, etc.) Russia had also raised the banner of Christian 
Orthodoxy against Turkish and Muslim rule in these lands. This Russian policy resulted 
in the massacres and the ultimate evictions of the Muslim populations from these 
mentioned areas toward Anatolia.172 The two countries fought nine wars since the time of 
Peter the First. This fact alone suggests that relations comprise an element of enmity, 
rivalry and confrontation. 173 Turkey is home to about five million Turks of Crimean 
Tatar origin whose ancestors escaped to Turkey during the peak years of the Russian 
repression. 174 Another five million Turkish citizens are the descendants of North 
Caucasian peoples who were forced out of their lands by Tsarist Russia in the 19th 
century. 175 Tsar Nicholas’s 1853 appeal to England to carve up “The Sick Man of 
Europe” once and for all has not been forgotten by the Turkish people.176 Russia also 
ultimately sought to capture Istanbul, the capital city of the Ottoman Empire, and the 
Turkish straits in the past. The outcome of the Russian expansionism affected the ethnic 
composition of modern-day Turkey, and had a vast impact on Turkey’s territorial and 
sociological evolution. This, in turn, made Turkey suspicious and cautious of Russia.  As 
a result, considering its relative weakness in comparison to Russia and the unfavorable 
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history of the hostilities, Turkey chose to restrain its policies, if not its rhetoric. The 
concern of being excluded by its reluctant NATO/Western allies, in case of a 
confrontation with Russia, also restrained Turkey.  
Profitable Commercial Relations with the Russian Federation: This was another 
restraining factor. Russian trade was an important source of revenue for the Turkish 
economy and aided its economic growth. In 1992, when the possibility of Turkish 
involvement in the conflict emerged, the total volume of trade between the two countries 
ranged between $3 to $4 billion, five times larger than Turkey’s trade with Azerbaijan 
and the Central Asian States combined.177 Including the non-registered trade, the volume 
of trade between the two countries placed both countries in the second position in their 
respective overall (for Russia, non-CIS) foreign trade. Turkish firms had penetrated the 
large Russian market and a considerable Turkish investment was in question. In 1995 
alone, trade with Russia amounted to $ 3.3 billion (excluding unofficial trade which was 
reportedly equal to the official trade). Over one million Russian tourists were visiting 
Turkey each year. The total volume of the official trade with all of the Turkic Former 
Soviet Republics amounted to only $650 million, showing the importance of the Russian 
market.178  Russia was also a source of procurement for weaponry needed to sustain the 
struggle against the PKK terrorism within Turkey. Given Western arms embargoes and 
limitations at the time against Turkey, Russia was seen as another source to circumvent 
western limitations in supplying much-needed essential equipment like helicopters, 
armed personnel carriers, small arms and ammunition. As a result, Turkey’s commercial 
interests in Russia and the risk of jeopardizing profitable trade links restrained the 
Turkish policy in the conflict. In addition, Turkey’s own internal problems at the time 
and a   weak economy to back up a more assertive foreign policy were limiting Turkish 
options. 
Russian Threats: These threats, including nuclear ones, also had a sobering effect 
on Turkish desires to intervene. After Armenian forces captured Kelbajar and attacked 
Fizuli, the risk of a Turkish intervention increased and Turkey massed troops on the 
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Armenian border in April 1993.  Then, Commander- in-Chief of the joint armed forces of 
the CIS, Marshal Shaposhnikov, warned of a “Third World War” if Turkey were to 
interfere militarily in the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict.”179 David S. Yost reminds the 
nuclear dimension:  
Turkish efforts to gain influence in Islamic areas of the former Soviet 
Union alarmed Russia enough for it to take countermeasures in 1992-93: 
Russia began to amass forces and leverage to become the sole and decisive 
arbiter of the Nagorno-Karabakh war and to defeat Turkey’s grand designs 
. . . Moscow aided insurgents against an anti-Moscow Azeri government, 
supported the Armenian forces fighting Azerbaijan, and deterred, by 
nuclear threats, any Turkish plans to act on behalf of Baku . . . Such 
reports of vague nuclear threats against Turkey by Russian military 
officers or civilian officials have gained little public attention in the 
West.180 
 
A Highly Effective and Influential Armenian Diaspora in Europe and the U.S: 
This was another Turkish concern. Armenians’ highly effective propaganda methods had 
worked effectively until then to promote Armenian claims, regardless of the nature of 
truth.  These groups could manage to pressure Turkey through their governments and 
they could threaten to further undermine Turkish credibility and prestige in Western 
countries. 
Turkey’s Ties with NATO as a Restraining Factor: In addition, Turkey’s 
dependence on western capital, technological and military support practically ruled out a 
Turkish policy to outright antagonize these western powers that were positively 
predisposed toward Armenia. 
Traditional Kemalist Foreign Policy: This policy cautioned against foreign 
adventurism. This cautious approach to outside events had been formed after 
experiencing the painful collapse of the Ottoman Turkey owing to their adventurous Pan-
Turkish rulers at the time. 
The Perceived Hostility of the Western and Other Regional Powers: Turkey was 
cautious of provoking negative reactions from these powers. The Turkish perception that 
western powers constituting the international community were not sympathetic toward 
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Turkey restricted Turkish involvement. This hostility was evidenced by the reactions 
against the Turkey’s intervention in Cyprus in 1974. Turkey had intervened in Cyprus to 
stop an ethnic cleansing perpetrated by the Greek majority against the Turkish minority. 
Turkey had a guarantor status to protect the Turkish minority on the island, as afforded 
by Zurich and London Treaties, in 1956 and 1958 respectively. In addition, the radical 
Greeks had attempted to annex the island to Greece, as a flagrant violation of 
international agreements signed to create an independent Cyprus. A military junta was 
governing Greece, which was sponsoring the social unrests in the Cyprus at the time. 
Turkey was, conversely, the staunchest ally of the U.S at the time, compared to Greece.  
Despite all these facts and the legitimacy of the ensuing Turkish intervention to stop the 
ethnic cleansing in Cyprus, Western powers (including the U.S) reacted sharply against 
Turkish intervention. This western reaction gave Turks the perception that Western 
powers were biased in cases involving a Christian and a Muslim state, however justified 
the Muslim side could be. 
These multiple factors were highly influential in molding Turkish attitude on this 
conflict. Nevertheless, there were some benefits of the Turkish connection to Azerbaijan. 
Turkey supported the position and actions of Azerbaijan in Nagorno-Karabagh conflict. It 
offered diplomatic and political assistance to Azerbaijan in United Nations, in the Islamic 
Conference Organization, in NATO and at the meetings of the OSCE Minsk Group, 
accompanying but not participating in the dispute. Turkey supported, facilitated, and 
secured Azerbaijan contacts with the United States and other western powers by using 
their interest in the Caspian oil.181  
D.        AZERBAIJANI-U.S RELATIONS 
Relations with the United States are complicated and in its current form, not 
satisfactory for Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan sees improved relations with the U.S as leverage 
against Russia and its ally in the region, Armenia. Azerbaijan seeks to improve western 
involvement in Azerbaijan commercially and politically.  Baku believes that US 
objectives in the region will promote political and economic independence and ensure 
that Caspian oil does not come under the sole control of Russia. Moreover, Azerbaijan’s 
ability to survive as an independent state and to build democratic institutions will largely 
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depend upon the western presence in Azerbaijan. 182 Actually, Leila Aliyeva, an Azeri 
scholar, summarizes the motives behind Azerbaijan’s western orientation.  She contends 
that President Aliyev preferred a balanced foreign policy, which was the only means of 
survival for an independent and weak state surrounded by countries with strong and 
opposing interests. Aliyev developed relations with the West based on an awareness of 
realpolitik with regard to the west and the United States: 
The example of the Gulf War and the determination of the U.S to protect 
its economic interests, regardless of the level of democracy in the country 
concerned, demonstrated clearly the motivation of the West toward its 
more active concern and involvement in the events in the region.183 
 
 However, the nature of the relations between the U.S and Azerbaijan are not in 
conformity with Azerbaijan’s desires.  Thomas and Schull describe the U.S policy toward 
Azerbaijan:  
Washington has two foreign policies toward the region, one pro-Azeri, the 
other anti-Azeri. The pro-Azeri belongs to the administration, which 
listens to the oil companies. The anti-Azeri belongs to Congress, which 
listens to the Armenian lobby.184  
 
This conflicting U. S approach evolved shortly after the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union in 1991 when American interests in the region were perceived to be very low. The 
oil companies were much more interested in the region than the U.S. government, which 
tended to see the newly independent states as a Russian sphere of influence. The U.S. 
government had many other concerns with Moscow (regarding the fate of the Soviet 
nuclear arsenal, the possibility of a resurgence of communism, etc.) As a result, the U.S 
administration did not want to risk Russian cooperation on key issues by challenging 
Russia's influence in the region. For this reason, Washington did not desire a leadership 
role in settling the Karabagh conflict, despite the active U.S. role in conflicts in other 
parts of the world, such as Iraq, Somalia, Bosnia, and later on in Kosova. Because the 
Caucasus was perceived as unimportant for vital U.S interests, Armenian-Americans 
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influenced the indifferent U.S administration and the Congress over the policies in the 
region, especially regarding the Armenia and inevitably the Azerbaijan. The U.S 
government was not actively seeking an impartial role in solving this conflict. Congress 
was left to the influence of lobbyists and as a result, Section 907 of the Freedom Support 
Act was introduced in the fall of 1992. This act was initially intended to facilitate 
economic and humanitarian aid to the former republics of the Soviet Union, hoping it 
would help stabilize democratic forms of government and foster economic growth. All 15 
former Soviet Republics were eligible for assistance with the exception of Azerbaijan. 
The Armenian government has received more than $1 billion in aid under this legislation 
since 1992 while Azerbaijan received none (except the subsequent $80 million released 
by the Clinton administration.)185 The clause restricting aid to Azerbaijan reads as 
follows:  
United States assistance under this or any other Act . . . may not be 
provided to the Government of Azerbaijan until the President determines, 
and so reports to the Congress that the Government of Azerbaijan is taking 
demonstrable steps to cease all blockades and other offensive uses of force 
against Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh186  
 
Azerbaijan widely criticized the outcome of this act. Azerbaijan claimed that the 
Armenians were the aggressors in the conflict, but Azerbaijan was punished instead by 
this act. Armenia had occupied almost 20 percent of Azerbaijani territory and had 
displaced one million Azerbaijani refugees. These refugees were still homeless, but 
Washington, due to this Section 907 adopted under the influence of an ethnic lobby, 
could not send humanitarian aid to Baku. The freedom support act was perceived to 
reward the aggressor not the victim. Subsequent U.S administrations opposed the section 
907 because it impeded the ability of the U.S to pursue its goals in the region. This act 
also impeded the U.S to act as an honest broker in the Karabagh Conflict, considering the 
fact that the U.S was one of the three co-chairs of the Minsk group that was supposed to 
resolve the conflict. Some modifications to the Freedom Support Act, Section 907, were 
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made during the Clinton administration in 1996.187 Under the current form of the act, it is 
now possible for the United States to provide Azerbaijan direct government-to-
government assistance as humanitarian aid and in democracy building. The U.S Trade 
and Development Agency, the Eximbank, and similar institutions can also operate in 
Azerbaijan. 188  The United States provided a total of $80 million aid to Azerbaijan since 
its independence. By contrast, Armenia received over a billion dollars, although its 
population is roughly one-half that of Azerbaijan. 189 The Armenian lobby successfully 
blocked the Azeri attempts to have this act waived altogether in the U.S Congress during 
the Clinton administration.   
E.        CONCLUSIONS 
Azerbaijan has enjoyed economic and political stability only after the election of 
Heydar Aliyev, a former KGB general and Politburo member, owing to his Soviet-style 
skills of authority. However, Aliyev is almost 80 years old and suffers from heart disease. 
Azerbaijan does not have state experience or an institutionalized succession mechanism 
coupled with a democratic tradition. There are already allegations about irregularities in 
previous elections held so far (the 1995 and 2000 parliamentary elections, and the 1998 
presidential election.) These elections supposedly gave Aliyev and his political party the 
majority of the votes in the parliament.190 Azerbaijan’s geopolitical position also exposes 
it to foreign meddling in the process of succession. Two neighboring countries, Russia 
and Iran, have their own puppet president candidates lurking in wait for the inevitable 
power struggle to engulf the succession process after Aliyev. Considering the fact that 
two former presidents (Ayaz Muttalibov and Ebulfez Elchibey) were toppled by force 
and that Aliyev himself survived several coup attempts, Aliyev’s passing away may 
cause serious civil disarrays in the country. Heydar Aliyev is also among the few current 
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Azeri politicians who openly expressed his resolve to solve the Karabagh conflict through 
peaceful means. A radical change in Azerbaijani leadership may cause major shifts in 
regional security, exploitation of region’s oil reserves, and the emerging constellation of 
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V. OIL AND PIPELINE ISSUES  
This chapter examines the effects of the proposed oil pipelines to be built to 
transport the Caspian oil. This oil will be extracted in Azerbaijan under an agreement 
concluded in November 1994 between the Azerbaijani government and foreign oil 
companies.  The possible pipeline routes to be chosen to transport this oil is a matter of 
fierce competition between the parties involved in oil production.  
To better evaluate the effects of the Caspian oil on the Karabagh Conflict, some 
background information on the Caspian region and its mineral resources will be helpful. 
The Caspian basin contains large deposits of oil and natural gas that attract the attention 
of international oil companies and their governments. The region has already received 
foreign investments to exploit its mineral wealth. As a result, the Caspian region is likely 
to be an arena for regional powers competing with each other to secure a portion of the 
oil revenues in a perceived new “great game” with its zero-sum character. This increased 
interest and investment of Western companies in the region can potentially affect the 
Karabagh conflict and Turkey’s role in the Caucasus region. 
The Caspian region is a land- locked area. Therefore, pipelines are needed to 
transport the oil to international markets. Two pipeline routes have already been chosen 
for the early oil. Azerbaijan is currently using these routes even before the completion of 
investment projects. However, the main element of the competition is the route to be 
chosen for the main export pipeline, which will be used in transporting the oil after the 
investment projects have been completed and the capacity to extract the oil has been 
dramatically increased.  The main pipeline routes under consideration are 
· Baku-Novorossiysk (Russia) via Turkish Straits 
· Baku-Novorossiysk (Russia) in connection with Burgaz (Bulgaria)-
Alexandropolis (Greece) pipeline  (transcending the Straits) 
· Baku-Supsa (Georgia) via the Turkish Straits 
· Baku-Batumi (Georgia) via the Turkish Straits 
· Baku-Ceyhan (Turkey) avoiding the Turkish Straits 
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Currently, Baku-Novorossiysk (via the Straits) and the Baku-Supsa lines are used 
to transport the early oil. An investment of $50 million for the Baku-Novorossiysk line191 
and $250 million for the Baku-Supsa line192 was spend to overhaul these pipelines. These 
two routes have a combined capacity of 200,000 b/d, which is insufficient to carry the oil 
after all the major oil exploitation projects are completed. These two lines were built to 
carry the initial volumes of oil to the world markets.193 A main pipeline, capable of 
carrying one million b/d, would be needed to transport the oil after the completion of all 
the major projects.194 The strongest contenders for the main export route are the Baku-
Novorossiysk and the Baku-Ceyhan lines. The Baku-Novorossiysk line is economically 
more competitive compared to the Ceyhan route and is supported by Russia. Its cost is 
estimated around $2.2 billion without considering a proposed Burgaz-Alexandropolis 
detour line, which would cost between extra $700 million to $1.43 billion. 195  
The Baku-Ceyhan line is the other likely contender, with strong U.S and Turkish 
support behind it. The Turkish government puts the estimated cost at around $2.4 billion, 
but independent sources contend that the cost would probably exceed $3 billion. 196 After 
some basic engineering studies conducted in May of 2001, the estimated cost was revised 
to approximately 2.9 billion. 197 The U.S, Turkey, Azerbaijan, and even Kazakhstan favor 
this route for various reasons that will be elaborated later in this chapter.198 However, the 
cost of the project is its main disadvantage.  
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Figure 4.   Pipeline Routes 
 
A.        RUSSIA’S ROLE IN THE CASPIAN REGION 
As mentioned earlier, Russia considers the region in its own sphere of influence. 
Numerous allegations of Russian involvement in the coup attempts and separatist 
movements in the region are evidence to that desire.199 Russia fears that a southern route 
(namely the Baku-Ceyhan route that would not pass through Russian territory) would 
decrease its influence in the South Caucasian states. As these states gain their economic 
independence and as western companies get increasingly involved, Russia fears it will 
eventually lose its remaining influence over the region.  
Any route that detours Russian territory would also deprive Russia of transit fees. 
Transit fees are important for Russia as hard currency because its economy is in disarray 
and direct foreign investments are in sharp decline. Another less articulated Russian 
concern is that the appropriation of the mineral wealth would not benefit its only willing 
ally in the region, namely Armenia. Armenia naturally supports the Baku-Novorossiysk 
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route for fear that Azerbaijan could use its mineral wealth to improve its military without 
Russian control (a northern pipeline through Russia’s territory).  
Despite Russia’s desire to pass the pipelines through its territory, Russia seemed 
to lack consistency over the pipeline issues. The Russian stance in the issue was a matter 
of controversy between the business interests and the Russian foreign ministry. After the 
signing of the agreement between Azerbaijan and the foreign oil companies (the largest 
one being British), the Russian Foreign Ministry rejected that agreement as invalid. 
Russians claimed that Baku had no right to conclude an agreement unless the riparian 
states agreed and Russia approved the status of the Caspian Sea. Russia sent a diplomatic 
demarche to Great Britain, stating that any oil agreements about the exploitation of 
Caspian oil could not be recognized without Russian approval. However, Russia’s largest 
oil company, Lukoil, participated in the agreement between Azerbaijan and the foreign 
oil companies, while the Russian Energy Minister attended the signing ceremony. Lukoil, 
as part of the oil consortium to develop the Azeri oil, took a ten percent share in the 
deal.200  
The Russian demarche to Great Britain stated that:  
The Caspian Sea is an enclosed water reservoir with a single ecosystem 
and represents an object of joint use within whose boundaries all issues or 
activities including resource development have to be resolved with the 
participation of all the Caspian countries . . . any unilateral actions are 
devoid of a legal basis.201  
 
             The address of the letter to London, instead of Baku, could well be taken as a 
Russian dis regard of Azerbaijan’s independence and sovereignty, by dismissing 
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B.        LEGAL STATUS OF THE CASPIAN SEA 
 
 The Russian attempts to challenge the legal status of the region can be regarded 
as part of the “carrot-stick diplomacy.”  Russia’s goal was to be included in the projects 
that it was initially excluded from by using rewards and punishments accordingly. Given 
the results Russia achieved, it can be claimed that the Russian diplomacy worked 
successfully. With the demarche sent to Great Britain and then sent to the United Nations 
General Assembly, Russia continued denying the “sea” classification of the Caspian. 
Russia claimed that the Caspian was an enclosed sea reservoir,202 specifically a lake, 
which should be exploited equally. According to the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of 
the Sea (which became effective in November 1994),203 countries bordering a sea have 
the legitimate right to claim sovereignty within 12 miles of the sea from the coast. These 
countries are also entitled to exploit resources economically within an extra 200 miles 
starting from the end of its territorial waters (a total of 212 miles). If a body of water is 
not a sea, then it is by default considered a lake. According to the Convention on the Law 
of the Sea, the riparian states bordering a lake should exploit the lake’s resources 
collectively.204  
However, this convention neither defined a sea nor a lake.  This lack of clarity on 
definitions is the main disagreement between the Caspian states. Russia claimed that 
according to agreements it struck with Iran in 1921 and in 1940, the Caspian was 
considered a lake and an internal water basin of these two countries. Accordingly, foreign 
navies had to be excluded from the Caspian and its fishing resources had to be equally 
shared. Russia put forth this agreement on exploiting fishing rights equally and excluding 
foreign navies, and it had claimed since 1991 that foreign oil companies could not 
develop the Caspian oil without the consent of all the Caspian states. Furthermore, 
according to Russia, the agreement with Iran mandated that these oil resources had to be 
shared equally.205  
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Countries that would lose most from the Russian interpretation, Azerbaijan and 
Kazakhstan, objected to these Russian claims. They maintained that the Caspian was an 
enclosed sea and had to be divided to national sectors accordingly. They contended that 
Russia itself did not conform to the claimed agreement, and that it engaged in unilateral 
oil production without giving Iran a share in it or asking for Iranian permission. 
Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan also claimed that the division of the Soviet part of the 
Caspian by the former USSR Oil Industry Ministry should be taken as a legal precedent. 
Since 1975, the Soviet Republics of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan were 
drilling for oil in their own parts of the Caspian, which the Soviet Oil Ministry divided 
between them until the Union collapsed.206  
 
Figure 5.    Caspian Sea 
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Russia modified its initial stance on the status issue in November of 1996 at a 
meeting between the foreign ministers of the states bordering the Caspian. This time, 
Russia proposed that it would recognize a 45-mile economic zone of littoral states from 
the shore and would be willing to negotiate, on a case-by-case basis, the status of the oil 
fields currently developed off that 45-mile limit. All the remaining deposits would be 
regarded as common and would be developed jointly by a commonly owned company. 
On the same day of the proposal, Iranian, Turkmen and Russian ministers signed a 
declaration supporting this new proposal, but Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan rejected the 
proposal.  
Turkmenistan changed its position on the legal status of Caspian several times. It 
supported the Kazakh-Azeri position against the Russian-Iranian proposal in February 
1997, when it signed a statement with Kazakhstan calling for dividing the Caspian 
according to national sectors. Turkmenistan also signed a similar statement with 
Azerbaijan in 1998, but these two states could not agree on the dividing line between 
their respective national zones. Consequently, they now have overlapping sovereignty 
claims on an oil field named “Kyapaz” by the Azeris and “Serdar” by the Turkmens.207 
Azerbaijan also has a similar dispute with Iran. However, Russia and Kazakhstan has 
signed an agreement in July 1998, dividing the northern Caspian seabed between 
themselves along the median lines with joint fishing, shipping and environmental 
ownership rights.208 The final solution on the legal status of the Caspian, which would be 
acceptable to all of the riparian states, is yet to be seen. 
C.        IRAN’S ROLE IN THE CASPIAN REGION 
Iran opposed the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline route rather than support the Baku-
Novorossiysk line directly because it expected the pipelines to traverse its own territory. 
The Iranian motive for opposing the Baku-Ceyhan route was to restrict the U.S presence 
and to restrict the increasing Turkish influence in the region. Iran initially wanted to 
participate in the oil projects. After Azerbaijani President Aliyev adopted a more 
inclusive attitude and his predecessor, Elchibey, toppled, Iran was eager to cooperate in 
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the Caspian region, anticipating economic benefits. Aliyev promised to transfer five 
percent of Azerbaijan’s share in the AIOC (Azerbaijan International Operating Company) 
to Iran, but the United States blocked this move. After this experience, Iran turned hostile 
to the foreigner exploitation of oil and repeatedly denounced the western presence in the 
region. Iran also used an increasingly threatening tone toward Azerbaijan after Iran’s 
exclusion from the AIOC.  
Iran, accordingly, sided with Russia on the legal status of the Caspian Sea and 
insisted that the Caspian should be regarded as a lake with collective exploitation rights 
for the littoral states. Iran claimed that the Soviet-Iranian agreements of 1921 and 1940 
were valid, and further claimed that all littoral states had to be asked for approval on 
current oil projects until the final status was agreed upon. Iran’s foreign minister said, 
after the exclusion of Iran from the corporate oil company (AIOC), that the Caspian 
States had not decided on a legal framework to tap the region’s energy resources, and as a 
result, the agreement recently concluded was invalid.209  
Azerbaijan then attempted to appease Iran by including it into other oil projects 
not developed by the AIOC.210  Nevertheless, this did not suffice to soothe Iranian 
resentments over exploiting the Caspian reserves. For instance, disagreements between 
Iran and Azerbaijan over the ownership of two oil fields flared up in July 2001 when an 
Iranian gunboat and a military aircraft chased two Azeri research vessels hired by a 
British oil firm from oil fields, which both sides claimed.211 
D.        TURKISH/U.S POSITION IN THE REGION 
Turkey and the U.S prefer a southern route for the pipelines. The main 
considerations for such a choice are to help consolidate the independencies of the 
Southern Caucasian States and to curb Russian influence in the region.  Encouraging a 
western orientation and containing religious fundamentalism in the area are other goals. 
A southern pipeline route would increase Turkish influence not only in the South 
Caucasian states but also in the Central Asian Turkic Republics. Instead of a pipeline 
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passing through a possibly resurgent Russia, a southern pipeline through Turkey (a 
NATO member) would enable the safe transportation of oil to the world markets.  
Turkey has various reasons to support the Baku-Ceyhan route. Turkey wants to 
increase its ties with Central Asian Turkic States and Azerbaijan by creating a concrete 
link. Turkey also wants to decrease the dependence of Turkic states on Russia for energy 
supplies. Another Turkish aim is to provide for its own increasing energy demands by 
diversifying its sources through the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline. Gaining hard currency from 
transit fees and preventing increased sea traffic in already over-burdened Turkish Straits 
are also Turkish goals. Other less articulated motives are to compensate for the losses 
Turkey suffered due to its closed pipeline with Iraq and to retain Turkey’s importance as 
an energy corridor in the Western camp.  
In the early 1990s, the U.S was rather tentative about becoming involved in the 
Caspian region for fear of antagonizing Russia. The U.S tacitly accepted the Russian 
position in the Caucasus for fear that increased tensions with Moscow would provoke 
Russia into resurgence and would jeopardize cooperation on critical issues, such as 
nuclear nonproliferation. Nevertheless, as tension grew with the NATO enlargement, the 
U.S assumed a more active role in the region. Madeleine Albright announced in 
September of 1994 that the U.S did not recognize Russia’s special role in the 
Caucasus.212 The U.S also applied pressure to rule out a possible oil pipeline route 
through Iranian territory for obvious reasons and in turn supported the Baku-Ceyhan 
pipeline route.  
E.        OIL RESERVES AND AGREEMENTS IN THE CASPIAN REGION 
Proven oil reserves in the Caspian region are 16 to 32 billion barrels and possible 
reserves are estimated around 162 billion barrels (a quarter of the total middle-eastern oil 
reserves). The region also contains huge amounts of natural gas (236 to 337 trillion cubic 
feet proven and another 300 trillion possible.)213 Most of these reserves have not been 
exploited so far.  
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There are, however, problems over the ownership of some areas that contain 
hydrocarbon reserves. There are still ongoing disagreements, for example, between 
Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan over the ownership of two out of three oil sites, which were 
included in oil exploitation agreements concluded between Azerbaijan and the Western 
oil companies.214  
In September 1994, the Azerbaijan state oil company SOCAR and ten foreign oil 
companies signed an $8 billion agreement, known as the deal of the century, 215 to 
develop the Azeri, Chirag, and Guneshli fields. These three oil fields were believed to 
contain 3.7 to 5 billion barrels of oil.216 A consortium named the AIOC (Azerbaijan 
International Operating Company) was formed to exploit these fields for thirty years, 
with an estimated $80 billion oil revenue, 80 percent of which would belong to the 
Azerbaijan. Current shares in the consortium are  
· AMOCO (US) 17.01%; PENNZOIL (US) 9.8%; UNOCAL (US) 9.52%; EXXON 
(US) 5%; MCDERMOTT (US) 2.45%; 
· BP (UK) 17.12 %; RAMCO (UK) 2.08%; STATOIL (Norway) 8.56%; 
· SOCAR (Azerbaijan) 10%; TPAO (Turkey) 6.75%;   
· LUKOIL (Russia) 10%; DELTA (Saudi Arabia) 1.68%;   
Originally, SOCAR was to hold a 20 percent ownership in the AIOC, but later 
transferred its five percent shares to the Turkish TPAO and American EXXON.217 
Azerbaijan also concluded some other contracts concerning the development of its oil 
resources. In May of 1996, Azerbaijan concluded a $ 1.2 billion contract for developing 
the Karabagh oil field, which was believed to contain 900 million barrels of oil. With the 
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contract, the CIOC (Caspian International Operating Company) was formed. Its shares 
were  
· LUKAGIP (LUKOIL/AGIP joint venture, Russia/Italy) 50%; 
· LUKOIL (Russia) 7.5%; AGIP (Italy) 5%; 
· PENNZOIL (US) 30%; SOCAR (Azerbaijan) 7.5%; 
In June of 1996, another US$ 4 billion contract was signed to develop the Shah 
Deniz fields, which were believed to contain 1.8 billion barrels of oil. The shares of this 
consortium were  
· LUCOIL (Russia) 10%; National Iranian Oil Company (Iran) 10%; 
· BP (UK) 25%; STATOIL (Norway) 25.5%; ELF (France) 10%;  
· SOCAR (Azerbaijan) 10%; TPAO (Turkey) 10%; 
In December of 1996, another contract worth $1.5 billion was signed to develop 
150 million tons of oil and 50 billion cubic meters of gas in Dan Ulduzu and Ashrafi 
fields for a 25-year period. Shares for the contract were  
· AMOCO (US) 30%; UNOCAL (US) 25.5%; ITOCHU (Japan) 20%; 4.5%; 
· SOCAR (Azerbaijan) 20%; DELTA (Saudi Arabia);  
Lastly in January 1997, a 30-year, $2 billion project to develop 100 million tons 
of oil was signed. Companies taking part were  
· ELF Aquitiane (France) 40%; DEMINEX (Germany) 10%; 
·  PETROFINA (Belgium) 5%; OIEC (Iran) 10%; 
F.         BAKU-CEYHAN ROUTE AND TURKISH VIEWS 
 
As stated previously, when the fields mentioned above are developed to their full 
capacity, a main pipeline route will be needed to transport the oil to world markets. 
Currently, the Baku-Ceyhan route has the advantage owing to U.S support. In May 1998, 
former U.S energy secretary, Federico Pena, reiterated the U.S support for the Baku-
Ceyhan route during a visit to Turkey in October of 1998. Presidents of Azerbaijan, 
Georgia, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan signed the Ankara Declaration, supporting the 
Baku-Ceyhan route.  
In August of 1999, officials from Turkey, Azerbaijan, and AIOC representatives 
announced that they would begin a new round of talks on the pipeline project. In April of 
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1999, Turkish and Azerbaijani officials and U.S special advisor for Caspian Energy 
(Richard Morningstar) signed the Istanbul protocol to accelerate talks on the pipeline.218 
In November of 1999, at the Istanbul OSCE summit, presidents of Turkey, Azerbaijan, 
and Georgia   signed an agreement in the presence of U.S President Bill Clinton, 
supporting the Baku-Ceyhan route. Nevertheless, all these were political maneuvers and 
the AIOC would choose the main export route according to various criteria, in which cost 
was a serious consideration. The Baku-Ceyhan route is more costly compared to the 
Novorossiysk route, but it also has its own advantages. Turkish arguments supporting the 
Baku-Ceyhan are as follows:219 
· Turkey itself needs oil and can buy a considerable percentage of the oil that 
would flow through the pipeline. Oil provides nearly half of Turkey’s energy needs.  
Turkey consumes 30 million tons of oil each year and this figure is expected to increase 
to 40 million by the year 2010. Approximately, 90 percent of the oil Turkey consumes is 
imported from abroad (mainly from the Gulf states and Russia.) Primarily the Baku-
Ceyhan line could meet increasing Turkish demand and Turkey could purchase the oil in 
hard currency. 
· Turkey is ready to negotiate the financing of the pipeline if necessary. Turkey 
believes that the pipeline is financially competitive. Nevertheless, Turkey proposes to 
cover the overrun, if the project exceeds the anticipated cost.220  
· Turkey is offering the lowest transmission fees compared to the other routes. 
Currently, the Caspian Pipeline Consortium of Russia (CPC) is charging $3.25 per barrel 
to transport Kazakh oil to the Russian Black Sea port of Novorossiysk. If Azeri oil is 
included in that proposed pipeline, the price is expected to increase. In addition, because 
Novorossiysk is not an international market, crude oil tankers are expected to add an 
extra $1 to $1.50 fee.  221 Iran’s route, although ruled out under US pressure, was 
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expected to ask for a $3.67 transportation fee for the pipeline to be feasible. The Turkish 
government estimates that Turkey can offer a fee below $3.25 without losing money.222  
· Turkey guarantees the operational safety of the pipeline and is ready to 
compensate if the pipelines are harmed. There is no real danger to the pipeline within 
Turkish territory. Turkey’s own oil production is realized in Southeast Anatolia, which 
was deemed unsafe by the opponents of the Baku-Ceyhan line because there were armed 
clashes between the Turkish security forces and the separatist Kurdish terrorists in the 
area. Turkish security forces heavily curtailed the activities of the terrorists in Southeast 
Anatolia recently and the region is peaceful.   In any case, pipeline route circumvents that 
area. Contrarily, Baku-Novorossiysk route passes through the Chechen territory, which 
naturally raises concerns.  
· The Ceyhan port on the Mediterranean coast has a much greater capacity to 
store oil than the Russian port on the Black Sea. Currently, Ceyhan has a capacity of 2.4 
million b/d, which can accommodate both the Caspian crude oil and a possible 
resumption of Iraqi oil, for which it was built.223  
· The Ceyhan port is open to ship traffic all year long owing to its mild weather, 
contrary to the Russian port, which is subject to closures in the wintertime. 
· Ceyhan is the cheapest port to access Europe and the West, and is the closest 
port to international oil markets such as Genoa and Rotterdam    
· The Baku-Ceyhan route circumvents the Turkish straits, which doubtfully can 
accommodate increased tanker traffic if the Baku-Novorossiysk route is chosen. 
G.        TURKISH STRAITS AND RELATED ECOLOGICAL AND SAFETY 
CONCERNS 
Turkey’s concerns about the ecological and safety consequences of increased 
naval traffic in the straits constitute the core of Turkey’s argument for opposing the 
Baku-Novorossiysk route, and so these concerns deserve more elaboration. Bosphorus, 
literally the size of a river, is one of the world’s most difficult straits to navigate. It is 30 
km long and only 700 meters wide at its narrowest point with three 45-degree turns. In 
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addition, approximately 600,000 small boats operate in the straits. About 1.5 million 
people in 1,300 boats cross the straits twice a day.  
Oil tanker tonnage increased four hundred percent in the Turkish Straits since the 
signing of the Montreux Convention that stipulates free passage to all sea traffic. While 
the number of ships crossing the straits was only 115 a year in 1936, it is now around 
50,000.224 According to Turkey, if the Baku-Novorossiysk route were chosen for the 
main pipeline, around 1,200 super tankers would be necessary for the transfer of oil 
through the straits. That many tankers would close the straits to traffic for 300 days of the 
year.225  
Increased traffic has already caused numerous accidents and oil spills, which 
created serious environmental hazards. In 1979, for instance, a collision between a 
Romanian and Greek tanker spilled 95,000 tons of oil into the straits and burned for 
weeks. In 1991, a Lebanese ship, carrying 20,000 live sheep, struck a bridge and sank, 
dispersing its cargo all around Marmara, causing serious health risks.226 In 1994, a Greek 
Cypriot tanker collided with another ship, killing 30 seamen and spilling 20,000 tons of 
oil in the Bosphorus. Fire, caused by the spilled oil, raged for five days and closed the 
straits to traffic for a week. If this accident had occurred a few miles to the south, Istanbul 
itself would have faced a major urban disaster.227 In August of 1998, a Greek tanker ran 
aground and in October of the same year, a Turkish oil tanker collided with another 
Tanker carrying water.228 Moreover, in December 1999, a Russian tanker carrying 4,300 
tons of oil fuel ran aground and sank in Marmara, closing the mouth of the straits and 
heavily polluting a six-mile stretch of coastline.  
Pollution resulting from shipping in the Bosphorus has stopped migration of 
marine life through the straits and has caused the fishing levels to drop to 1/60 of their 
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former levels.229 Super tankers, loaded with tons of fuel and passing through a city of ten 
million inhabitants is considered a serious danger for the safety of Turkish citizens. 
Turkish public officials articulate this fact in every instance. Turkish Environment 
Minister, Imren Aykut, for instance, stated that, “No country has the right to endanger the 
lives of 10 million people just because it wants to sell oil.”230 Turkish Foreign Minister 
Ismail Cem also stated in 1998 that: 
We warn those who are contemplating such a calculation that they will 
face serious difficulties in transporting not only existing oil shipments but 
also future ones through the Turkish Straits starting in the year 1999. To 
this end, Turkey will start implementing all possible means afforded by 
international law as well as its own legislation . . . I would suggest that 
companies who are in a position to transport their Caspian oil via the 
Baku-Ceyhan pipeline or through the Black Sea and Turkish Straits to take 
the above-mentioned facts into consideration. Turkey has both a right and 
the determination to take all necessary measures to protect the ecological 
system as well as the historic and cultural environment of the Turkish 
Straits.231 
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Figure 6.   The Bosphorus 
 
 In accordance with the International Maritime Organization (IMO), Turkey 
introduced some regulatory restrictions in July 1994.232 These restrictions, which went 
into effect in November 1994, intend to ensure safe passage for the tanker traffic through 
the straits.233 Russia considered Turkey’s adoption of these new regulations restricting 
the tanker traffic through the straits as an attempt to reduce the appeal of the Russian 
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pipeline route. Russia protested the newly introduced measures because they violated the 




Figure 7.   Proposed Pipelines Detours Circumventing the Bosphorus 
 
Russia, meanwhile, tried to offset the Turkey’s Straits trump card by introducing a 
new (290 km) pipeline project from the Bulgarian Black Sea port of Burgaz to Greek 
Aegean port of Alexandrapolis that would circumvent the Bosphorus. As stated before, 
the main advantage of the Novorossiysk line is its cost. This new detour pipeline would 
add $700 million to $1.43 billion and decrease the Novorossiysk line’s 
competitiveness.234 In addition, the loading and unloading processes generate more 
concerns about this detour route’s feasibility for the oil companies that would invest in 
the project. Nevertheless, this new proposed detour, if realized, would have serious 
consequences for Turkey’s role in the region, and to some extent, its global stance. 
According to Stephan Blank, an expert on the Caucasus region,  
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This project would avoid Turkish restrictions on the Black Sea and wholly bypass 
Turkey as a player in Transcaucasian energy, striking at Ankara’s vital interests there and 
in the Balkans. It also helps consolidate a Greco-Russian, and perhaps Bulgarian bloc 
against Turkey and its efforts to play a leading regional role in Southeast Europe through 
the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Zone.235  
H.        ARMENIAN VIEWS ON CASPIAN OIL AND ITS EFFECTS ON THE 
KARABAGH CONFLICT 
Armenians are uneasy about the Caspian energy and the pipelines. They are 
concerned that Azerbaijan may use its future oil wealth to change the balance of power in 
its favor, strengthen its military power, and regain the Karabagh and other occupied Azeri 
lands by force. Former Armenian President, Petrossian, shared these concerns. He also 
wanted to stop the isolation and economic blockade of Armenia, to decrease the serious 
economic hardships at home, to move closer to the west and to become free of Russia’s 
grip. In light of all these concerns, Petrossian adopted a peaceful solution to the problem 
contrary to the Dashnaks and Diaspora Armenians. The current hardliner government 
rejects the argument that oil would change the balance of power in favor of Azerbaijan. 
The Kocharian government and some fanatics in the Armenian Diaspora have differing 
ideas about the impact of the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline on the Karabagh issue. Some of their 
ideas are as follows:  
· Baku-Ceyhan Pipeline, which Azerbaijan sees as a tool for independence from 
Russian dominance, is costly and not viable compared to a pipeline through Russian 
territory. Russia is an Armenian ally and would use the pipelines to pressure Azerbaijan 
into stopping a possible attack. 
· Although the Caspian basin was promoted as the second Persian Gulf, the oil 
reserves in the Caspian Basin are grossly inflated. These reserves possess far less oil than 
the Persian Gulf reserves.  “Potential, possible, probable, and proven reserves” were not 
differentiated and not all the reserves were recoverable. At a time of the low oil prices, 
the high cost of transporting the Caspian oil through the Baku-Ceyhan line was another 
shortcoming. This high cost was considered to restrict Azerbaijan from using the oil 
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wealth to the utmost extent.236 Moreover, it was argued that even if the potential oil were 
exploited to the limit, Azeri oil would be depleted in 30 years.  
· Armenians articulated another argument, that the property rights in the Caspian 
were not clearly defined. These rights were a matter of controversy. Eighteen oil fields in 
the Caspian region were disputed. Two out of the three oil fields that were to be 
developed by AIOC, namely the Azeri and Chirac oil fields, belonged to Turkmenistan. 
Turkmenistan allegedly owned these two oil fields even if the sectarian division of the 
Caspian, which was favored by Azerbaijan in the demarcation, was applied.237  
· Even if the legal problems were solved and the fields were developed as planned, 
the profits from the oil would not show benefits in Azerbaijan in the short term. 
Considering the extent of corruption in Azerbaijan, the elites and some clans would 
probably pocket large part of the oil money. The oil could also be a curse as well as a 
cure, as was evidenced in Nigeria, in which the appropriation of the oil money increased 
corruption and caused social unrest and civil war. These possibilities should not have 
been ruled out for Azerbaijan. 238 
· Even in case the oil wealth strengthened the Azeri position and upset the current 
balance of power in Azerbaijan’s favor, Azerbaijan was unlikely to attack Karabagh and 
Armenia. Considering Azeri dependence on oil money to sustain such a move, oil 
companies would have a greater influence on the Azeri administration. These oil 
companies, anxious about their profits in an unstable environment, would pressure 
Azerbaijan not to start hostilities. Even if the Azeris disregarded the pressures from the 
oil companies in the beginning, they would have to succumb to pressure if the fighting 
took a protracted character, which would be quite likely considering the rugged and 
mountainous terrain and the tenacious defense anticipated from the Karabakh Armenians. 
In case of a renewed war, the oil flows would probably cease because Armenians would 
be willing to attack the pipelines to cripple the Azeri economy. 
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· Armenia had a strong and influential Diaspora in the U.S and France that would 
most likely pressure Azerbaijan, which lack a Diaspora or a strong foreign support, to 
stop hostilities. The efficiency of the Diaspora was evidenced when they convinced the 
U.S administration to implement an embargo against Azerbaijan. The Armenian lobbies 
succeeded despite the fact that Armenians themselves had attacked and defeated 
Azerbaijan. For this aggression, Armenia was rewarded with the largest per capita U.S 
aid in the world after Israel.239  
· Armenia also enjoyed strong ties with Russia, which had supplied Armenia with 
large numbers of weaponry free of charge. Contrary to Azerbaijan, which strongly 
refused to let Russian soldiers on its soil, Armenians accommodated Russian bases and a 
twelve-thousand-strong Russian contingent in Armenia. Russians were training and 
equipping the Armenian Army. Russia would not sacrifice its only ally in South Caucasus 
and would probably supply Armenia with arms and, if necessary, would intervene 
militarily. Azerbaijan, however, seemingly lacked that kind of support considering 
Turkey’s very limited assistance during the first war for reasons mentioned earlier. The 
genocide allegation campaigns by Armenian lobbies in the U.S and Europe had already 
neutralized Turkey. 
· The Armenian hardliners used another argument to alleviate Armenian concerns 
about a possible Azeri resurgence was the fact that Armenia (and Karabagh) was 
strategically located to undermine the flow of oil. As Melcon Melconian put it:  
Reliability of oil supplies to world markets is the single most important 
consideration in oil companies . . . Oil pipeline routes supported by the 
West [Baku-Ceyhan route is implied] are within Armenia’s gaze. In as 
much as this strategic juxtaposition may convey a threatening aspect, it 
puts Armenia in a strong negotiating position to guarantee the security of 
the pipeline routes.240 
   
· Armenians also recognize the inherent weaknesses of the Azeris. These 
weaknesses include the lack of ethnic cohesion; minorities that could be manipulated 
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against the central government; and the ailing health of the current president, Aliyev. 
Azerbaijan President Aliyev established the current stability in Azerbaijan. Considering 
the lack of democratic or institutionalized succession mechanisms in Azerbaijan, 
Aliyev’s death would spark social disorder over the succession of political authority. 
I.         CONCLUSIONS 
The Baku-Ceyhan route seems to have the upper hand in the competition to 
transfer the Caspian oil and gas to the world markets. The Turkish Energy Minister, for 
example, said that Azeri oil would reach the world markets by 2005 through the Baku-
Ceyhan line.241 However, this line is also vulnerable to security risks and instability. To 
make the Baku-Ceyhan route a reality, much stability is needed in the region, which is 
ridden with civil strife, ethnic violence, and wars. A radical change in the leadership of 
Azerbaijan or Georgia would seriously jeopardize the chances of the Baku-Ceyhan 
Pipeline project itself. The personal charismas of Azerbaijani President Aliyev and 
Georgian President Shevardnadze have stabilized the region so far. Their replacement 
with outright Russian puppets or people who merely prefer closer ties with Russia would 
seriously jeopardize the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline project. 
Because of the Karabagh conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia, the Baku-
Ceyhan pipeline must make a detour from Armenia through Georgian territory. This 
detour adds an extra $500 million to the cost for a project that is already a vast economic 
challenge. Azerbaijan offered to pass the pipeline through Armenian territory in exchange 
for the return of occupied Azeri territories to Azerbaijan and for the return of around one 
million Azeri refugees to their homes.242  Moderate Armenian president Petrossian 
welcomed the offer and this opened discussions between the Armenian elites. In a press 
conference, the Armenian president declared publicly that Karabagh independence was 
unrealistic and that a stalemate could not last indefinitely. He added that the Armenian 
public had to be ready for compromise and that there would be no improvement in their 
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lives and their standard of living until a settlement was reached over the Karabagh. He 
further said, the Armenian people  
should be bold enough to face up to the fact and make everyone aware that 
we will never live well until the Karabagh conflict is settled and the 
blockade of Armenia lifted.243 
   
The governing elites in Armenia and fanatics in Diaspora accused Petrossian of 
“selling out” Karabagh. 244 Therefore, he was forced to resign and the hardliners assumed 
power in Armenia.245 The new Armenian President, Robert Kocharian, after securing 
power, declared that the Armenians would not betray Karabagh for a so-called peace 
pipeline offer. Mediation efforts are still proceeding between Azerbaijan and Armenia 
with little tangible results so far. Instability and a lack of consensus on security issues in 
the region pose a threat to the prospect of peacefully exploiting mineral wealth. 
Skirmishes erupt on the border zone of Azerbaijan and Karabagh, with the possibility of 
expanding to a full- fledged war at any time. As Emil Danielyan put it:  
The prospect of renewed hostilities cannot be encouraging for Western 
nations mindful of the future multi-billion-dollar oil contracts signed with 
Azerbaijan and other Caspian nations. What is projected to be the main 
pipeline transporting Azerbaijani oil to world markets passes less than 
50km (30 miles) from the Karabagh frontline.246  
 
Former advisor to Azeri President, Eldar Namazov, also stated that Armenia had 
made use of political instability and disarray in Azerbaijan to occupy Azeri territories and 
to banish the Azeri population from their homes.  Such instability was quite likely in the 
event of the death of the current President Aliyev. Namazov further stated that he 
believed Armenia’s and Russia’s military complexes were planning to use the possible 
instability in Azerbaijan. For instance, a possible Armenian thrust toward the Yevlekh 
district in Northwest Azerbaijan would cut communications and pipeline routes between 
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Azerbaijan and Georgia and bring the Western companies and Azerbaijan itself into a 
hopeless situation. 247 Prominent experts on the region share Namazov’s concerns.248 
Such a move by Armenians or an Azerbaijani attack to regain its territories runs 
the risk of spinning out of control very easily. Considering the oil stakes in the region, a 
renewed war could drag other regional states into the conflict. A resurgence of the 
violence should be avoided through a permanent solution on the issue. Unless the 
stability is restored, developing the Caspian mineral resources would not be a cure but 
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VI.      CONCUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A.        EFFECTS OF KARABAGH CONFLICT ON TURKEY’S ROLE IN THE 
REGION 
With the collapse of the Soviet Union, Turkey had high hopes for actively 
influencing the Caucasus. The political situation at the time increased these expectations.  
After the Cold War, European interest in Turkey decreased as soon as the Soviet threat 
disappeared. Now that Turkey was not needed for European Security, Turkey’s European 
allies started to criticize Turkey about human rights issues and about Turkey’s struggle 
for its territorial integrity. That kind of treatment disillusioned Turkey. As Laurent 
Ruseckas said: 
This sense of insecurity was compounded by the decision of the European 
Community to reject flatly Turkey’s application for membership in 1989. 
Although this decision did not come as a great surprise to the Turkish 
political elite, it did seem to confirm their fears that Europe was closing 
the door on Turkey now that its Cold War security contribution was no 
longer needed.249 
This disillusionment with Europe encouraged Turkey to consider reorienting its 
foreign policy toward the Caucasus and Central Asia and to foster good relations with the 
Turkic World. In this new orientation, Turkey immediately became interested in the 
Caucasus region for several reasons: 
· The Caucasus formed a natural corridor between the Turkic Central Asian 
States and Turkey (virtually a bridge to Turkic Central Asia).  
· The area was strategically important as a possible hedge between an 
untrustworthy Russia and Turkey.  
· Azerbaijan was ethnically and linguistically closest to Turkey. In fact, Turkey 
and Azerbaijan had a history of cooperation during the last years of the Ottoman Empire. 
As a result, compared to Turkey’s other ethnic cousins, who were culturally, 
linguistically, and geographically more distant, Azerbaijan was Turkey’s immediate 
choice for partnership. Also a politically active and organized pro-Turkish movement was 
to assume office in Azerbaijan eventually.  
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· Azerbaijan was also known to contain large deposits of oil, on which Turkey 
was completely dependent.  
These factors were more than enough to make the Caucasus, specifically 
Azerbaijan, Turkey’s first priority. Turkey also saw the collapse of the Soviet Union as a 
chance to reconcile its differences with Armenia and to maintain a normal relationship. 
The Armenian Diaspora communities had strong and well-organized lobbies in Europe 
and especially in the U.S. These lobbies were effectively collaborating with other anti-
Turkish ethnic lobbies against almost anything relating to Turkey in the U.S Congress 
and in other forums. These lobbies were engaged in active “genocide” propaganda. 
Terrorists who felt ethnically affiliated with Armenia assassinated Turkish diplomats and 
their family members in 1970s and 80s. Turkey considered an improved relationship and 
reconciliation with Armenia as a way to stem anti-Turkish agitation and propaganda that 
these expatriate community groups conducted. An improved relationship might also 
facilitate Armenia abandoning territorial claims in Eastern Turkey. Some circles in 
Armenia and in the Diaspora had been articulating these territorial claims even during the 
Soviet era.  
Armenia’s geographical location was another reason for Turkey to improve 
relations with Armenia. Crafted skillfully by Tsarist and Soviet Russian policies, 
Armenia blocked Turkey’s direct connection with Azerbaijan. Turkey borders the Azeri 
province of Nakhcivan, on which Turkey had a guarantor status, according to the Soviet-
Turkish Treaty of 1921. A railroad through Armenian territory linked Nakhcivan to 
mainland Azerbaijan. The viability of this connection with Azerbaijan was left to the 
mercy of Armenians. As mentioned earlier, in April 1991, The Turkish Ambassador in 
Moscow visited Armenia. During his visit, the Turkish Ambassador arranged drafts of a 
treaty of friendship with the Armenian government, together with an agreement to initiate 
direct cross-border trade and the opening of a highway between the two countries.250  
Turkey was interested in turning the entire Caucasus into a peaceful cooperative 
zone so that it could have unhindered access to Central Asia. Turkey’s other goal was to 
stabilize economic development in the region (particularly the oil development in the 
Caspian). However, events would not unfold as Turkey hoped. When the Karabagh 
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conflict erupted between Armenia and Azerbaijan, Turkey had to choose between these 
two states. Turkey was obliged to balance between avoiding Armenia’s alienation and 
losing Azerbaijan altogether. Azerbaijan, in those critical moments, was vacillating 
between a Russian, Iranian and Turkish orientation. After an outright Armenian 
aggression on Azeri territories outside Karabagh, public outrage exploded in Turkey. As 
a result, following an initial hesitation, Turkey was forced to side with Azerbaijan.  Even 
generally cautious Turkish politicians had to support Azerbaijan despite the international 
community’s predominant sympathy for Armenia. Cornell describes the dominant 
inclination in the international community at the time: 
The world attitudes were from the start heavily tilted toward Armenia, 
very much because of the successful lobbying efforts of Armenians in the 
United States and France, in particular, who had succeeded in depicting 
the conflict since its inception in 1988 as a new genocidal attack on the 
Armenian people.251  
 
The Turkish government could not disregard public outrage and the criticism of 
the opposing political parties. Turkey eventually closed the border with Armenia and 
participated in the trade embargo Azerbaijan imposed on Armenia. Turkey also refused 
diplomatic contact with Armenia until the Armenian forces withdrew from occupied 
Azeri territories and a solution suitable to Azerbaijan was found. Turkish foreign policy 
priorities were set as follows: 
· Support Azerbaijan’s Independence 
· Support Azerbaijan’s sovereignty over the Nagorno Karabagh 
· Prevent or limit Russia’s return to South Caucasus. 
· Participate in the Azerbaijani oil production and the export of significant amounts 
of this oil through Turkey (the Baku-Ceyhan Pipeline project was foreseen as the 
main export route for Azerbaijani oil) 
· Preserve a friendly, though not necessarily pan-Turkist, government in Baku.252 
Nevertheless, Turkey always fell short of truly committing itself to the Azeri 
cause despite a strong public desire for active Turkish support. The Turkish government 
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was widely criticized within Turkey for its inefficiency and caution in handling the crisis. 
However, this criticism did not change Turkish policy. Since the reasons for Turkish 
caution in the Karabagh conflict were explained in Chapter V, this present chapter will 
discuss the effects of Turkey’s inability to play a decisive role in the conflict.  
The Turkish failure in the Karabagh conflict and Turkey’s hesitation in the face of 
Russian threats were seen as weakness. This perceived weakness put the Turkish 
capability to play an assertive role in the region in doubt. Turkey’s failure to keep a 
friendly and strongly pro-Turkish Elchibey regime in power against a coup (allegedly 
supported and plotted by Russia) sealed this perception of Turkey’s weakness in the 
region and in general. The Karabagh and the subsequent Elchibey experience also led 
Turkish policy makers to realize the inhe rent shortcomings of their country in 
formulating its policies.  
The conflict in Nagorno Karabagh at an early stage shattered the illusions 
of certain policy makers about the capabilities of their country with regard 
to its relations with its lost cousins of the Caucasus and the Central Asia. 
Indeed, as if subjected to a cold shower, the Turks, which had not done so, 
realized the complexity of their country’s relations with the U.S, Western 
Europe, Russia, and the Middle East, and the constraints upon it that 
prevented Turkey from pursuing a truly independent policy in the 
region.253 
 
 This realization ended the illusions of the Turkish policy makers. It also brought 
about moderation in rhetoric and policies. Mentioning a Turkic world extending from the 
Adriatic Sea to the Great Wall of China was not taken seriously after these experiences. 
These limits of Turkey’s capabilities eroded the nation’s prestige, and it prompted a more 
realistic image of Russia’s role.  
After this Turkish failure, the Central Asian and Caucasian States saw Russia’s 
capabilities clearly. Russia was the only game in town, so these Turkic states modified 
their policies accordingly. Russia’s ability to meddle and plot coups in their interests to 
topple unfriendly regimes was a sobering reminder to these Turkic states in Central Asia 
and in the Caucasus. Turkey, obviously, lacked the resources and capabilities to replace 
Russia.  
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Because Turkey aligned with Azerbaijan—however limited this alignment might 
have been—Armenia aligned itself with Russia. Then, owing to the tactless policies of 
the Elchibey government, Armenia aligned with Iran. As a result, Turkey experienced the 
return of Russian troops in Armenia, facing Turkey. Then a perceived hostile 
constellation, which Turkey tried to avoid, solidified. Turkey’s failure to reconcile with 
Armenia also led to anti-Turkish agitation and harassment by Armenian Diaspora lobbies.  
Especially after the Armenian hardliners took office following the forced resignation of 
Petrossian, the so-called “Armenian genocide” resolutions began to appear in Western 
parliaments in a coordinated fashion.  
Because of all these outcomes, Turkey could not have altered this situation. With 
the Soviet Union’s collapse, Turkey tried vigorously to reconcile with Armenia, to avoid 
a Russian return, and to create a stable region ripe for commerce and free of all the 
spillover effects of ethno-political violence.  Nevertheless, the war in Karabagh and 
resulting wide-scale suffering of Azerbaijani civilians led to a public outcry. Dismissing 
this public reaction would have been too risky politically for any Turkish government.  
Clearly, failing to support Azerbaijan, although limited, in that situation would 
have eroded Turkish prestige even further. Turkish credibility would have almost totally 
disappeared in the eyes of Azerbaijan and the other Turkic Central Asian States. 
Fortunately, Turkey’s loss of prestige remained somewhat manageable due to active 
Turkish political and economic support for Azerbaijan. Politically, Turkey used its 
western ties in the international arena, and Turkey imposed an economic embargo on 
Armenia, along with Azerbaijan. The absence of these measures would have most 
probably alienated Azerbaijan completely. This would have meant an end to the Turkish 
role in the Caucasus and in the recent economic developments. 
As a result, claiming that the Karabagh conflict took Turkey’s Caucasus policy 
hostage from the start is fair. Events, which Turkey could hardly have had any choice or 
say in it, shaped the current situation. Consequently, this influx of events deteriorated 
Turkey’s prestige and its role in the region by exposing the complexity of Turkey’s 
situation and its inherent weaknesses.  
Lastly, the oil issues and the exploitation of Caspian mineral wealth, instead of 
helping to solve the Karabagh conflict and to contribute to regional welfare and stability, 
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further complicated the situation. The oil related issues polarized the region with 
implications for a broader conflict than anticipated. Armenia, Russia, and Iran 
consolidated their ranks while Azerbaijan sought assistance to offset that constellation 
with Turkey, the U.S and other western powers by encouraging those powers to invest in 
the region. Solving the Karabagh issue bears great importance to exploit the Caspian 
mineral wealth and for regional and global stability. However, with all the regional actors 
seeking benefits from the oil pie, solving the problem became more politicized.  
B.        FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS AND ANAYSIS 
The current status quo should not be expected to last forever. Hostilities might 
resume at any time, depending on the pace of events, the attitude of the leaderships, and 
the perceptions of the actors.  
Azerbaijan is not in a position to defend itself militarily in case of an armed 
Armenian attack. Their demoralized and ill-trained army, which lacks sufficient 
armaments, holds little prospects against the well- trained, motivated and generously-
equipped Armenian and Karabagh Armies, which Armenians’ historic ally, Russia, 
backs.  The Azerbaijan Army lacks, most importantly, a professional officers corps, 
owing to the Soviet “nationality policies,” which informally discouraged Azeris, among 
other Muslim peoples, from joining the Soviet officer corps.254  
Resumption of the hostilities risks carrying the fighting deep into unoccupied 
Azeri territories, including the pipeline routes and junctions. Realistically assessing their 
own capabilities, the Azerbaijanis are currently trying to resolve the problem 
diplomatically. A diplomatic solution, however, is proving more difficult after the 
hardliners headed by current Armenian President Robert Kocharian took over the 
Armenian government. The predicament of the refugees is a great concern for the 
Azerbaijan government. The Azerbaijan leadership is increasingly pressed to resolve the 
conflict as soon as possible, but without compromising Azerbaijan’s sovereignty. Public 
opinion in Azerbaijan favors settling the problem militarily.  
Azerbaijan has made it clear that, although preferring a peaceful 
settlement, it will consider military options should a settlement not be 
forthcoming. Given the close and competitive involvement of Turkey, 
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Iran, and Russia in the region, this would risk a wider and potentially 
disastrous war.255  
 
Different scenarios may develop in the future, depending on the pace of events 
and the perception of the actors. Azerbaijan, for example, may prefer to strengthen its 
military power with the anticipated oil money and try to solve the problem with a military 
campaign to rega in its lost territories. Depending on the course of the events, such a 
move could spillover, igniting new conflicts in the region. Armenians currently feel that 
the flow of oil could upset the region’s current status quo and the balance of power. If the 
Karabakh Armenians and Armenia, on the other hand, get clear signals that Azerbaijan 
would use the oil money to strengthen its Army and to regain Karabagh and other 
occupied Azeri lands by force, then the Armenians might opt to launch a preemptive 
attack. Such an attack into the Azeri territory would most probably intend to capture 
pipeline routes and to compel Azerbaijan to accept a permanent agreement. Walker also 
foresees such a scenario: 
Both the U.S and Russian oil and gas companies were committing huge 
sums of money to the development of these resources, and renewed 
fighting over Karabakh seemed likely to sabotage investment projects and 
complicate plans to build the pipelines needed to bring the Caspian’s 
energy reserves to market. Renewed fighting might even lead to a full 
blown showdown between Azerbaijan and Armenia (Armenia’s 
involvement in the fighting during 1992-94 had been substantial but 
covert), in which case Karabakh and Armenian forces might carry the war 
even deeper into Azerbaijani territory, threatening Ghandzha 
(Azerbaijan’s second largest city which lies only 30-40 km to the north of 
the line of contact) or even Baku. Nor could attacks by Armenian and 
Karabakh forces on Azeri oil production facilities and pipelines be ruled 
out.256 
 
Although Russia does not have a unified stance in the Caucasus, considering the 
disagreements between the Russian oil companies and the Russian government, such an 
                                                 
255 Kevin (Abdul Khadir) Miller, “Aze rbaijan Will Never Put up with Armenian Occupation of 
Karabagh-Aliyev,” BBC Monitoring Service, UK, August 26,2001, source: Interfax News Agency, 
Moscow, in English 1237 gmt August 26,2001; MacFarlene, S.Neil and Minear, Larry “The Nagorno-
Karabakh Time Bo mb,” (www.reliefweb.int) 
256 Walker, Edward W. “ No Peace, No War in the Caucasus” (wwwc.Cc. Columbia .edu/sec/ dlc/ 




Armenian move would likely be with Russian support, either open or concealed. Given 
Russia’s proclivity to meddle in the region to regain its influence, such support is not 
farfetched. This is especially likely in case Russia was completely alienated or felt that it 
was losing its influence altogether in the Caucasus. Naturally, such a move would create 
risky complications, involving other regional powers.  
The resurgence of hostilities, whether by Azerbaijan, which may be eager to use 
its oil riches to correct injustices or by Armenia, which may want to preempt before the 
Azeris gain advantage, could really spin out of control and create unanticipated results.  
Reactions from the regional powers in such a case gain importance in determining the 
possible repercussions. Especially at a time when Turkey’s EU prospects are getting 
dimmer, Turkey, for example, may not remain impartial, as it did in the first war. An 
unequivocal exclusion from the European Union enlargement, for example, would free 
Turkey from some of its self- inflicted constraints that it had adopted when it sought a 
secure place in the Western camp.  Seeking new prospects, including the pipeline issues, 
Turkey could choose to become involved in a possible Azeri-Armenian conflict more 
directly.  
 Armenians, on their part, have a Friendship and Cooperation agreement with the 
Russian Federation against third party interventions. Russia’s mindset is not much 
different from Turkey’s. Russia altered its initial western orientation and is currently 
trying to reassert its position in the Caucasus and Central Asia against new powers, one 
of which is Turkey. Even though the Russian-Western relations seemingly took a more 
conciliatory character following the terrorist attacks in the U.S on September 11, the 
future of the Russian-Western relations is yet to be seen 
Russia holds the key to solving the problem. It can exert pressure on Armenia to 
conform to a peaceful solution according to UN resolutions or the Lisbon Summit 
decisions, which the Minsk Group countries, including Russia, supported.257 
Nevertheless, the continuation of the conflict currently benefits Russia because 
continuing conflict serves as leverage against Azerbaijan, which adopts a pro-Western 
policy and refuses to welcome Russian troops. The conflict constitutes a pretext for a 
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Russian military presence in the region. The conflict also serves as a possible future 
trump card against the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline. 
The Karabakh conflict, if not resolved peacefully, has a potential to undermine the 
regional stability, investment and the safe flow of oil to the world markets, as mentioned 
earlier. In the light of current developments elaborated previously, a permanent peaceful 
solution seems unlikely. 
C.        RECOMMENDATIONS 
Contain Armenia: Turkey’s strained relations with Armenia have shaped Turkey’s 
role in the region so far. In Turkey, overcoming the animosity of the past and forming 
working relations with Armenia are generally considered useful. As a result of Ter 
Petrossian’s moderate rhetoric and policies, a softening of the relations between Turkey 
and Armenia seemed imminent. On the other hand, Kocharian government’s overtly anti-
Turkish foreign policy in conjunction with the unleashed Diaspora efforts to organize 
campaigns of genocide allegations in foreign capitals did not give the Turkish leadership 
much choice. Consequently, subsequent Turkish governments declared that improving 
the relations with Armenia was conditional on Armenians’ withdrawal from the occupied 
Azeri territories, on revoking their claims to Turkish territory, and on ending their 
blockade of Nakhcivan.  
Views about the course of current Turkish-Armenian relations differ in Turkey. 
For some, Turkey in a sense became prisoner of its relations with Azerbaijan that held 
back Turkish-Armenian relations. Accordingly, hinging relations with Armenians on 
solving the Karabagh conflict and withdrawing of Armenian forces from Azerbaijani 
territory is a mistake. Since Armenia has no economic or diplomatic ties with Turkey, 
Armenia lacks any meaningful incentives to maintain decent relations with Turkey. As a 
result, Armenia provokes Turkey by sponsoring anti-Turkish resolutions in western 
parliaments, because Turkish-Armenian relations are currently nonexistent. Therefore, 
Armenia loses nothing by maintaining a hostile attitude. However, trade relations and the 
development of Turkish trade in Armenia would encourage the Armenian leadership to 
moderate its policies toward Turkey. Turkish-Greek relationship even in the presence of 
the Cyprus problem, for example, could be a model for relations between Turkey and 
Armenia.  
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Beyond the above points, Turkey’s increased relations with Armenians would 
also facilitate relations with the United States, where influential Armenian lobbyist 
groups, who cooperate with other anti-Turkish lobbies, effectively influence the U.S 
congress and block arms sales, military hardware and technology transfers. Nevertheless, 
Turkey had to bring about this policy change delicately so as not to alienate Azerbaijan, 
which is vital for a Turkish role in the region. Prompted by these arguments, there are 
some attempts to improve relations by forming dialogue through a council formed of 
prominent members of each community.  
A dialogue between the Turks and the Armenians is potentially useful. Discussing 
their common history, which both sides perceive differently, would be helpful. However, 
in today’s world, the norm is to live in the present, not in the past, either real or imagined.  
Unfortunately though, living in the present is rare in Armenia.   Turkey's policy toward 
Armenia over the last decade has been based on the reality of Armenia’s occupation of 
Azerbaijani territory and the deportation of one million people from their homes, not on 
past animosities. Without any changes in Armenian policy, which would convince 
Turkey of Armenia’s goodwill, Turkey should not change it s policy of cutting diplomatic 
and trade relations with Armenia.  This policy of ceasing cooperation with an aggressor is 
in line with international law, as Turkey implemented during the Gulf War against Iraqi 
aggression against its neighbor, Kuwait.  
Turkey naturally feels that it must change Armenia’s hostile image of Turkey. 
However, beginning a dialogue with the Armenians at a time when Armenia’s 
negotiating with Azerbaijan is becoming increasingly uncompromising might be 
perceived erroneously. Turkey should not create a perception that ethnic cleansing and 
military aggression is acceptable for improving relations. Such behavior cannot be 
condoned. 
In addition, the wave of various parliamentary "genocide resolutions" pushed by 
the Armenians resulted in a perception that Turkey’s arguments regarding the “genocide” 
issue were weakening. By forming a Turkish-Armenian reconciliation commission, for 
example, as described in Chapter IV, Turkey seems to appease the Armenians at such a 
time. By doing so, Turkey justifies Armenian extremism and acknowledges Turkey’s 
susceptibility to pressure. Such concessions only open the doors for further and even 
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stronger pressures. These concessions might also open Pandora’s box of past grievances, 
with which every nation in the region, especially Turkey, is replete. Yet, unlike most 
nations, Turkey is not preoccupied with its past grievances.  
Although normalizing relations with Armenia, as an instrument of encouraging 
and rewarding it for moving toward peace is desirable, this move risks being interpreted 
as rewarding the hard-liners in Armenia and Diaspora. These groups believe that they can 
achieve their goals by putting pressure on Turkey without compromising with 
Azerbaijan.   So Turkey should pressure Armenia until the Armenians agree to reconcile 
with their past and to form a working relationship, without the two nations necessarily 
agreeing to what really happened during the WW I.  
Armenians should admit that civilized states do not engage in ethnic cleansing in 
today’s modern world.  Until Armenia accepts civilized norms, Turkey’s dialogue with 
Armenia should be limited to how to end the aggression against Azerbaijan and 
Armenia’s territorial claims against its neighbors, including Turkey. Turkey should also 
convince Armenia to become an independent country, not a fortress of Russian military 
presence in the Caucasus. Armenia should act as a responsible state, not as an 
impoverished past-oriented society obsessed with militant ethnic expansionism.    
Improve Relations with Iran: As to other policies Turkey could use to improve 
stability in the region, Turkey could lure Iran from its alliance with Russia in regional 
affairs. Historically, Russia has been the greatest threat to Iran. Russia invaded the 
Caucasus region at the expense of Iran in the 19th century. The U.S policy of “dual 
containment” and the sense of isolation this policy created in turn caused a siege 
mentality in Iran and forced it to establish other relations to overcome its isolation. 
Russia, which was also recovering from its initial pro-Western illusions, was a natural 
choice for Iran. Turkish policy toward Iran has been in parallel with the US containment 
policy. Heeding Iran’s national interests and coming to a working compromise with Iran 
would facilitate a better understanding of the need to contain aggressive policies in the 
Caucasus.  
Turkey and Iran resolved their differences through various wars starting from 
1514 to the early 18th century. The Turkish-Iranian border stabilized after the 1639 Kasri 
Sirin accord between the Ottomans and the Iranian Safevi regime of the time. Wars with 
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Iran occurred in 1639, from 1723 to 1727, from 1730 to 1737, and from 1743 to 1746, 
but ultimately the frontiers, which the Kasri Sirin Treaty established, remained 
unchanged. Turkish-Iranian relations have been good for almost two centuries without 
any hostilities. The fact that no territorial claims exist between these two countries is a 
rather uncommon phenomenon in the region. However, this does not mean that no 
problems exist between these two countries. Iran’s alleged support for PKK terrorists, its 
alleged role in Islamic fundamentalist groups within Turkey and its efforts to export its 
revolution abroad to its neighbors in the wake of the 1979 Islamic revolution were the 
main irritants in Turkish-Iranian relations.  
As Iran began to feel the consequences of isolation more severely, Iran’s policies 
regarding its neighbors became more moderate. However, an unconcealed power struggle 
between the moderates and traditiona lists in Iranian politics still brews. Improving its 
relations with Iran in order to stabilize the Caucasus region is in Turkey’s interests. 
Improving Turkish-Iranian relations would create a compromise and would reduce the 
probability of a conflict. By increasing trade volume, Iran could be given alternative 
avenues to overcome its isolation. At the same time, active engagement could further 
accelerate Iran’s moderation.  
However, Turkey should not pursue this policy change with Iran by directly 
confronting the United States. In addition, increased relations with Iran should not 
jeopardize the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline project. The U.S support is vital for the Turkish 
proposed Baku-Ceyhan pipeline project, which was not economically competitive against 
a much shorter Iranian route. The U.S supported the Turkish project for political 
considerations, namely to restrict the Iranian and Russian roles in the region. Owing to 
this U.S support, the proposed Turkish route has currently gained the upper hand.  The 
U.S support is vital for Turkey’s role in the region. The U.S support for Turkey proved 
invaluable in giving credence to Turkey’s position on the pipelines against Iran and 
Russia after the poor Turkish performance during the Karabagh war. As a result, 
increased relations with Iran should not be at the expense of U.S support for Turkey in 
the region.  
The current natural gas deal with Iran to supply Turkey with $ 20 billion worth of 
natural gas over a period of 25 years is a good step toward interdependence. Turkey 
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would leverage such a gas deal against a cash-deprived Iran without constraining Turkish 
options. For example, in cases of emergency, Turkey could obtain its energy 
requirements from a variety of sources.258As Recknagel puts it: 
Commercially, Turkey and the Islamic Republic complement each other 
nicely. Turkey's industries are thriving, while Iran's are hard hit 
economically, creating a market for Turkish goods like refrigerators and 
cars. Moreover, Iran is energy-rich while Turkey must import almost all 
its oil and gas, creating a market for Iranian fuel.259 
 
Improve Relations with Russia: Russian role in the Caucasus should not be 
underestimated either. Russia proved to be the only force capable of actually affecting the 
course of events in the region. Russia has a long imperial past and the resulting cultural 
affinity with each South Caucasian state facilitates its involvement in the region. Russia’s 
willingness and capacity to meddle in the domestic affairs of these nations bolsters 
Russia’s importance in stabilizing the region.  
Numerous wars fought between the Ottoman, the Persian and the Russian 
Empires proved that taking a confrontational stance in the region was counterproductive. 
These wars caused endless misery, resentment and grievances for the peoples of the 
region. It is to everyone’s interest to engage Russia in a web of relations that would 
restrain unilateral and arbitrary moves. Turkey, being mostly the victim in these previous 
wars, should try to prevent the revival of past animosities and hostilities.   
Trade relations with Russia and Turkey should be brought to such a level that 
both countries would think twice before taking any steps to jeopardize these relations. 
The Blue Stream project that is planned to carry $13 billion worth of Russian natural gas 
to the Turkish market through a 1,200 km pipeline to be laid on the surface of the Black 
Sea is an example of such cooperation. 260 Russia also seeks to participate in arms deals to 
supply the Turkish Armed forces with weapons for its ambitious modernization projects.  
Turkey’s trade relations with Russia are in a far better position compared to trade 
volume with other former soviet states. Volume of the trade has already played a modest 
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role in constraining Turkish, and to some extent, Russian policies in the Karabagh 
conflict in 1993. Furthering trade relations and developing them to a level of mutual 
interdependence in economic affairs would help stabilize the region. The more the sides 
stand to lose in a conflict, the more they would restrain the ir hostile policies against each 
other. Fear of losing profitable commercial ties would expectantly moderate the policies 
of both countries. Undoubtedly, improved commercial relations are vital to the stability 
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